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AVERTISSEMENT 
 
Ce rapport de recherche s’inscrit dans le cadre du volet dit « recherche » du projet mobilisateur 
« Appui à l’élaboration des politiques foncières », financé par l’Agence française de 
développement, et mis en œuvre sous l’égide du Comité Technique « Foncier et développement » 
de la Coopération française.  
Ce volet « recherche » vise à approfondir les connaissances, à travers des travaux empiriques 
menés par des équipes de recherches du Nord et du Sud, sur deux thèmes : 
• Dynamiques et transactions foncières : formes concrètes des transactions, acteurs en jeu, 
modes de régulation, impact économique et social.  
• Les processus d’élaboration des politiques foncières : enjeux politiques et économiques, 
jeux d’acteurs, lobbies et négociations formelles et informelles, rôle effectif de la recherche et 
de l’expertise, etc. 
Les rapports issus de ces travaux sont disponibles sur le portail « Foncier et développement » : 
http://www.foncier-developpement.org/vie-des-reseaux/le-projet-appui-a-lelaboration-des-
politiques-foncieres/volet-recherche 
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RESUME 
 
En 2004, le parlement de l’Afrique du Sud a promulgué la Loi sur les droits fonciers 
communautaires (Communal land rights act, CLaRA) : cette loi a pour objectif de sécuriser la 
tenure foncière des communautés et des individus pour qui l’occupation foncière repose sur le 
droit coutumier ou des permis précaires (DLA, 2004, p. 4). La réforme de la politique foncière sur 
les terres coutumières en Afrique du Sud ne représentait pas seulement une priorité de l’agenda 
politique face aux nombreux défis qui se posent à la population rurale de ce pays. Elle établit 
également le cadre d’un nouveau régime de réformes institutionnelles affiché par le 
gouvernement, régime qui promeut la démocratisation de la vie publique à travers de nouvelles 
formes de gouvernance favorisant, entre autres, la transparence dans la prise de décision et la 
redevabilité des décideurs. A ce titre, CLaRA a été vantée par ses rédacteurs comme le texte de loi 
le plus participatif jamais produit par le Département des Affaires Foncières (DLA, 2004). 
Cependant, quelques mois après sa promulgation, la loi a fait l’objet d’un recours en anti-
constitutionnalité par un groupe de communautés, ce qui a eu pour conséquence d’en suspendre la 
mise en œuvre. Parmi les arguments avancés figurait le caractère non consultatif du processus de 
rédaction de la loi. Au-delà du jeu rhétorique, cette anecdote nous a semblé révélatrice de la 
nécessité d’explorer les processus participatifs d’élaboration de CLaRA, et d’interroger la nature 
de l’inclusion dont ces processus se réclament. 
Cette étude s’inscrit dans le cadre plus large d’une réflexion sur la rénovation des politiques 
publiques. Elle a pour objectif d’évaluer dans quelle mesure le cas de CLaRA représente une 
rupture dans les conditions d’élaboration des politiques publiques, à travers des processus 
participatifs, inclusifs et transparents, et ce aux différents échelons pertinents au regard de la 
décentralisation en vigueur en Afrique du Sud (local, provincial et national). Elle porte plus 
particulièrement sur les deux objets de recherche suivants : 
• le déroulement des différentes phases de négociations, de conception et de rédaction de 
CLaRA au niveau national 
• au niveau local, les positions des membres des communautés sur les questions de sécurité 
foncière et de gouvernance locale 
Le projet montre que le processus ne peut se réduire à un simple débat « propriété coutumière 
versus propriété privée ». Au-delà du régime des droits, le centre de gravité des controverses s’est 
porté sur d’autres questions, telles que la légitimité et le périmètre des prérogatives des autorités 
coutumières, les relations de pouvoir, les processus politiques, ainsi que les infrastructures et 
services publics. Le texte final de ClaRA est le résultat d’une longue phase de rédaction de 
versions successives portant la marque des différents acteurs engagés dans le processus. Quand 
bien même certains aspects du processus ont été critiqués ou remis en question par certains 
acteurs (concernant notamment l’ajout in extremis de modifications substantielles au projet de loi, 
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ou encore l’absence d’inclusion des membres des communautés au niveau local), le projet montre 
qu’on ne peut pas pour autant parler d’une absence de consultation ou de participation. Les 
multiples modifications apportées au texte tout au long du long processus de discussions, débats, 
consultations et lobbying, témoignent de l’engagement d’un large éventail d’acteurs (pouvoir 
politiques, administrations, autorités tribales, communauté académique, société civile) sur 
plusieurs aspects de la loi (entre autres : les pouvoirs des autorités tribales et du Ministre, le 
processus de consultation, la constitutionalité de la loi, les positionnements envers la propriété 
communale, les droits des femmes). 
L’étude conduit donc à nuancer les attaques portées contre le gouvernement au motif que le 
processus d’élaboration de la loi n’aurait pas été inclusif, ni même participatif. Elle montre plutôt 
la diversité des rôles et des niveaux d’influence exercés par différents types d’acteurs. Elle met 
notamment en évidence comment certains groupes n’ont pas été en mesure de faire valoir leurs 
positions afin de faire contrepoids face aux autorités traditionnelles et aux factions de l’ANCA 
quelques exceptions près, les membres des communautés locales n’ont pas assez pesé dans les 
débats politiques autour de ClaRA. Des groupes de recherche et des ONG ont certes participé 
activement aux débats, en faisant valoir qu’elles s’exprimaient au nom des communautés. 
Cependant, leur légitimité à ce titre a parfois été contestée au motif qu’elles n’avaient pas de 
mandat explicite de la base communautaire et que leur propre agenda politique, issu des luttes 
menées contre le précédent régime d’apartheid, ne coïncidait pas nécessairement avec la diversité 
des problématiques locales des communautés. 
L’étude montre par ailleurs qu’il ne suffit pas d’ouvrir le débat et de permettre formellement la 
participation des acteurs (formels et informels) pour garantir le caractère inclusif des politiques 
publiques, basé sur la construction de compromis institutionnalisés par des acteurs aux intérêts 
divergents. En particulier, il est rapidement apparu que l’élaboration de CLaRA ne s’était pas 
caractérisée par l’inclusion des acteurs au niveau le plus local. Certes, les chefs traditionnels, à 
travers leurs organisations politiques, ont occupé une place de premier plan dans les négociations 
et la rédaction des versions successives de la loi. En revanche, les principaux intéressés au niveau 
local, c’est-à-dire les membres des communautés, qui sont à la fois citoyens Sud-Africains et 
placés sous l’autorité de leur chef coutumier, n’ont pratiquement pas été consultés. Par ailleurs, 
les débats au niveau national ont mobilisé des visions largement monolithiques et idéalisée 
communautés, peu à même de prendre en compte la réalité effective – et plurielle, comme le 
montre cette étude – du fonctionnement (et des dysfonctionnements) des systèmes fonciers et de 
la gouvernance au sein des communautés.  
L’étude au niveau local montre que la principale préoccupation des membres des communautés ne 
porte pas sur la tenure de la terre en tant que telle mais plutôt sur le développement de la 
communauté, particulièrement en matière d’infrastructure. C’est essentiellement par le prisme des 
infrastructures que les membres des communautés analysent, évaluent interpellent ou remettent en 
question les structures de gouvernance locale, qu’il s’agisse des autorités traditionnelles ou du 
gouvernement municipal, et leur articulation avec le régime foncier. L’étude au niveau local 
montre d’une part que les individus raisonnent les questions de gouvernance et les questions de 
sécurisation foncière de manière relativement déconnectée, et d’autre part que régime coutumier 
et régime de droit commun sont perçus comme complémentaires plutôt que comme antagonistes 
et mutuellement exclusifs. Même si l’option du titre de propriété privée peut être perçue comme 
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intéressante relativement au système actuellement en vigueur de « petits papiers » visés par le 
chef coutumier, parce qu’elle élargit le faisceau de droits (en particulier pour l’absusus) et parce 
qu’elle s’appuie sur un document plus formel, émis par l’Etat, la majorité des personnes enquêtées 
n’a pas pour autant manifesté un rejet du système foncier et de gouvernance tribal. 
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I. CONTEXT AND STUDY PRESENTATION – THE RESTRUCTURING OF 
SOUTH AFRICA’S COMMUNAL LAND IN A RENEWED PUBLIC POLICY 
DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT 
1. Contextual and Historical Perspectives on Communal Land in RSA 
The importance of land reform in South Africa arises from the scale and scope of land 
dispossession of black people at the hands of the colonisers. Although blacks had already lost the 
majority of their land in 1913, and could not occupy more land than what was 
abandoned/forsaken by Whites, the period of the South African Union was marked by the 
formalisation of race-based spatial segregation in the form of laws. Rights to own, rent or even 
share-crop land in South Africa depended upon a person's racial classification. In this framework, 
the Land Settlement Act and, above all, the Natives Land Act and the Natives Land and Trust Act 
were instituted in 1912, 1913 and 1936, respectively. These laws introduced the formal division of 
South African land between “white” and “black” zones in the proportions of 92% and 8%, and 
later 87% and 13%, respectively. Millions of black people were forced to leave their ancestral 
lands and resettle in what quickly became over-crowded and environmentally degraded 
homelands. The ills of this diminished distribution were intensified by the interdiction of all 
transfers of land between “races” and by the appropriation of land reserved for the South African 
State (Keegan, 1986; Plaatje, 1987). “Blacks,” therefore, no longer had the right to own their land 
– even if it was found in a region classified as “black” – but were reduced to using land 
administered by tribal authorities, who were appointed by the government (see Box 1). 
 
Box 1: Chieftaincies in South Africa  
 
Although the focus of this project concerns present policy processes, it is important to situate rural 
governance in the former bantustans within its historical context. 
 
The traditional leadership is an ancient institution, prevalent across the entire African continent. For 
centuries the African people experienced no other form of governance. The power of chiefs and their 
subordinates in the former reserve territories of colonial Africa lies mainly in their power over land 
allocation. Also in South Africa, rural governance in the former bantustans was, and in certain ways still is, 
controlled by Tribal Authorities. These structures were dominated by chiefs, headmen, and their 
appointees. 
 
Although often severely undermined and disintegrated under colonial forces, the institution of traditional 
leadership, not least in South Africa, was also often used (or misused) by the rulers in place. In South 
Africa, under the National Party regime a number of laws were formulated to regulate and control 
traditional leadership, often to the advantage of the racist regime (Nthai, 2005, pg. 1-3). Mahmood 
Mamdani (1996) has characterized Tribal Authorities as a South African version of decentralized 
despotism, similar to what countries on the African Continent went through under colonialism. Meanwhile, 
the apartheid government continued to intervene in the administration of land within the homelands, where 
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tribal chiefs were accorded special land-ownership rights and far-reaching powers over land allocation, 
often beyond those normally sanctioned under customary law. As a result, it is often considered that tribal 
authorities were imposed1 and are often considered unaccountable, undemocratic and despotic.  
 
The Constitution of the ‘New’ South Africa provides for recognition – although limited – of traditional 
leadership, and Houses of Traditional Leaders at both national and provincial level were established. 
However, the issue of the institution of traditional leadership proves to be problematic. Much confusion 
over the scope and degree of traditional authority remains, with traditional law and practices often coming 
into conflict with those of the new democracy. On one had, for most of the first fifteen years of South 
Africa’s democracy, the ANC-led government has embarked on an overall democratization process. In the 
rural areas of the former bantustans, this included attempts to dismantle the concentration of powers in 
Tribal Authorities in the form of reforms in local government and land administration. Through the 
implementation of elected local leaderships, attempts are being made to democratise the system of land 
administration, including the involvement of women in land administration structures, and to emphasise 
the improvement of the quality of life of previously disadvantaged sectors through a new conception of 
developmental local government (Ntsebeza, 2005). On the other hand, the presence and direct control of 
the Traditional Authorities remain, and no decision can be made in the rural areas without consulting the 
tribal authorities. Through their cultural rights and their fundamental role within the rural areas, they claim 
that they have been excluded from the political arena and, thus, their role in contemporary South Africa 
has been negated (Meer & Campbell, 2007). 
 
In addition, these laws were completed by measures that equally intended to limit the number of 
“blacks” residing on “white” land (Bundy, 1979). Black families, who occupied land outside the 
reserves, before 1913, were initially exempt from the provisions of the Natives Land Acts. The 
result was a number of so-called 'black-spot' communities in farming areas occupied by whites. 
These were the subject of a second wave of forced removals implemented from the 1950s through 
to the 1980s (DLA, 2004). The government expelled most of these black farmers to the set aside 
homelands, often without compensation for their lost land rights. Dispossession not only forced 
the few remaining black farmers to seek employment as farm labourers, it also contributed to an 
increasing the population density in the delimitated black areas.  
These land features persisted until the first democratic elections and the change of regime in 
South Africa in 1994. The previous spatial segregation measures not only engendered extreme 
inequalities concerning land distribution, they also caused important inequalities between white 
and black (farmers). In 1994, about 60 000 white farmers occupied 87 million hectares of 
privately-owned land. Commercial farms contributed 95% of the total agricultural production of 
the country (World Bank, 1994) and, as far as most agricultural products were concerned, 
assumed the country’s self-sufficiency. They employed between 750,000 and 1 million farm 
workers (SSA, 2000). On the other hand, the 14 million blacks gathered on the former homelands 
shared 13% of the total area of the country, i.e. 13 million hectares (Department of Agriculture, 
1995). Although the South African Government attempted several times to enhance the socio-
                                                   
1
 For South Africa, see areas such as Phondoland (Mbeki, 1984), Sekhukhuneland (Delius, 1996) and Xhalanga 
(Ntsebeza, 2002), where the imposition of these institutions led to often bloody conflicts between apartheid state 
supporters and those in resistance. 
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economic conditions of these homelands during the transition years.2 These by then former 
homelands were characterized by poor conditions. The over-exploitation of resources, the 
impoverishment of the environment and the limited means of production only permitted a small 
number of black farmers to subsist in the reserves.3 The farming production of these areas only 
represented 16% of their food needs. According to the World Bank’s Southern Africa 
Department, about 13% of farming households occasionally commercialised part of their 
production (World Bank, 1994); however, only 02% of these households could effectively make a 
sufficient living out of it. For those who have access to land (it was estimated that one third of 
rural households on these reserves had no access to land), agriculture has been reduced for the 
large majority to an activity complementing their subsistence. 
Land reform was one of the main promises made by the ANC during its ascension to power in 
1994. The ANC noted in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) that land 
reform was necessary to redress unjust forced deportations and the denial of land access (ANC, 
1994). The land reform process thus not only represents a decisive element of ideological 
transition, it is also seen as one of the conditions for the political, economic and social stability of 
the country. This new situation required the implementation of adapted economic policies 
(Department of Agriculture, 1995): on one hand, they aimed to find a solution to the 
overpopulation and poverty of the former homelands and, on the other hand, to promote access to 
residential and farm land. To this end, three major land reform programmes – restitution, 
redistribution and land tenure reform – were recognised by the Constitution and subsequently 
implemented (see Box 2). 
 
Box 2: Land Reform in South Africa Since 1994 
 
Land Restitution (Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994) enables people or communities 
dispossessed of their land after 19 June 1913 (implementation date of the first Native Land Act) to make a 
claim for the restitution of their land rights (or the equivalent, i.e. other land or financial compensation). In 
March 1996, the deadline for claim submission, 68,878 individual or grouped claims were submitted. 
 
Land Redistribution aims to assist, through subsidies, previously disadvantaged populations in 
purchasing available land at market prices. Although it can take different forms (individual, grouped or 
commonage resettlement), two major programmes exist: 
 
● SLAG (Settlement and Land Acquisition Grand) representing a subsidy of 16,000 rand per household 
wanting to acquire land (for subsistence, commercial or other reasons). 
LRAD (Land Reform for Agricultural Development), a sub-programme implemented in 2000, promotes 
agricultural development, and supports the transfer of private agricultural land to individuals or limited 
                                                   
2
 The latter concerned mainly the Betterment Planning programmes, already implemented from the 1930s. These 
programmes sought to regulate these areas through spatial engineering. It should be recognised that these 
programmes were not neutral, but were used to stabilise the fragile political situation in the country in the late 
1980s. They took place in conjunction with renewed definitions of the power relations between the chieftaincies 
and the communities.  
3
 The Department of Agriculture estimated the number of non-white farming households at 2 million. Nevertheless, 
this estimate should be used with caution since the definition of a farming household is neither certain nor precise. 
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groups who are able to invest in commercial farm development. The transfer of private title deeds is 
facilitated through LRAD subsidies that increase in value according to the beneficiaries’ own investment. 
Based on increasing own contributions in labour and farm assets (if the beneficiary is not in a position to 
contribute financially), up to a financial contribution of 400,000 rand, LRAD will provide proportionally 
increasing subsidies from 20,000 up to 100,000 rand (Ministry of Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2000). 
 
● Land Tenure Reform, often recognised as the most complex, has the objective of defining and 
institutionalising every existing mode of land tenure and, subsequently, conferring well-defined and more 
equal rights to various landowners and occupants. Although it primarily concerns communal land, it also 
focuses on resolving other conflict situations (such as those concerning farm workers having worked 
independently for several years already on properties owned by others, mainly whites), and aims to provide 
alternatives for people who are displaced in the process. 
 
All three components of South African land reform are lagging. Regarding restitution and 
redistribution, the magnitude of land inequality in South Africa led the ANC to aim at 
redistributing/restituting 30% of the land during the first five years after the apartheid era. To 
date, however, only 4.7% has been transferred since the change of regime (Department of Land 
Affairs, 2008). With regards to tenure reform, the process started in 1996 but mainly concerned 
the extension of security of tenure for labour tenants. The issue of reforming the communal lands 
of the previous homelands has still to be implemented (see Box 3). 
 
Box 3: Land Rights Reform in South Africa Since 1994 
 
The Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act of 1996 (IPILRA) was enacted to secure the position 
of people with informal rights to land. These people were predominantly located in the former homelands. 
IPILRA was initially intended as an interim measure whilst more comprehensive legislation was being 
developed (DLA, 2004). However, it has been renewed annually ever since. IPILRA sought to ensure that 
holders of informal land rights were recognised as stakeholders in land-based transactions and 
development projects on the land they occupied. At the time, the hope was that more comprehensive 
legislation with regards to communal land tenure would be tabled in Parliament during the course of 1999. 
 
The Communal Property Association Act of 1996 (CPA Act) provides for the establishment of legal 
entities that enable groups of beneficiaries to acquire, hold and manage property on a communal basis 
within a supportive legislative framework. The CPA Act requires that the following primary objectives be 
fulfilled in accordance to a written constitution, embodying the principles of democracy, inclusion, non-
discrimination, equality, transparency and accountability (Kariuki, 2004). 
 
The Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 (ESTA) addresses the relationship between land 
occupiers and landowners. In particular, it defines the circumstances under which evictions can legally take 
place and the procedures to be followed. The ESTA is underpinned by the following principles: the law 
should prevent arbitrary and unfair evictions; existing rights of ownership should be recognised and 
protected; and people who live on land belonging to other people should be guaranteed basic human rights. 
In essence, this law promotes long-term security on the land where people are currently living (Kariuki, 
2004). 
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The Transformation of Certain Rural Areas Act of 1998 (TRANCRAA) represented the first 
comprehensive legislation to reform communal land tenure in South Africa (Wisborg & Rohde, 2003). Its 
aim was to transfer land in twenty-three former coloured areas to residents or accountable local 
institutions. The former bantustans (i.e. black areas as opposed to coloured areas) were subject to 
TRANCRAA. 
2. The Renewal of Public (Land) Policy 
The renovation of public policy in general, and particularly in land policy, appears in numerous 
cases to be a priority on national agendas to relieve the numerous challenges rural Africans face: 
land conflicts, land insecurity, important demographic pressures and weight, and the high 
prevalence of poverty in rural areas, to identify just a few of these challenges.  
Simultaneously, although at varying paces according to particular situations, the countries of sub-
Saharan Africa engaged (at times due to external pressure) in institutional reforms. These reforms 
concerned, on the one hand, regional integration and, on the other hand, the democratisation of 
public life, administrative decentralisation and the promotion of new forms of governance that 
favour, among other principles, transparency in decision making and management, negotiation 
among actors, and the responsibilities of decision-makers with regards to other actors. This new 
politico-institutional context raises questions notably related to the renovation of public policies, 
not only regarding their contents, but equally about the processes driving their elaboration that are 
based on the inclusion of a multitude of actors and institutions at different levels (national, 
provincial and local). 
As such, after decades marked by little consultations by States and foreign donors/funders during 
the definition, development and implementation of policies, increased participation appears in 
public debates as well as in more formal processes. In Africa, such an evolution was observed in 
different countries with the development of the DSRPs (Sewpaul, 2006), agricultural policies 
(Senegal, Mali and Kenya are examples) (Anseeuw, 2008) and, also, land policies (Senegal and 
South Africa, for example) (Faye et al., 2007; Claasens & Cousins, 2008). 
A wider dialogue involving more actors from different political segments, NGOs, FOs, civil 
society, and the private sector, for example, accompanied the formal elaboration process of 
agricultural policies. These different – more inclusive – processes represented an emerging factor 
of reactivation and dynamisation of actors and networks, who progressively found their place as 
privileged interlocutors. These emerging processes and actors reflect, in the African context, a 
certain evolution, particularly in terms of participative democracy, compared to preceding 
policies.  
The possibility of influencing policies themselves appears. As a result, there is a need to deepen 
the question of interactions and mechanisms of coordination between a multiplicity of economic 
and social actors implicated in the construction of markets and institutions, as well as of 
agricultural and land policies. The policies, therefore, can no longer be considered as imposed 
‘entities’ (by the State or externally), but as constructs by the different actors. As negotiated 
entities and not imposed choices/options, these renewed processes call into question the choices 
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and ideologies that before were regarded with certainty. Another result is an awakening of the 
need to exceed the normative definition of policies, the handing-over of single ideals and “one 
size fits all” approaches, and the possible elaboration of a diversity instruments for policies in 
general, land and other aspects more particularly. It also leads to a redefinition of the roles of the 
different actors, including the State and private sector. 
However, in both theory and practice, a lack of knowledge and concrete actions to facilitate these 
processes is often noted – regarding both the content of these policies and their implementation 
processes. On the one hand, this is linked to the absence of favourable conditions for putting in 
place these new – more inclusive – processes of policy development: strong asymmetries among 
actors, partial negotiations, imposed agendas and sequences, and weak information dissemination 
before consultations. On the other hand, a lack of concrete knowledge about these new policy 
development processes, particularly regarding land policy, is apparent. In a context marked by the 
multiplication of concerned actors and by the awareness by the African continent of the necessity 
of developing, in a more autonomous way, their own agricultural policies, the reality becomes 
increasingly complex. As such, a number of policies developed in a more inclusive manner were 
not subject to effective implementation (LOASP in Senegal and SRA in Kenya), or were even 
subject to major civil and political objections (CLaRA has been challenged in court, see below). 
3. CLaRA as a Renewal of Land Policy Development? Legitimating the 
Research question 
As detailed earlier, there was need for more comprehensive legislation that would deal with the 
insecurity of tenure of the millions of black South Africans living in the former homeland areas. If 
the renovation of land tenure policy appears to be a necessity to address the many challenges that 
rural South African people face, such as overcrowding of communal land, rural poverty, 
marginalisation and exclusion from public processes, the processes according to which the latter 
are developed and implemented also have to be renewed. 
As such, in 2004, the Government of South Africa voted the Communal Land Rights Act. “The 
purpose of the Act is to give secure land tenure rights to communities and persons who occupy 
land that the apartheid government had reserved for occupation by African people known as the 
communal areas. The land tenure rights available to the people living in communal areas are 
largely based on customary law or insecure permits granted under laws that were applied to 
African people alone” (DLA, 2004, pg. 4). According to the framework of more transparent and 
inclusive policy development and implementation processes, the 2004 CLaRA has been hailed by 
its drafters as one of the most participatory pieces of legislation ever drafted within the 
Department of Land Affairs (DLA, 2004). Regarding its development process, the DLA notes 
(DLA, 2004, pg. 4):  
 
“The public consultation on the Bill commenced in May 2001 following the production of third 
draft of the Bill. The consultation process culminated in the hosting of the National Land Tenure 
Conference (NTLC) held in Durban at the International convention Centre in November 2001. 
Two thousand persons representing various stakeholders attended the conference. 
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“Between 14 August 2002 when the Bill was gazetted and 22 September 2003, there was also a 
thorough public consultation process on the Bill. Stakeholders consulted include: 
●  Eleven National Departments 
●  Six Provincial Governments: Eastern Cape, North West, Mpumalanga, Limpopo, Free State 
and KwaZulu-Natal 
“Organisations consulted were, amongst others, the Bafokeng Royal Council, Congress of 
Traditional leaders of South Africa, local and district councillors from the Polokwane and 
Capricorn districts, councillors and officials from Polokwane municipality, the press, His 
Majesty King G. Zwelithini, together with Inkosi Mangosuthu Buthelezi and Amakhosi in 
Ulundi. Over and above the reference group set up by the Minister, communities were consulted 
widely in the affected provinces.” 
 
However, several months after having voted the Act, CLaRA was accused of non-constitutionality 
for several reasons (see Chapter 2). This court case has delayed the implementation of the Act, 
with DLA officials indicating that the regulations of the Act might only be tabled in Parliament 
after the next general elections in 2009.4 
If the delay in implementing the Act is an example of an inherent democratic process, it also leads 
to questioning the implemented seemingly more inclusive development process. Several questions 
come to the fore. On one hand, it leads to the necessity to scrutinize the technical and 
organizational aspects of such more inclusive processes. Indeed, if there seems to be a broader 
consensus on the need for more transparent and inclusive decision making, there is no overall 
harmony on how such processes can be developed. What went wrong or what is being criticized? 
On one hand, it also leads to questioning the nature of these more inclusive processes. Are they 
really inclusive, i.e. reflecting the positions of a large if not entire panel of protagonists, or does it 
just represent a Government strategy to legitimize policy reform? 
4. Analysing CLaRA – Research objectives and hypothesis 
The study of “the politics of communal land reform in South Africa” is part of a broader reflection 
on the renovation of public policy, particularly land policy. As such, on one hand, the 
democratisation of public life, the participatory approach, the inclusiveness and the promotion of 
new forms of governance, and on the other hand, the impact the latter has on the content of the 
specific land policies are critically investigated in the process of the development of CLaRA. 
The main purpose of this study is to determine whether the development of CLaRA (Act No. 11 
of 2004) represents a renewal of public policy development which is participatory, inclusive and 
transparent, including – in the framework of South Africa’s decentralisation process – the 
different levels of decision making (local, provincial and national). It will investigate and analyse 
to what extent the development process and the contents of CLaRA can be considered innovative. 
As such, this study is specifically interested in: 
                                                   
4
 Discussion with Vuyi Nxasana, Chief Director, Tenure Reform 
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i) PROCESSES: Analysis of the CLaRA development process. As such, it will 
describe the different steps but will also identify the stakes around which each actor 
(national government, regional government, agricultural producers and 
organisations, NGOs and the private sector) structured their argument through the 
course of the development of CLaRA. 
ii) CONTENT: The study will attempt to identify and characterise the impacts of 
CLaRA’s drafting process and potential implementation on the choices concerning 
the effective measures at national level, the perceptions, positions and proposals 
made by the different actors. 
iii) Finally, INCLUSIVENESS: To determine the extent of the democratisation of 
negotiation and decision-making processes, and formulate proposals concerning the 
democratisation of negotiation and decision-making processes on the subject of land 
policies. 
As detailed previously, the study focuses solely on the CLaRA development process and the 
impact it had on the content and choices made regarding communal land tenure in South Africa. 
As such, the object of the research is not South Africa’s ‘land tenure system’ per say; it does not 
pretend to analyse South Africa’s land tenure problems, nor will it propose recommendations to 
solve them. It will neither focus on the effectiveness of nor propose to evaluate CLaRA’s 
proposed measures. The land reform options themselves will not be detailed, but it will more 
specifically examine why and how certain land reform options were retained. The study will thus 
focus on the policy development process itself, and on the unrolling of the processes that allowed 
CLaRA to be developed and validated. The CLaRA evolution process will be critically analysed 
to determine whether it represents a more participatory approach to public policy formulation as is 
claimed by those who drafted it, and how the approach influences the different policies and policy 
measures adopted and reflects a democratisation of public policy development. 
This being said, we assume that CLaRA’s development process was only inclusive in a certain 
way. Looking at the issues challenged in the court case, it seems that a large majority of 
protagonists were excluded or that their positions were not taken into account. The content 
therefore does not reflect the overall positions, needs and wants of the South African population, 
but characterises standpoints of the ruling party and/or its agreements with specific strategic 
actors. 
5. Conceptual Framework and Methodology 
Being aware of the importance of integrating grassroots views and stances in a study focusing on 
inclusiveness and participation, the study will make a distinction between public policy making at 
national and local levels. As such, the study will be implemented on two levels, focusing on the 
following research objects: 
• the unrolling of the processes at national level that permitted the development and 
validation of CLaRA, and 
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• the integration of local positions within the policy development process, i.e. analyse the 
positions at local level (communities and local government) and their participation (or non 
participation) in the processes at national level. 
5.1. Understanding the National Development Process for CLaRA 
 
 Reformulation of the Objectives at National Level 
This first part developed at a national level aims at: 
• describing the policy development processes and at detailing the unrolling of negotiations 
at national level that permitted the development and validation of CLaRA; 
• identifying the actors, their strategies, their power relations and at understanding of the 
interactions between the different categories of concerned actors at the national level; and 
• examining the impact that the (new) policy development processes have on the content of 
public policies. 
 
 Conceptual Framework 
The global idea is to reflect on the modalities of the development of renewed public policies, from 
a point of view of: 
• their contents, as they will not represent ‘one-size-fits-all’ or ‘given’ entities anymore but 
are ‘developed entities’, including aspects of sustainability, efficiency and equity; and 
• their development processes, which are more open and engage a diversity of actors.  
 
However, the efficiency, sustainability and innovation of public policies can not be based on the 
simple participation of (formal and informal) actors. It supposes the elaboration of compromises 
guaranteeing their recognisance and stability. Hence, within the context of broader participation 
regarding policy development, it seems pertinent to put the institutionalised compromises and 
collective action necessary to the elaboration of public policies at the core of the questions to 
accompany the renovation of policies towards more equity and social cohesion. 
As such, the notion of institutionalised compromise is defined as a “politico-social armistice” 
(Leborgne & Lipietz, 1992) between actors in conflict conforming to an institutional structure 
more or less sustainable embracing rules, rights and obligations (André, 1995). In the framework 
of the project, the notion could be seen as an elaboration and internalisation of agreements, and 
subsequently of the stabilised and sustainable rules it engages between actors. The more the 
agreement is based on compromises, the more it will lead to sustainable institutions (including 
policies). These compromises can thus be analysed as macro-social agreements that can be 
concretised as public policies at national level (Cf. CLaRA). 
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For the present project dealing analytically with policy issues, one implication from the above 
observations is to focus not only on conducting a high-quality, technical analysis (of tenure 
reform alternatives for example), but to develop a good understanding of the political context and 
processes of the problem. The latter is even more important considering that the policy analysis 
literature has long recognized that the effectiveness of technical and policy alternatives is often 
limited because of their inattention to politics (Jenkins-Smith, 1990; Radin, 2000).  
One theoretical framework to ground the political context and processes is the stakeholder 
analysis and the advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993, 
1999). As noted by Weible (2007), the stakeholder analysis and advocacy coalition framework is 
frequently used to explain stakeholder behaviour and policy outcomes in intense political conflicts 
over a certain period regarding specific issues (Sabatier & Weible, 2005). They are defined by 
identifying opportunities and constraints for analysing the likelihood that a strategy, venue or 
alternative will be successful in initiating or preventing policy change. To help navigate this 
political landscape, stakeholder analysis provides a guide to investigate stakeholders' perceptions 
regarding the severity, causes and proposals of a problem, the distribution of resources among 
coalitions, and the accessible political venues for influencing policy (Weible, 2007). This allows 
one to identify roadblocks and strategies for achieving more inclusive collective agreement, and 
consequently, more sustainable public policies. As such, the following set of questions (Susskind 
& Thomas-Larmer, 1999; Brugha & Varvasovsky, 2000) need to be addressed: (1) Who are the 
stakeholders to include in the analysis? (2) What are the stakeholders' interests, positions, and 
beliefs? (3) Who controls critical resources? (4) With whom do stakeholders form coalitions? (5) 
What strategies and venues do stakeholders use to achieve their objectives?  
The stakeholder analysis and advocacy coalition framework helps to understand the dynamics of a 
policy subsystem, mapping the activities of multiple stakeholders employing multiple strategies. 
It provides a useful conceptual framework that explains policy stability and change. It has a focus 
on the coalitions that share a set of normative and causal beliefs and often act in concert, and 
views policy changes as the consequences of coalitions' competition to translate their ideas into 
official actions. It therefore has a broader perspective than political feasibility analysis, which 
tends to focus on the probability of successfully implementing a particular policy alternative for a 
particular problem (Weimer & Vining, 2005). This broad perspective is important in this case of 
the analysis of the politics of communal land and CLaRA’s development process, open seemingly 
to multiple participants and different levels, and where there are opportunities for actors to 
confront each other during the policy development and implementation process. 
 
 Research Objects at National Level and Methodology 
To do so, the research will be conducted through four major phases, each of them linked to 
different research methods. 
1) Analysis of policy documents and secondary data sourced from previous studies that have 
focused on CLaRA (at different levels).  
Primary sources for the analysis of CLaRA and its policy processes were the 
different (draft) policy documents, gazetted or unpublished. In addition, although 
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few have focussed on the policies around CLaRA, complementary information is 
available, particularly from (i) academic literature on the implementation of 
CLaRA (PGSARD, 2008), the issues around CLaRA (Kariuki, 2003) and 
democratisation and power relations in South Africa (Ntsebeza, 2005), and (ii) 
media information mainly covering CLaRA’s court case. 
2) Description of the elaboration process that has led to the drafting of CLaRA, including the 
different steps and phases and the actors engaged. 
Although this was complemented through interviews, it was mainly realised 
through the review of secondary data such as the Department of Land Affairs 
reports and updates, official communications, newspaper articles, etc. 
3) Analysis of the actors’ (engaged and those not engaged5) positions and strategies to bring 
their standpoint forward and be heard/retained. 
Analysing the positions necessitated in-depth open interviews with the different 
actors, including questions on their views, the factor determining the latter, their 
strategies to exteriorise their positions, etc. The interviews were also 
complemented by the written contributions different actors had sent in during the 
consultation phases. An analysis of the deliberations of the portfolio committee 
will also give insight into the actors involved in supporting or opposing the Bill 
when it was being debated in Parliament. 
4) Analysis of the impact of the processes on content through linking the elaboration process 
and the positions of the different engaged actors to the evolution of the content. 
To link process and content, an in depth structural and textual analysis was 
realised based on the different versions of the Bill and Act. The latter was also 
complemented by specific questions during the open questionnaires. 
 
In addition to the different versions of the Bill and Act and secondary information, this study is 
based on empirical data gathered through open interviews used to stimulate discussions with the 
respondents to enable the researcher to obtain as much information as possible from the actors 
involved in formulating this legislation. The target population for this study are thus the 
stakeholders involved in formulation of land policy at national level. But, as we assume in the 
hypotheses that CLaRA’s development process was only inclusive in a certain way, the target 
population was not only the population effectively engaged in CLaRA’s development, but also 
land protagonists and other stakeholders who have been left out of the process.  
As such, since the objective is to analyse in detail the unfolding of the CLaRA process, an 
extensive (all-embracing) sample of respondents has been retained, including: 
                                                   
5
 It might be that several actors were not engaged in the process (as stated in our hypothesis). The fact of not being 
engaged in the process will influence the policy process and content. These actors, however, have to be included in 
the research in order to understand the reasons for their non-participation and the impact the latter has on the policy 
itself. 
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• all the protagonists identified during the CLaRA process; and 
• all the stakeholders who have been left out of the process. 
The people engaged were identified through the description of the different phases of the CLaRA 
development process. Those excluded were identified through interviews of engaged and 
excluded persons/institutions. The extensiveness of the sample was verified when none of the 
respondents identified additional stakeholders. 
As detailed in Table 1, sixty-one detailed interviews were conducted. Policymakers and 
(potential) influencers of policy at the national level such as Ministers, members of parliament, 
portfolio committee members, land NGOs, lobby groups, traditional chiefs’ councils are some of 
the national actors who were interviewed.  
 
Table 1: Interviewed Institutions and People in the Framework of the Unfolding of the 
CLaRA Process at National Level 
National Government Departments 
and Institutions 
National Department of Land Affairs (10x) 
National Department of Agriculture (2x) 
South Africa Commission on Human Rights (2x) 
Commission on gender equality (1x) 
Provincial or Local Government 
Departments 
Limpopo Department of Agriculture (3x) 
Local Municipalities Fetakgomo Department of Agriculture (2x) 
Makapanstad Department of Agriculture (2x) 
Tribal Authorities GaSelepe Tribal Authority (5x) 
Makapanstad Tribal Authority (3x) 
The Ingonyama Trust (1x) 
Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (1x) 
Political Parties ANC (3x) 
SACP (1x) 
DA (1x) 
NADECO (1x) 
IFP (1x) 
Portfolio Committee 
 
Comprising all political parties represented in Parliament, chaired by 
ANC MP (2x) 
Civil Society / NGOs AFRA (3x) 
Landless People’s Movement (1x) 
Legal Resources Centre (2x) 
Nkuzi Development Agency (1x) 
OXFAM (1x) 
Rural Women’s Movement (1x) 
Transvaal Rural Action Committee (TRAC) – Mpumalanga (1x) 
SPP (1x) 
Trade Unions COSATU (1x) 
National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) (1x) 
Academic Institutions Specializing in 
Land Policy 
 
PLAAS-University of Western Cape (1x) 
University of Pretoria (2x) 
Wits University (1x) 
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Affected Communities in the Former 
Homelands 
GaSelepe 
Makapanstad 
(linked to local level research – See hereafter) 
Other Maruleng and Bushbuckridge Economic Development Initiative (1x) 
Independent consultants (1x) 
Independent academics/students (1x) 
 
• In addition, a large number of original submissions and contributions to the CLaRA 
process were gathered and analysed. Submissions were received from: 
• traditional authorities: National House of Traditional Leaders, Congress of Traditional 
Leaders of South Africa, Royal Bafokeng Nation;  
• unions / commissions: COSATU, NUM, Commission for Gender Equality, SA Human 
Rights Commission, South African Council of Churches; 
• civil society – NGOs: AFRA, ANCRA, Joint Monitoring Committee on Improvement of 
Quality of Life and Status of Women, Legal Entity Assessment Project (LEAP), Legal 
Resources Centre (LRC), LPM, Masifunde, Nkuzi Development Agency, NLC, Rural 
Women’s Movement, TCOE, Transvaal Rural Action Committee (TRAC), TRALSO, 
Umbumbano Lwabesifazane, Women’s Legal Centre; 
• local municipalities: Marble Hall, Groblersdal, Tubatse, Fetakgomo, Makhuduthamaga; 
• local communities: Dwesa-Cwebe, Greater Manyeleti Land rights group (Utha, Dixie, 
Gottenburg C and Serville B villages), Hlanganani-Polokwane, Kalkfontein, Kgalagadi 
(15 communities of Northern Cape Province), Madikwe, Mpumalanga Consultative 
Group on Land (Kangwane, Lebowa and KwaNdebele), Sekhukhuneland Ad Hoc 
committee on land (five local municipalities: Marble Hall, Groblersdal, Tubatse, 
Fetakgomo and Makhuduthamaga and their rural communities); and 
• academics: Centre for Applied Legal Studies (Wits University), PLAAS (University of 
Western Cape). 
 
Once identified, all of the identified stakeholders were interviewed through key informant 
interviews. All interviews were realised by the Masters student with the assistance of the 
Supervisor (whereas some of the respondents – DGs of Government departments, etc. – require a 
more senior academic to engage with). Data collection was hampered by the unavailability of 
some of the actors, especially the politicians. Furthermore, initially, as this particular legislation is 
facing a court challenge regarding its constitutionality, it was expected that some actors would not 
be willing to discuss CLaRA in detail. The latter did however not appear as a major issue. Lastly, 
as it concerns ongoing policy development processes including stakeholders with different views, 
it was important to verify the accuracy and completeness of the data that is collected during the 
interviews or detailed in secondary sources. Therefore, particular attention was paid to the 
interview techniques (reposing certain questions in different ways, for example). Key information 
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was generally cross-checked for quality and rigour through (i) confronting the information to 
divers stakeholders, and (ii) regular presentations of the results to a diversity of stakeholders. 
5.2 The Positions on Communal Land Reform at Local Level 
 Reformulation of the Objectives at Local Level 
The aim of this second part is to analyse the different positions on communal land reform at local 
level and study, through the local elaboration process for CLaRA, if it had been inclusive of the 
communities and how the debates were framed and formulated at this level. As such, the objective 
of the project was to confront the positions of people towards communal land reform with CLaRA 
and its provisions, and to apprehend the relevance of South Africa’s communal land reform. 
 
The objective of this component of the project was thus reformulated as follows:  
• characterize the perceptions of community members with respect to their bundles of rights 
under the communal land tenure system (with an aim to providing insights into the extent 
of de facto individualization and commoditization of communal land), and the perceptions 
of security that are attached to it; and  
• identify their positions on the two features of CLaRA that have been identified as salient 
and controverted, namely the issuance of an individual land title by the State, and the role 
of the chief and  tribal authorities in land matters. 
Both objectives imply understanding the local context, the stakes and conflicts around land and 
power, and the way local people perceive and formulate those stakes. 
 
 Conceptual Framework 
Delimitating Communities and Communal Land 
From the project’s perspective, communal land is the area where a village or tribe is located and 
that is managed under a common traditional council, and a community is the people living on that 
communal land and being under the same traditional council. 
These definitions follow the ones provided by CLaRA:  
Communal land is “land which is, or is to be, occupied or used by members of a community 
subject to the rules or custom of that community.”6 Communal land is not exclusively the land in 
the former homelands but is also : 
 
“the land acquired by or for the community whether registered in its name or not and any other 
land, including land which provides equitable access to land in a community and which is, or is 
                                                   
6
  Section 1, Definitions of The Communal Land Rights Act (DLA, 2004a). 
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to be, occupied or used by members of a community subject to the rules or customs of that 
community.”7 
 
A community “is a group of persons whose rights to land are derived from shared rules 
determining access to land held in common by such group.”8 
There are 892 recognized Traditional Authorities in South Africa, which gives an idea of the 
smallest possible number of communities. This number is probably greater as more than one 
community can be under the authority of a single traditional authority. 
 
Disentangling the Bundles of Rights and Defining Security of Tenure 
Property rights on communal land are accounted for in this research through the concept of 
bundles of rights, which include 3 broad categories: 
• usufruct rights: refer to the rights of using the land and reaping the benefits of its use; 
• abusus rights: refer to the rights of transferring the land through different mechanisms – 
transfers can be temporary or definitive,  they can be market- or non-market-based, etc.; 
and 
• administration rights: refer to the right to define the rights of others. Again, these rights 
can take many forms: exclusion of non-members, allocation of vacant land, registration of 
rights and transfers, enforcement, conflict resolution, etc. 
 
In the remainder of the chapter, the concept “security of tenure” will refer to the inverse 
probability for holders of permanent usufruct rights on a particular piece of land to have these 
rights challenged by another party, and to lose the possibility to exercise those rights. Note that 
this definition is irrespective of the scope of rights (usus, fructus, abusus) that are held on a 
particular piece of land, or the nature of the property right regime (customary, private property, 
etc.) that prevails.  
The effort to disentangle the bundle of rights of community members on communal land needs to 
be extended to the bundle of prerogatives that the tribal authorities hold under the community 
regime. Although those prerogatives clearly derive from the initial statement of the authority of 
the chief over a territory, they should not be assimilated to an outright bundle of individual 
property rights over the communal land. They, rather, relate to administration rights as defined 
above. Also, their prerogatives in terms of local governance usually go well beyond land issues to 
include other aspects of community life (both material, such as service provision, and immaterial, 
such as a sense of belonging). Accordingly, the opinions of the people about the appropriate roles 
for the tribal authorities might differ depending on the focus. 
                                                   
7
  Section 2 (c),(d).  
8
 Section 1, Definitions. 
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Accounting for Legal Pluralism 
A major feature of the communities is the legal pluralism that is displayed with regards to both 
land rights and local governance. The legal status, content and strength of the bundle of rights on 
communal land can be diverse and overlapping: they can include mixed and evolutive features 
inherited from pre-apartheid indigenous regimes, from the apartheid legislations, then from the 
post-apartheid policies. As a result, collective processes of land allocation and land administration 
(including the provision of tenure security), as well as individual practices of land use and land 
transfer, can often rely on several sources of legitimation. With regards to local governance, the 
respective prerogatives of tribal authorities and municipal authorities (e.g. in terms of 
infrastructure and service provision, land planning, etc.) usually also lack clear definition. 
 
 Research Questions at Local Level 
The two objectives stated in the introduction were translated in the following research questions:  
• What are the de facto bundles of rights that community members hold over their 
landholdings? In particular, what is the extent of the de facto individualization and 
commoditization of communal land? 
• Do community members consider that a title from the government would make them feel 
more secure and/or hold a broader scope of rights than they do under the current situation? 
• What role do community members consider to be appropriate for traditional structures to 
play with regards to community matters (including, but not limited to, land matters)? How 
do they perceive the articulations with local forms of State governance? 
 
These questions thus indirectly address the “demand from below” for communal land reform. 
Security of tenure is the first justification put forward by CLaRA. According to CLaRA, it seems 
obvious that people on communal land feel insecure because of the lack of formal titles. There is a 
growing body of evidence – in South Africa and elsewhere on the African continent – that 
customary tenure and the lack of formal titles are not necessarily equivalent to tenure insecurity, 
and that the latter is an empirical question depending on how local tenure systems work in 
practice. The third question is to be viewed in relation to the act’s objective of providing for local 
democratic governance structures for the administration of land and the criticism that too much 
power is potentially given to traditional structures under CLaRA. 
 
 Fieldwork at the Local Level 
The objectives of the study imply understanding the local context, the stakes and conflicts around 
land and power, and the way local people perceive and formulate these stakes. Since very little 
consultation or research has been conducted on communal land reform in South Africa (for a 
recent overview, see Cousins, 2007), this study mainly relies on first-hand data collection in two 
communities in South Africa.  
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Selection of Communities 
An overarching hypothesis of this project was that individuals’ perceptions and positions towards 
land tenure issues and local governance issues were likely to be quite diverse, following two main 
types of heterogeneity: community heterogeneity and individual heterogeneity. The selection of 
the two different communities was made according to the following criteria, which we assumed 
might make a difference in local perceptions towards communal land and traditional leadership:9 
• Rural/Urban Setting: We chose to work with one rural community and a more urban one. 
The integration in a more urban network might imply (i) less dependency on communal 
institutions (such as self-help systems, etc.), and (ii) more familiarity with non-traditional 
modes of local governance, enabling people to make informed comparisons (Cousins, 
1999). 
• Different Provinces: Communal land and traditional settings have diverse statuses in the 
different provinces (Keulder, 1998). We chose one community located in the Limpopo 
province, where traditional leadership is still very powerful, and one located in the North-
West province, were it is less prominent. 
 
In the end, the fieldwork was conducted in the following two communities: 
• Ga-Selepe (hereinafter “Selepe”), a small rural community in a mining area in the 
Limpopo province.  
Ga-Selepe is part of the Fetakgomo Municipality. The community is the Baroka-Ba-
Selepe Community under Chief Difera Albert Selepe and the Roka Selepe Traditional 
Council Brakfontein-Ga Selepe. The language spoken is Pedi. Ga-Selepe was part of the 
former Lebowa homeland. This community was never forcefully removed during 
apartheid, and their written history claims that they have been here since 1862. 
The Atok Platinum Mine exploited by Anglo Platinum has two mining shafts on the 
community’s territory. The mine’s exploratory activities has recently created tension 
among community members and the chief. The mine is also the main source of local jobs 
(although the absolute number of jobs is not very high). The total population of Selepe is 
6,354 and the total number of households is 1,269.10 
• Makapanstad, an urbanized community close to Pretoria. 
Makapanstad is part of the Moratele Municipality and Bojanala District. Makapanstad is 
approximately fifty kilometres north of Pretoria. Although in the North West Province, it 
is characterized by many links to the urban and industrial environments of Gauteng 
(mainly Pretoria). 
                                                   
9
 Initially we had planned to include the criteria of presence/absence of major land or community conflicts. However, 
access to communities in conflict proved to be difficult (the required authorizations from the tribal councils were 
denied on several occasions), leading us to cancel the ‘community-in-conflict’ case-study. 
10
 Numbers communicated by the Ga-Selepe Traditional Authority. 
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The people are living under Chief Motsegwa Hendrick Makapan and the Bakgatla Ba 
Mosethla Traditional Authority. Chief Makapan has under his authority twenty-eight other 
towns. Makapanstad was part of the former independent Homeland Bophuthatswana. The 
language spoken is mainly Tswana. The total population of Makapanstad is about 12,250 
and the total number of households is approximately 2,930.11  
 
Both communities share the following characteristics: agriculture is not the main source of 
activity and income, there are no major conflicts around land and/or governance issues, and there 
was no systematic forceful inward or outward movements of people during apartheid. 
 
Data Collection  
Data collection was organized as follows: 
• secondary data collection and review, including previous studies, local policy and 
planning documents, official statistics, etc.; 
• zoning and interviews with key informants. The latter were conducted in order to (i) get a 
broad image of the different communities, their features, their social organization and 
their issues, or (ii) deepen certain issues identified during the fieldwork (community rules, 
certain problems, etc.). These interviews were semi-structured, with a variable number of 
informants. People interviewed were mainly tribal chiefs, tribal council members, ward 
councillors, community leaders, development workers, local consultancy agencies, etc.; 
and 
• individual questionnaires administered to a sample of ninety community members. We 
used a semi-open questionnaire which addressed the following topics: bundle of rights, 
security of tenure, and local governance (the questionnaire is provided in the appendices). 
 
As the objective was to uncover and better understand the diversity of positions and opinions 
regarding communal land in each community (but not to obtain statistically representative 
samples), a reasoned sampling method was developed. Households were selected according to the 
following criteria that might influence people’s positions on communal land and tribal 
institutions: 
• wealth and social status (proxied by a ranking of house characteristics); 
• age; and 
• gender. 
In the end, a total of forty-five valid questionnaires were administered in each community.  
                                                   
11
 Numbers communicated by Naledi development, 2005 census. 
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Table 2: Sample per Community and Number of Community Member Interviews 
According to Gender, Age and Occupation  
 Selepe Makapanstad Total 
Total Number of Interviews 45 45 90 
Gender    
Women 19 27 46 
Men 26 18 44 
Age group    
[18-30] 3 10 13 
[30-40] 16 5 21 
[40-50] 11 6 17 
>49 15 24 39 
Occupation    
Unemployed 15 19 34 
Self-Employed or Wage Earners 19 11 30 
Pensioners 11 15 26 
 
Interview Implementation Conditions 
Fieldwork was conducted by a team of two masters’ degree students12 between April and June 
2008. The two senior project leaders joined the team for a few days at the beginning of the 
fieldwork to train and assist the students with the on-site application of the semi-structured 
questionnaire, in order to ensure a good level of relevance and quality of the data collected. The 
interviews were conducted on an individual basis. Group interviews were avoided as they might 
easily influence perceptions and positions on sensitive issues such as communal land reform. One 
interview lasted for about one and a half hours, and on average four interviews were conducted 
per day per interviewer. Translation was needed in both communities. Two translators from the 
community were hired in each community. The interviews were not recorded but hand written 
notes were taken and then transcribed electronically. We chose not to display any people’s names, 
except the names of the chiefs, to keep the questionnaires anonymous. The different types of 
difficulties that appeared during the implementation of the fieldwork are described in Box 4. 
 
                                                   
12
 Lorraine Trickey, from the University of Pretoria, and Marie Kientz, from Supagro Montpellier. Marie Kientz also 
performed most of the data analyses and wrote the preliminary report. 
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Box 4: Difficulties Occurring During Field Work 
 
●  Working with communities, particularly on such sensitive issues, is a difficult process that is time and 
resource demanding. As communal land reform, as well as traditional power, present sensitive issues, it 
was not always easy for people to open up and be straightforward about such subjects. Introduction into the 
community was thus necessary; our translators were also essential for this matter. 
●  Linked to the latter, to start working in a community, authorization from the traditional council was 
necessary. This mainly made it impossible to conduct the research in communities characterized by land 
and community conflicts. None of the chiefs of conflict-affected communities authorized the research to go 
on. Consequently, the communities researched only show mild degrees of land and tribal issues. 
●  Another difficulty had to do with the fact that local people did not know about CLaRA, which made the 
conducting of the interviews somewhat tricky, as the main issues had to been dealt with indirectly. For the 
same reason, it was not possible to discuss the deed of communal land rights as such, and it was therefore 
decided to address the transfer of title by talking of title deeds, which people clearly relate to private 
property. Therefore, in the rest of the document, “title deed” refers to a title of private property, and not to 
the deed of communal land rights provided for under CLaRA 
●  The interviews were not conducted in English and four different translators (two in each community) 
were used, which introduced a potential bias. Therefore, the final data is not exactly the discourse of the 
interviewee but a mixed interpretation by the interviewer and translator. For this same reason, discourse 
analysis was not conducted. Nevertheless the repetitive use of some words or expressions by the 
interviewee was noted when relevant. Although countered through more random selection, as members of 
the community, the translators were also a substantial source of potential bias with regards to the selection 
of households (they might have induced us to visit more family and friends, which might over-represent a 
specific group in the community, and they might have prevented us from visiting some people with whom 
they had some issues, even though the issues had nothing to do with the purpose of our study). 
●  A last bias might be linked to household selection. Although diversity was covered within the 
communities, (former) inhabitants not residing in the communities (anymore) were not included. People 
who left the communities for certain (ideological, but also social or professional) reasons and people who 
were expelled  for different reasons (political opposition for example) are absent from the sample. 
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II. CLARA – MAIN FEATURES, KEY ACHIEVEMENTS AND CRITICISMS 
1. CLaRA’s Main Features 
After the Communal Land Rights Bill was issued for comment in August 2002, there were eleven 
drafts submitted before President Mbeki finally signed, and thus enacted, the Communal Land 
Rights Act No. 11 of 2004. The need for communal land tenure reform is not a symbolic exercise 
arising from promises made in the Constitution. Logistically, and from a development standpoint, 
the DLA posits that reform of communal land tenure is necessary to address issues of: 
• overcrowding on communal land, 
• underdevelopment in the communal areas, 
• lack of legally secure tenure rights, 
• conflicting land rights,  
• gender inequalities and inequities in land ownership and inheritance, 
• lack of good and accountable governance around land matters, and 
• chaotic land administration systems occasioned by numerous disparate laws and 
administrative systems (DLA, 2004). 
1.1 CLaRA’s Principles 
As such, CLaRA was designed by the DLA with the objective of providing “legal security of 
tenure by transferring communal land […] to communities, or by awarding comparable address” 
(DLA, 2004a, CLaRA Preamble). This means that eligible applicants, either communities or 
individuals depending on the nature of the claim, will be granted rights in or to land that they 
beneficially occupy;13 Where transfer of the land in question is not possible, applicants will be 
awarded comparable redress in the form of land of equal value, financial compensation, or a 
combination of alternative land and financial compensation. CLaRA seeks to do this by 
transforming an old order right, a tenure or other right in communal land which is formal or 
informal, registered or not derived from or recognised by law, including statutory law, practice or 
usage, into a new order right, a tenure or other right in communal or other land which has been 
confirmed, converted conferred or validated by the Minister in terms of CLaRA (CLaRA, 2004). 
This conversion of old to new order rights is “the demonstration of a new beginning,” according 
to the DLA, as these new order rights are “not only secure but they are also capable of being 
registered in the name of a person or a community” (DLA, 2004a, pg. 12).  
                                                   
13
 Beneficial occupation means “the occupation of land by a person for a continuous period of not less than five years 
prior to 31 December 1997 as if that person was the owner, without force, openly and without the permission of the 
owner.” (CLaRA, 2004a, Chapter 1 Definitions) 
 33 
Section 2 of CLaRA describes the land that is eligible to be applied for under its guidelines. These 
guidelines state: 
 “2.(1) This Act applies to: 
(a) State land which is beneficially occupied and State land which- 
(i) at any time vested in a government contemplated in the Self-governing 
Territories Constitution Act [21 of] 1971, before its repeal or of the Republics 
of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda or Ciskei, or in the South African 
Development Trust established by section 4 of the Development Trust and 
Land Act [18 of] 1936, but not land which vested in the former South African 
Development Trust and which has been disposed of in terms of the State Land 
Disposal Act [48 of] 1961; 
(ii) was listed in the schedules of the Black Land Act [27 of] 1913, before its 
repeal or the schedule of released areas in terms of the Development Trust and 
Land Act [18 of] 1936, before its repeal;  
(b) land to which the KwaZulu-Natal Ingonyama Trust Act [3 KZ of] 1994 applies, to the 
extent provided for in Chapter 9 of this Act; 
(c) land acquired by or for a community whether registered in its name or not; and 
(d) any other land, including land which provides equitable access to land to a community 
as contemplated in section 25(5) of the Constitution.”   
 
The land contemplated in this excerpt is land that is held in trust by the State on behalf of the 
communities that reside on and use it. Under CLaRA, the land transferred will go to the 
community in a Deed of Transfer (with each member of the community receiving a Deed of 
Communal Land Rights) or to individuals within the community in the form of a Deed of 
Transfer. How the land is held depends on the community’s rules, drafted by the community. 
 
This legacy of State custodianship is a poignant reminder of apartheid logic and control, thus 
CLaRA is presented to bring an end to this practice. To accomplish this, the DLA presents 
CLaRA, which they (the DLA) claim:  
 
“democratises the system of land administration by taking an eclectic approach to institutional 
development […] [which is] evident in CLaRA’s attempt to strike a balance between the African 
norms and traditions and the democratic ethos and practice in the administration of communal 
land” (DLA Tenure Newsletter July 2004, pg. 13).  
 
In addition to the institutions provided for under CLaRA, the types of tenure that communities can 
employ under its provisions also reflect of the amalgamation of customary African practices 
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(secure communal tenure) and more individual forms of secure tenure. The three tenure options 
provided for in CLaRA are: 
1. The land can be held communally in title in the name of the community and the individual 
members of the community will be granted registerable Deeds of Communal Land Rights 
for the land they occupy and use.14 This deed is not a title deed but it’s a legal document 
that confirms a person’s or family’s or household’s exclusive occupation and use of the 
land allocated to them in terms of the community’s community rules. The holders of such 
a deed will be able to convert it into freehold ownership, subject to the consent of the 
community. 
2. Communal Land can also be held in terms of freehold ownership by individuals.15 
3.  A hybrid system is also possible, where part of the communal land is held communally, 
and part of the land is held in ownership by members of the community.16 
 
How a community intends to own and administer its land is determined by the community rules it 
drafts. To administer these tenure options, CLaRA provides for the eclectic institutions mentioned 
above and developed in the subsequent section.  
 
1.2 CLaRA’s Institutions 
The eclectic approach to institutions in the Communal Land Rights Act calls for the establishment 
of two integral institutions: the Land Administration Committee (LAC) at local level (s.21-24), 
and the Land Rights Board (LRB) at regional level (s.25-30). These bodies act at their respective 
levels to monitor the access and use of land allocated to the community, among other things as 
developed below. 
 
 The LAC 
The Land Administration Committee is comprised at community level and administers the 
communal land on its behalf. In a community where there is no traditional council, the LAC will 
be elected democratically according to the community rules and to CLaRA Regulations. The 
general criteria for the LAC, listed in CLaRA and its Regulations, are: members must be 18 years 
or older; one third of the membership must be women; vulnerable community members and their 
interests must be represented; and the chairperson, deputy chairperson, secretary and treasurer 
must be elected. A single term for members of the LAC cannot exceed five years, and each 
member can only serve two successive terms. In a community with a recognised traditional 
                                                   
14
  Section 18 (3) a (CLaRA, 2004a). 
15
 Section 18 (3) b. 
16
 Section 18 (3) c. 
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council,17 there must be a democratic decision made whether the traditional council will perform 
the functions of the LAC, or whether “the community will establish a land administration 
committee which is separate and distinct from the recognised traditional council” (DLA, 2007, pg. 
19; CLaRA Regulations). Where a traditional council is democratically allocated the role of LAC, 
they must act in one capacity at a time, i.e. they cannot represent both the traditional council and 
the LAC simultaneously. The option to have a traditional council act as the LAC has been fodder 
for intense debate, as will be discussed in subsequent sections.  
The functions of the LAC are outlined in sections 21-24 of CLaRA and in its Regulations. In 
short, the LAC is responsible for all aspects of community land administration, including 
awarding and registering new order rights to community members; maintaining a community land 
register that accounts for land transactions in the community; documenting all LAC activities and 
meetings; safeguarding and promoting community interests in their land, including inter- and 
intra-community cooperation regarding community land and the resolution of community land 
disputes; and liaising with the municipality and the Land Rights Board about service delivery and 
development on community land. All aspects of the LAC’s activities are subject to the 
community; these rules can assign more roles and responsibilities to the LAC, if necessary. The 
LAC must call meetings and make news about communal land known to the community they 
represent.  
Ultimately, the LAC is accountable to the community and to the Land Rights Board (LRB) for its 
actions. The LRB, DLA, provincial MEC’s of agriculture and local government and the 
municipality (or municipalities) in which the community resides are all considered to be interested 
parties in the LAC’s activities and, as such, can each appoint a non-voting member to the LAC as 
liaisons.  
 
 The Land Rights Board 
The Land Rights Board (LRB) is a body that is formed and disestablished by the Minister of Land 
Affairs. The Minister, taking into account the number of communities and communal land areas, 
decides the area of jurisdiction of each LRB. The Minister appoints the members of the LRB, who 
– as in the LAC – must be one-third women and whose term can last no longer than five years. 
When making these appointments, the Minister must include: 
• one representative from each organ of State determined to be necessary; 
• two members nominated by the Provincial House of Traditional Leaders, who have 
jurisdiction in the area of the particular LRB; 
• one member nominated by the commercial or industrial sector; and 
• seven members from the affected communities, among whom the interests of child-headed 
households, persons with disabilities, youths, and female-headed households must be 
represented (see §26 of CLaRA for more detail).  
                                                   
17
 A recognised traditional council is a re-constituted traditional authority in accordance with the Constitution and 
section 3 of the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003 (TLGFA).  
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The LRB, in addition to monitoring the constitutionality and application of community rules by 
individual communities’ LACs, acts as an advisor to the Minister and to the communities on 
issues of sustainable land ownership, use, and development. Further, it must liaise with the 
spheres of government, civil society and institutions to enable sustainable development and 
service delivery on the communal land in its jurisdiction.  
In KwaZulu-Natal, the Ingonyama Land Trust, formed by the KwaZulu-Natal Ingonyama Land 
Trust Act No. 3 of 1994, will act as the LRB. When CLaRA is implemented, the current members 
of the Ingonyama Land rights Board will be permitted to sit in office for the remainder of their 
term; however, once the terms of the respective members expire, the Ingonyama LRB must be 
constituted in accordance with CLaRA (and the Constitution), with the exception of the 
Ministerial appointments. When the KwaZulu-Natal Ingonyama Land Trust Act is inconsistent 
with CLaRA, the latter will prevail. 
1.3 The CLaRA Process 
CLaRA can be invoked through application by a community whose land meets the criteria listed 
in CLaRA §1(a-c), or it can be enacted by the Minister of Land Affairs, who can publish notice of 
land contemplated in section 1(d) in the government Gazette. In this notification, she must specify 
which provisions of this Act apply to the land. Once CLaRA is invoked, there are simultaneous 
activities to be carried out by the Minister and the government, as well as by the applicant 
community. The Land Rights Enquiry (LRE) and the establishment of community rules are tasks 
that must be undertaken by the Minister and the community respectively.  
 
 The LRE 
The CLaRA process begins with a land audit implemented by the Minister of Land Affairs. This 
land audit, called a Land Rights Enquiry (LRE), determines the validity of the claim (i.e. is the 
land really beneficially occupied by the claimants who possess old order rights?) and the 
feasibility of the claim (i.e. if the claim is valid, is it in the public interest to award land rights, 
comparable redress (financial or alternative land), or a combination of these options?).  
To gather the necessary information (including the above and any other information the Minister 
thinks necessary to inform her determination) the Minister appoints an enquirer. The enquirer can 
be an officer from the DLA, an external party, or a team made up of both the former and the latter. 
The selection criteria for this important position in CLaRA are noted in section 14 of CLaRA, 
which states, in summary, that the enquirer must possess a high-level of integrity and a 
commitment to equity; these characteristics must be matched with skills in facilitation, dispute 
resolution, research, and expertise in land and related topics, development planning, surveying 
and land registration, and the law.  
To begin an LRE, the Minister is required to provide the public with notice of the land and 
communities in question and must provide the contact details of the enquirer(s). In this notice the 
Minister will provide the purpose and scope of the enquiry and invite any interested parties to 
attend a meeting about the enquiry. This meeting will provide more details about the intent and 
potential outcomes of the LRE.  
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Through the LRE process, qualitative information gathered during meetings and interviews allows 
the enquirer to establish the stakeholders, the relationship of the current land and claim with any 
other land reform programme, the municipal obligations to the community, the community’s 
relationship with their traditional council and whether community rules, as prescribed by CLaRA, 
have been established and, if so, what their contents are. In addition to this qualitative 
information, the enquirer must survey the land in question. This survey establishes the outer 
boundaries of the community, and informs the enquirer of all interested parties through a deeds 
search.  
Once the LRE is completed, the enquirer submits a report to the Minister. Based on this report, 
the Minister must make a determination on the land claim. First, she needs to ascertain from the 
report if the claim falls under the criteria set by CLaRA and, therefore, if the claim should 
proceed. Then she must measure the public interest in terms of awarding the rights in or to land or 
the need to award comparable redress in one of the three forms previously described (alternative 
land, financial compensation, or a combination of the two). 
 
 Community Rules 
All communities subject to CLaRA must draft community rules that describe their community, its 
land, and how they plan to use and administer that land. To begin the process of drafting 
community rules, the community must notify the land rights enquirer and LRB responsible for its 
jurisdiction; these parties will assist by convening a community meeting to this end. If the 
community needs assistance in drafting their rules, they can apply to the Minister who will 
appoint an officer of the DLA to assist them. The land rights enquirer must attend all meetings 
concerning the community rules and document these meetings.  
The community members must decide upon the content of the rules in an informed and 
democratic manner during these meetings, although basic content guidelines are provided in 
CLaRA regulations. At minimum, the community rules must cover the administration and use of 
communal land, the form of tenure to be applied, what new order rights entail in the particular 
community, who is a community member (including acquisition and disposal of membership), the 
LAC’s functions in accordance with the Act, procedural rules for the LAC, decision making and 
dispute resolution processes, land identification, and the management of finances of the 
community relating to land (CLaRA Regulations Annexure D, 2007). All rules must be compliant 
with CLaRA and with the Constitution, and are subject to any other applicable law (CLaRA 
§19(1)).  
Once the community decides that the rules are complete, they must be forwarded in writing and 
with the signature of the meeting’s chairperson to the LRB responsible for the community within 
fourteen days of adoption by the community. The rules must be read and approved by the 
Director-General of the LRB; if the Director-General finds the rules to be insufficient or 
inappropriate, s/he must return the rules to the community with comments and instructions for 
suitable amendments. Once the Director-General of the LRB accepts the community rules, s/he is 
to respond in writing and refer the rules and any supporting documents to the Registry Office to 
be officially registered and entered into the public domain.  
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Once the community rules are complete and approved by the Director-General of the LRB, the 
community is then a juristic person in terms of §4(1) of CLaRA and is eligible to receive rights in 
or to land. Whether this happens or not depends on the determination of the Minister, based on the 
LRE report.  
1.4 CLaRA’s Key Achievements to Date 
Once enacted, the years 2004 and 2005 were devoted to explaining and justifying CLaRA. As 
such, the DLA’s Tenure Newsletter published in July 2004 addressed concerns from communities 
and critics, defending CLaRA with the same arguments as always. In addition, the DLA 
responded to an article published about CLaRA and pointed out several misunderstandings. As 
such, Minister Didiza reassured readers that land will be transferred to communities as owners 
and not to traditional leaders, and Sibanda responded that the communities have a choice for LAC 
and that traditional leadership is an option, but it is the democratic right of the people in the 
community to choose. 
While admitting that CLaRA’s implementation will take more than 15 years, the implementation 
date is set for June 2005 in DLA’s December newsletter. However, there is still confusion among 
community members, civil society and traditional leaders as to what the DLA plans to do under 
CLaRA. And it was during the National Land Summit, organised by the ANC and the SACP and 
held on 27-31 July 2005, that rumours of activists’ plans to legally challenge CLaRA began 
circulating. Community members from homeland areas and civil society complained that 
communal land issues were not discussed in the tenure session, and they were very frustrated. The 
DLA had become aware in January 2006 of the plans to challenge CLaRA. While collecting 
information about the challenge, the DLA would defend CLaRA as it is, and would continue 
planning for its implementation. Being motivated to take CLaRA forward and to implement it 
under any circumstance, it published the Communal Land Rights Act National Implementation 
document on 19 April, about ten days after the LRC had announced a Constitutional Court case to 
challenge CLaRA.  
Several months of silence regarding CLaRA followed. These months – while CLaRA was 
awaiting its court case – were characterised by the DLA preparing for implementation. As such, it 
published a framework on 19 April, 2006, outlining implementation responsibilities and 
obstacles: 
• CPIs are not working well, which can be linked to their design and establishment. 
• The DLA has inadequate baseline data to plan the implementation of CLaRA. Baseline 
studies were subsequently implemented. 
• Departmental capacities and coordination are not conducive to implementing CLaRA as a 
national programme. Reflection regarding the latter are engaged.  
• The estimated total cost of implementing CLaRA is 8,487,732,022.00 rand, which is more 
than the amount presently budgeted. 
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On 8 February 2008, the DLA also published and gazetted the Draft Regulations for CLaRA. 
Comments are due on 8 April 2008. In the meantime, on 3 and 4 April, it organised consultation 
workshops at the overall level on the regulations with Traditional Leaders and civil society in 
Durban. It also organised more local consultation workshops, however these were implemented in 
a more secretive way and included mainly traditional leaders. But since the Presidential elections 
were approaching rapidly (expected for April 2009), the consultation in KZN was cancelled and 
all legislative debates and processes were interrupted so as not to cause any political instabilities 
and upheavals. 
On 14-17 October, a first court hearing took place in CLaRA’s constitutional challenge. Four 
communities (Kalkfontein, Makuleke, Makgobistad, and Dixie) took part in the process. 
2. Criticisms and Major Positions Regarding CLaRA 
2.1 Criticisms of CLaRA  
Patelike Holomisa, ANC MP and president of the Congress of Traditional Leaders of SA 
(Contralesa), declared when the act was passed that, “The Communal Land Rights Act 2004 is a 
progressive piece of legislation that promotes gender inclusively and democracy while giving due 
recognition to traditional leadership. Opponents of the act are wasting their apparently vast 
resources if they think the role of traditional leaders over land can ever be diminished.”18 
Criticisms of CLaRA came from various parties, at various stages of its development process. The 
following criticisms – reproduced as stated by the criticisers – were made: 
 
• Procedural Challenge: The Act has a major impact on customary law and the powers of 
traditional leaders, both of which, in terms of the Constitution, are functions of provincial 
government. Thus, it should have followed the Section 76 parliamentary procedure that 
enables input by the provinces. Instead it was rushed through parliament using the section 
75 procedure. The Constitution provides that laws that deal with provincial functions 
should follow the section 76 procedure and those that deal with national functions should 
follow the section 75 procedure.  Because the wrong parliamentary procedure was 
followed the Act is invalid. 
• Section 25 – Tenure and Property rights: An intrinsic feature of systems of property rights 
is the ability to make decisions about the property. Under customary systems of property 
rights decisions are taken at different levels of social organisation, including at the level of 
the family. By transferring ownership at the level of the “community” and individual only, 
CLaRA undermines decision-making power and control at other levels. This is 
particularly serious when disputed tribal authority boundaries are imposed as the “default” 
boundaries of communities. The end result will be that CLaRA will undermine security of 
tenure in breach of section 25(6) of the Constitution. Within the boundaries of existing 
tribal authorities are groups of people with property rights in the land. They are deprived 
                                                   
18
 ‘South Africa: Africa's Rural Communities Poised to Reap Fruits of Freedom’. Business Day, 20 October 2004. 
 40 
of their property rights when ownership of their land is taken from existing structures and 
vested by CLaRA in imposed Traditional Council structures or other structures created by 
CLaRA. 
• Equality: The Act conflicts with the equality clause in relation to both gender and race. It 
does not provide substantive equality for rural women because it entrenches the 
patriarchal power relations that render women vulnerable. The 33% quota for women in 
traditional councils is not sufficient to offset this problem because the women may be 
selected by the senior traditional leader. Moreover 33% is too low in the context that 
women make up almost 60% of the rural population. While the Act seeks to secure the 
tenure rights of married women it undermines the tenure rights of single women, who are 
a particularly vulnerable category of people. The Act also treats black owners of land 
differently from white owners of land, who are not subjected to the regulatory regime 
imposed by CLaRA. Moreover section 28(1)-(4) of the TLGFA entrenches the power of 
controversial apartheid-era institutions that were imposed only on black South Africans. 
• Fourth Tier of Government: The Constitution provides for only three levels of government 
– national, provincial and local. The powers given to land administration committees, 
including traditional councils acting as land administration committees, make them a 
fourth tier of government in conflict with the Constitution. 
 
The criticisms against CLaRA are crystallised in the court challenge it faces for 
unconstitutionality. Four rural communities represented by the Legal Resource Centre and Weber 
Wetzel Bowens Attorneys are challenging the act19 notably on the grounds that the act conflicts 
with the equality clause in relation to both gender and race, and that it does not provide security of 
tenure for groups of people with property rights regarding the land within the boundaries of 
existing tribal authorities. They argue that they are deprived of their property rights when 
ownership of their land is taken from existing structures and vested by CLaRA in imposed 
Traditional Council structures or other structures created through CLaRA (for more on the legal 
challenge of CLaRA see the appendices). 
Besides the criticisms alimenting the court case, two more issues mushroomed: 
• Lack of Capacity: CLaRA bestows many new roles and responsibilities to several 
departments and levels of government, including the DLA itself. There are concerns, 
when looking at the National Implementation Framework for CLaRA (NIF), that the 
assignment of these roles and responsibilities was made without regard for the capacity 
levels of the various implementing bodies. A major issue is the complexity of the rights 
that will be transferred by CLaRA and the ability of the DLA and its implementing 
partners to deal with the disputes that arise from the transfers.20 Currently, the DLA is 
                                                   
19
 For more information, see Legal Resource Centre, Legal Challenge of the Communal Land Rights Act-Overview, 
April 2006. 
20
 Portfolio Committee on Agriculture and Land Affairs, National Assembly, Report on public hearings on Communal 
Land, held on 11-14 November 2003. 
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awaiting the approval of a new staffing structure that takes into account the human 
resources needed to implement CLaRA. It is envisaged that after the regulations are tabled 
in parliament in early 2009, implementation can begin with the setting up of land rights 
boards in the different provinces.  
• Budgetary Constraints: There is concern that the cost of implementing CLaRA will far 
surpass the budget allocated to the DLA. At the time CLaRA was passed, it did not have 
an official budget accompanying it; estimates placed the cost of its implementation at 
approximately 68 million rand over five years of implementation (Wisbourg & Rhode, 
2005); this excludes the approximately ten years of planning and preparation for CLaRA. 
In the National Implementation Framework, this figure has increased exponentially to 
8.48 billion rand over the five-year implementation period. In 2008, the total budget 
allocation to the Department of Land Affairs was 4 to 6 billion, including provincial 
allocations for all its programmes, duties and costs (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 
(PMG), 2008). Clearly this raises concerns about the ability of the DLA to finance 
CLaRA – along with its other programmes and responsibilities – if the NIF is accurate.  
2.2 Issues Regarding CLaRA and the Divers Positions of the Different Actors 
This part details the major issues that mushroomed from the debates around the development of 
CLaRA, and analyses the different positions of the different stakeholders regarding it. Based on 
the total contributions, besides the ANC and the DLA, NADECO, and the Portfolio Committee on 
Agriculture and Land Affairs, which deal directly with the Act, about thirty-two actors are 
engaged directly in CLaRA’s consultation process. The latter included national trade unions, 
national commissions, traditional representations, academic institutions, councils/movements, 
NGOs and communities (Table 3). 
 
Table 3: Institutions which Contributed Directly to the CLaRA Consultation Process 
Type of Actor (number of 
actors) 
Actor 
National Trade Unions (2) COSATU, NUM 
National Commissions (2) Commission for Gender Equality, SA Human Rights Commission 
Traditional Representations 
(national/regional) (3) 
National House of Traditional Leaders, Congress of Traditional Leaders of South 
Africa, Royal Bafokeng 
Academic Institutions (2) Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS, Wits University), PLAAS (University 
of Western Cape) 
Councils/Movements (4) South African Council of Churches, Landless People’s Movement, NLC, Rural 
Women’s Movement 
NGOs (12) Legal Entity Assessment Project (LEAP), ANCRA, Joint Monitoring Committee 
on Improvement of Quality of Life and Status of Women, Legal Resources 
Centre, Masifunde NGO, Nkuzi Development Association, Umbumbano 
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Lwabesifazane, Transvaal Rural Action Committee (TRAC) Mpumalanga, 
TRALSO, Women’s Legal Centre, AFRA, TCOE 
Communities (7 groups, 
representing at least 29 
communities) 
 
Dwesa-Cwebe, Mpumalanga Consultative Group on Land (Kangwane, Lebowa 
and KwaNdebele), Hlanganani-Polokwane, Kalkfontein, Kgalagadi (fifteen 
communities of Northern Cape Province), Madikwe, Greater Manyeleti Land 
Rights Group (Utha, Dixie, Gottenburg  C and Serville B villages), 
Sekhukhuneland Ad Hoc Committee on Land (five local municipalities: Marble 
Hall, Groblersdal, Tubatse, Fetakgomo and Makhuduthamaga and their rural 
communities) 
 
Overall, according to the debates and contributions, several controversies appeared (presented in 
order of importance, identified through their re-occurrence in the contributions): (1) the powers of 
traditional leadership in land administration, (2) the rights of women to land, (3) the consultative 
process for the Act, (4) the constitutionality of the Act, (5) whether communal ownership as 
opposed to private ownership should be retained, and finally (6) the powers of the Minister. 
 Different Positions on the Powers of Traditional Leadership in Land Administration 
Considering the discussions around CLaRA, perhaps the most controversial issue raised has been 
the role of traditional leaders in relation to land and land management. This was the major focus 
of public debates when the draft law was discussed in parliament in late 2003 and early 2004, and 
many of the submissions by civil society and community groups emphasized these issues 
(Claassens & Cousins, 2008, pg. 20). It appeared during the debates that the issue of power as 
such was not problematic, but CLaRA institutionalising the present powers seems to trouble a 
majority of actors. 
The National House of Traditional Leaders (National and Provincial Houses of Traditional 
Leaders, the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa and the Royal Bafokeng Nation) 
argues that traditional councils are directly accountable to their people, who in addition participate 
in decision-making on all major matters (including the fundamental bases on which land rights are 
to be dealt with in the community). They note that traditional leaders are not entitled to make 
decisions that are contrary to the will of the people. 
More nuanced, a few introduced a condition that communal land reform should ensure the 
democratization of the allocation of land rights at community levels, including the functioning of 
traditional leadership. They propose that provision should be made for the Land Rights Board to 
use its powers to monitor the participation of traditional leaders at community levels. They argue 
that, to avoid confusion, the Bill and later the Act should indicate clearly that it is up to the 
community to decide who should serve on its land administration committee. There should be no 
possibility of a traditional council seizing control of land administration over the objections of the 
community. 
However, the large majority, including activists and all the all the communities who participated 
in the consultation process, were against the Bill/Act’s provisions regarding powers of traditional 
leadership in land administration. Indeed, from the discussions and contributions, strong 
contestation appeared around the perceived – increased or institutionalised – powers of traditional 
leadership in land administration. Opponents felt that the traditional council is an unelected, and 
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therefore inherently undemocratic, institution. This lack of democratic practice would be carried 
over to land administration. As such, it was noted that the bill does not provide any checks on the 
powers of traditional leaders. According to them, democratic means that institutions must be 
elected by both men and women of the affected community and must be accountable and 
transparent. Several NGOs confirmed the latter by stating that traditional authority structures as 
they are now in South Africa, and many other parts of Africa, are a construct of the colonial 
regimes specifically established to solve the "native problem" through indirect rule. Even where 
traditional councils function well and in the interests of their communities they remain essentially 
undemocratic. It emphasizes that it must provide for democratic institutions to allocate, administer 
and control communal land.  
As such, Section 21(2) states that if a community has a recognised traditional council, the powers 
and duties of the land administration committee of such community ‘may’ (highlighted by 
researcher) be exercised and performed by such council. Most of the activists and all the 
communities who participated in the consultation process argued that this is against the principle 
of transferring control of land to its rightful owners.21 Hence, it is argued that the Bill/Act favours 
Traditional Leaders, who are said to be fighting democratically established CPA’s implemented to 
administer land in the villages.22 As such, one of the communities notes that the problem is that 
the traditional council that will take over the powers and duties of the land administration 
committee has a composition that is not consistent with the principle of democracy in that 40% of 
its members are to be elected members and the majority are to be appointed by the chief. A further 
problem highlighted is that the community has no power to replace the council if it is found to be 
incompetent or corrupt. In addition, the Bill does not give communities choices to say what 
institutions should administer their land – Section 21(2) read with definitions of the Land 
Administration Committee in Section 1. Lastly, it is mentioned that the Bill/Act will also create 
problems of traditional councils claiming jurisdiction over communities who historically owned 
the land and those who bought it for themselves. 
 
                                                   
21
 “We cannot administer our land since the Bill intends to give powers and functions to chiefs who do not have rights 
over our land and do not represent our community” (community contribution). 
22
 “For now the democratically elected CPA committee have duties to administer the communities affairs. The Chief is 
totally against the existence of the CPA and wants full control. Section 39 of this Bill will make this possible. This 
will go against the wishes of the community who favours the CPA to have control” (community contribution). 
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Table 4: Major Positions on the Provisions Regarding the Powers of Traditional 
Leadership in Land Administration 
AGAINST INTERMEDIATE FOR 
LPM: 
- The Bill has no checks on 
traditional powers. 
- It must provide for elected, 
democratic institutions. 
 
PLAAS:  
- Democratic and accountable 
institutions for land administration 
are not provided for in the Bill.  
- The Bill allows ‘traditional 
councils’ in areas where the latter 
have been recognised or 
established (defined in the 
Traditional Leadership and 
Governance Framework Bill 
(section 25(3)). 
- No mechanisms to ensure 
accountability are provided. 
 
Nkuzi Development Association:  
Traditional councils remain 
undemocratic  
– The Bill must encourage and 
strengthen democratic structures. 
 
Dwesa-Cwebe community: 
- The Bill will favour traditional 
leaders who are currently fighting 
CPA’s established to administer 
land in the villages. 
- The Bill does not give 
communities choices to say what 
institutions should administer their 
land. 
 
Mpumalanga Consultative Group 
on Land:  
- The Bill gives traditional leaders 
ownership and administrative 
powers in communal lands. 
Traditional leaders will abuse these 
powers. 
 
Kalkfontein community: 
- The Bill intends to give powers 
COSATU and NUM:  
- Communal land reform, with 
mechanisms to ensure the 
democratization of the allocation of 
land rights at community level. 
- Provision for a Land Rights Board 
monitoring the participation of 
traditional leaders at community 
levels. 
 
SACC:  
- The less rigid approach (“may”) is 
welcomed, but its implications are 
unclear.  
- To avoid confusion, clear 
indication that community should 
decide who should serve on its land 
administration committee.  
 
CGE:  
- Traditional leadership and 
traditional communities are not 
democratic and highly patriarchal. 
- Their legitimacy and recognition 
is a contested issue could lead to 
further divisions and conflicts. 
 
Masifunde (NGO):  
- LACs are an extension of 
apartheid policies, and can lead to 
disputes. 
National House of Traditional 
Leaders: 
- Traditional Councils are directly 
accountable to their people. 
- People do participate in decision-
making on all major matters 
(including land).  
- Traditional leaders are not 
entitled to make decisions that are 
contrary to the will of the people. 
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and functions to chiefs or to 
existing traditional council who do 
not have rights over our land and 
do not represent our community 
 
Kgalagadi: 
- The Bill will also create problems 
of traditional councils claiming 
jurisdiction over communities who 
historically owned the land and 
those who bought it for themselves 
(Section 39 will further strengthen 
these claims, e.g. the community of 
Cwaing was recently restituted). 
- Chiefs are against the existence of 
the CPA and want full control. 
Section 39 of this Bill will make 
this possible. 
 
Madikwe community: 
- Traditional councils will take over 
the powers and duties of the land 
administration committees (their 
composition is not consistent with 
the principle of democracy, in that 
40% of its members are to be 
elected members and the majority 
are to be appointed by the chief). 
 
 Major Positions on Women’s Rights to Land 
Another key controversy generated by CLaRA during its progression from the CLRB to CLaRA 
was the issue of the rights of women to own land as individuals, without having to depend on 
their spouses, be represented within the communal representative bodies and, overall, to have 
recognised rights comparable to the ones of their male counterparts. 
As for the previous issue, the National House of Traditional Leaders emphasise that the 
participation of women and youths in decision-making processes and forums is increasingly 
becoming a common feature of life in the rural communal areas. According to them, due to the 
fact that the determining factor is a question of need, unmarried women do qualify for land 
allocation whenever they prove, like everyone else, that they have the means to sustain 
themselves and have dependents to support. As such, married women would enjoy equal access to 
family allotments as husbands. The traditional leaders note that they accordingly do not object to 
the registration of allotments in the names of both spouses. 
Although many contributors nuance these statements, the opposition is not as straightforward as 
in the previous issue (regarding the powers of traditional leadership in land administration). 
Without opposing the provisions regarding women as they agree that there is reference to women 
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in the Bill, they argue that it does not give unequivocal provisions for women’s equality with men 
in as far as access to land is concerned. They underscore that the Minister may confer new order 
rights on a woman who is a spouse of a male holder of an old order right, but note that there is no 
guarantee that the Minister will do so. Once again, the ‘may’ (“the Minister may confer ‘new 
order rights’ on women,” as stated in the Bill and Act, emphasis added) causes incertitude.23 
There is, however, a majority feeling amongst women activists that Government has taken a 
laissez-faire approach to women’s issues in land (SACC, for example). They assert that merely 
passing legislation that states women are equal to men in land allocation is not enough because 
the majority of the rural areas still operate in a patriarchal manner that undermines the day-to-day 
rights of women’s access to and ownership of land. As such, it is notes that the Bill tends to 
address gender equality in form rather than substance. Women’s movements and land sector 
NGOs pointed to the fact that recognition of old order rights would strengthen past discriminatory 
policies which only recognised male ownership of land. Put forward by many contesters is the 
example of PTO certificates that were only issued to men during the apartheid era. As such, the 
main tool envisaged by the Bill is a process of formalising old order rights. They note that, in 
reality, women are not holders of old order rights (because under customary law, land was only 
allocated to men), and will thus be marginalised during the implementation of CLaRA. It would 
lead to a perpetuation of the vestiges of the past, i.e. recognition of old order rights perceived to 
be continuing apartheid era policies and were only given to men. Academic institutions confirm 
the latter by stating that measures dealing with gender equality in relation to land rights (e.g. 
sections 24(3) (a) (1), 19 (4) (d) and 18 (1)) are weak and unconvincing and are likely to be 
overridden by the provision that traditional councils dominated by traditional leaders will allocate 
land, and can do so on the basis of custom,24 which provides that they are to “administer the 
affairs of the traditional community in accordance with custom and tradition.” 
Contributions also highlighted the Bill’s potential devastating effect on women – termed “double 
discrimination.” The LRC highlight the fact that the insecure tenure faced by African women is 
not only because they are women but because they are also African. Oppressive legislation 
enacted under the apartheid era such as the Black Administration Act, the Development Trust and 
Land Act, and the Black Areas Land Act affected only African women and not other races.  
Consequently, according to Section 25(6) of the constitution, African women can be described as, 
“people whose tenure of land is insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or 
practices.” The vesting of land administration in male dominated, unelected structures as well as 
the recognition of old orders rights, hitherto only given to men, will not provide African women 
with tenure that is legally secure or with comparable redress. As such, the LRC noted that not 
only would this Act be discriminatory towards women, it would also be inconsistent with section 
25(6) of the Constitution. 
 
                                                   
23
 “Women face serious problems under communal tenure. We are concerned that this section of the Bill states 
that the Minister may confer ‘new order rights’ on women. The word ‘may’ gives the impression that this may 
not be enforced.” (community contribution) 
24
 They refer as such to the definition of ‘old order rights in section 1, together with section 4 (f) of the TLGFB. 
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Table 5: Major Positions on Women’s Rights to Land 
AGAINST INTERMEDIATE FOR 
CALS:  
- The ‘hands-off’ approach of 
government in the Bill renders 
women vulnerable as they are not 
likely to access land fairly and in 
equal manner. 
 
CGE:  
- Only right ‘derived from or 
recognized by the law is a 
derivative or secondary and 
temporary right.  
- The legal rights created CLaRA 
are therefore highly gendered and 
discriminate against women. 
 
Joint Monitoring Committee on 
Improvement of Quality of Life 
and Status of Women: 
- The main tool envisaged by the 
Bill/Act is a process of confirming 
old order rights. 
- Women are not holders of old 
order rights under customary law, 
and will thus miss out. 
 
PLAAS:  
- Measures dealing with gender 
equality in relation to land rights 
are weak and unconvincing.  
- Likely to be overridden by the 
provision that traditional councils 
dominated by traditional leaders. 
 
SACC:  
- Although Bill states that new 
order tenure rights may vest in 
women, the Bill does not guarantee 
women access to land or security of 
tenure. 
- As the Bill envisions that land 
will be administered by traditional 
authorities, this problem is likely to 
be perpetuated. 
 
LRC: 
- Double discrimination of ‘African 
women.’ The Bill does not provide 
ANCRA: 
- Although there is reference to 
women in the Bill it does not give 
unequivocal provisions for 
women’s equality with men in as 
far as access to land is concerned. 
- Rather the rights to be conferred 
to women are vested in the 
minister’s discretion. 
 
Masifunde (NGO): 
- The Minister may confer new 
order rights on a woman who is a 
spouse of a male holder of an old 
order right. There is no guarantee 
that the Minister will do so. 
 
Kgalagadi: 
- The Bill does not give guarantees 
as to women’s access to land. 
 
Madikwe community: 
- Section 18(4)(b), determination by 
Minister (Women). Women face 
serious problems under communal 
tenure. We are concerned that this 
section of the Bill states that the 
Minister may confer ‘new order 
rights’ on women. The word ‘may’ 
gives the impression that this may 
not be enforced. 
 
 
National House of Traditional 
Leaders: 
- Participation of women and the 
youth in decision-making 
processes and forums is 
increasingly common. 
- Unmarried women do qualify for 
land allocation if they have means 
to sustain themselves and 
dependents.  
-Married women enjoy equal 
access to family allotments as 
husbands. 
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African women with legally secure 
tenure or comparable redress. The 
Bill is therefore inconsistent with 
the constitutional requirement. 
 
Kalkfontein Community: 
- The Bill does not redress the 
injustices, but create a situation 
where women do not have secure 
land lights and reinforce the 
customary prohibition of allocating 
the land to women. 
 
Sekhukhuneland Ad Hoc 
Committee on Land: 
Women, and in particular un-
married women, have no access to 
land rights (see §24(3)(a)(i)). 
 
Also of concern to (women) activists was the notion that strengthening the power of traditional 
structures over land allocation would be retrogressive since these structures were already 
undermining women due to their patriarchal nature.25 The final Act as enacted into law did try to 
alleviate these concerns by inserting various clauses that strengthened the equality of women in 
land matters, as well as address the concern of formalising old order rights. However, the sections 
dealing with the powers of traditional structures in relation to land allocation and administration 
were left largely unchanged. CLaRA makes provision for 30% representation of women on the 
land administration committee. This is seen as not being enough. Some women in KwaZulu Natal 
have voiced concerns regarding their participation in traditional decision-making structures. They 
note that most women are not even aware what role they are supposed to be playing in these 
structures and at times are not even informed when the meetings are taking place.26 
 Positions on the Act’s Consultative Process 
The Department of Land Affairs asserts that no Bill in the department’s history has been 
consulted upon as much as the CLRB which led to CLaRA (DLA, 2004). However, besides 
traditional authorities, critics of the Act argue that there was very little consultation on the part of 
Government (except with traditional leaders).  
Of interest is the fact that land sector activists do not comment much on the extent of consultation 
on the Bill prior to the October 2003 version. For their part, the National Land 
Committee/PLAAS initiative received funding from DFID in July 2002 to embark on a 
consultation and lobbying exercise which also encompassed extensive use of the media. This 
                                                   
25
 “The Bill has inherited the injustice of the Past Laws, e.g. the Code of Zulu Law says that women could not own 
property. The Bill provides for PTO’s to be converted into new order rights but the PTO’s are issued to men only 
which is discriminatory against women.” (Community contribution) 
26
 Discussion with the head of the Rural Women’s Movement. 
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culminated in several communities appearing before the portfolio committee during the 
November 2003 parliamentary process. This being said, major objections to the Government’s 
assertion regarding its extensive consultation appeared, on one hand, after publication of the 
October 2003 version which had substantial changes relating to the powers of land administration 
committees in land allocation and, on the other hand, regarding the amendments made just before 
passing the Bill through Parliament. Criticisms are threefold: (1) the consultation process was not 
ideal, (2) consultations were selective, and (3) the effective consideration of the consultation 
process was questioned. 
Firstly, land sector activists and local communities assert that the review period given for 
comments after the publishing of the October 2003 version was extremely insufficient (3 weeks). 
In addition, they noted that the language and communication media used were often inaccessible 
to local communities.27, 28  
Secondly, many felt that some actors were more consulted than others. This is particularly the 
case with the traditional leaders, who are criticised of being predominant in the process. The DLA 
(and the ANC) is accused of favouring them. On contrary, many other, especially local 
communities, indicated not being integrated in the consultation process.29 In addition, in May 
2008, a senior DLA official admitted that there had not been sufficient consultation with rural 
communities, but instead mainly with traditional leaders. Consultations in the provinces were to 
only take place in June 2008 after the workshop on regulations in Durban in April 2008.30 The 
official also highlighted that, as in 2004 before the elections, consultations in the rural 
communities in KwaZulu Natal had to be stopped until after the 2009 elections on the orders of 
the ruling party in that province. 
Thirdly, many questioned the relevance of the consultations as they felt that their point of view 
was not taken into consideration.31 As such, they pointed to the added sections dealing with the 
powers of the LAC and see this as a pre-election “pact” between traditional leaders and the ruling 
ANC party. This links up with the constitutionality of the Bill.  
                                                   
27
 “The information dissemination process was not rural areas friendly since there are little if no access to the 
internet or televisions and this also relates to the question of language. Today we are here through short notice 
and we only had time for preparations on this presentation over the weekend.” (Community contribution) 
28
 “Between 2001 and 30 October 2003, we had never heard anything about the Bill either from government 
officials or other people in the area where I live. We only got to know about the Bill through PondoCROP on 30 
October 2003, an organisation that is working in our area.” (Community contribution) 
29
 “There have been no consultations with the communities represented by the Dwesa/Cwebe Land Trust and the 
seven CPA’s. We only heard about the Bill for the first time in 2001 at the Tenure Conference in Durban.”; “We 
were not informed or consulted. We heard about the CLRB just recently through our lawyers. The timing was 
very short and inappropriate. We had to rush from Mpumalanga to Cape Town at short notice to make our 
presentation.” (community contributions) 
30
 Interview with Senior DLA official in May 2008. 
31
 “Too little time was given for community consultations. Numerous changes were made to the Bill that we the 
community were not aware of and none of those changes were communicated to us by the DLA.” (community 
contribution) 
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Table 6: Positions on the Act’s Consultative Process 
AGAINST INTERMEDIATE FOR 
National House of Traditional 
Leaders (National and Provincial 
Houses of 
Traditional Leaders, the Congress 
of Traditional Leaders of South 
Africa and the Royal Bafokeng 
Nation): 
- Consultations were significant 
and representative. 
South African Council of Churches 
(SACC):  
- The review and consultation 
period on the current draft was too 
brief to permit one to develop and 
explore the implications of 
potential amendments. 
 
ANCRA:  
- Insufficient participation of 
communities. Process was not clear 
and transparent and the 
communities remained uninformed 
about changes in the Bill and due 
processes to table the Bill. 
 
CALS:  
- As the changes required to the 
Bill are not possible for Parliament 
to effect, it is recommended that 
this version of the Bill (which 
differs in material respects from 
earlier versions) be subjected to a 
longer process of consultation. 
- Consultation excluded women’s 
groups in rural areas. 
 
CGE:  
- Concerns about the fast tracking 
of this Bill through the 
Parliamentary process, about lack 
of adequate consultation with rural 
communities, and about a biased 
processes favouring Traditional 
leaders. 
 
LPM:  
- No dissemination about the Bill. 
No real consultation was carried 
out with the people, or with well-
known representatives of the 
people such as the LPM. 
 
Masifunde (NGO):  
- The process of developing this 
Bill has not been democratic and 
transparent. 
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Dwesa-Cwebe community: 
- There have been no consultations 
with the communities represented 
by the Dwesa/Cwebe Land Trust 
and the 7 CPA’s.  
 
Hlanganani-Polokwane 
Community: 
- Dissemination of information on 
this Bill leaves much to be desired.  
- The overwhelming majority of 
residents are not aware of the Bill. 
 
Kalkfontein community: 
- We were not informed or 
consulted. We heard about the 
CLRB just recently through our 
lawyers. 
- The timing was very short and 
inappropriate. 
 
Kgalagadi: 
-Too little time was given for 
community consultations.  
- Numerous changes were made to 
the Bill that we the community 
were not aware of and none of 
those changes were communicated 
to us by the DLA.  
- The information dissemination 
process was not rural area–friendly.  
 
It made activists, civil society and academics conclude that the process was not transparent and 
not inclusive. If the consultation process was criticised overall, the lack of inclusion of specific 
groups, mainly local communities and women’s groups, was highlighted by several activists.  
 
 Positions on the Constitutionality of the Act 
Issues concerning the constitutionality of the Act centred on four major aspects. 
Firstly, there was the procedural challenge. Here, opponents of the Bill argued that it should have 
gone through parliament as an ‘§76 Bill’ (one which affects the provinces since CLaRA deals 
with issues of customary law and traditional leadership) and not as an ‘§75 Bill’ (one which does 
not affect the provinces). The §75 process allows for a shorter parliamentary process since there is 
no need for debate in the national council of provinces. There are some who hold the view that 
this route was used as a way of fast-tracking the Bill through parliament; they subsequently 
deemed the Act invalid. The State argued that the Bill dealt with land matters, and land was 
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reserved for National government only. Issues of customary law and traditional leadership (which 
must be discussed at provincial level) were considered as secondary aspects in the CLRB and, as 
such, did not warrant the Bill being discussed in the provinces. 
Secondly, the setting up of duplicate and overlapping decision-making structures in the CLRB 
masks the fact that the practical effect of the Bill will be that new order right holders will not 
exercise ownership powers in terms of the determinations made by the Minister, but they will in 
fact be governed by LACs in terms of community rules. As such, mainly the LRC argued that the 
CLRB and the TLGFB established a fourth sphere of government, constituted by the 
administration committees, which is not provided for in the Constitution.32 Read together, the 
CLRB and the TLGFB provide for the exercise of public administrative powers and ownership 
powers by traditional leaders in terms of custom and tradition (LRC submission to portfolio 
Committee, Nov. 2003). 
Thirdly, the Act is seen by its opponents as alienating the rights of those who currently have 
secure individual tenure rights in communal areas by vesting all the rights in the community as 
represented by the LAC. This violates section 25(6) of the Constitution, which seeks to provide 
legally secure tenure.  
Fourthly, and linked to the above mentioned issues, the Act does provide for the equality of men 
and women in land administration. The Rural Women’s Movement asserted that the 33% quota 
for women on the LAC is seen as inadequate. 
 
Table 7: Positions on the Constitutionality of the Act 
AGAINST INTERMEDIATE FOR 
National House of Traditional 
Leaders (National and Provincial 
Houses of Traditional Leaders, the 
Congress of Traditional Leaders of 
South Africa and the Royal 
Bafokeng Nation):  
- progressive piece of legislation 
that promotes gender inclusively 
and democracy while giving due 
recognition to traditional 
leadership 
Joint Monitoring Committee on 
Improvement of Quality of Life 
and Status of Women:  
- Is concerned because the Bill 
does not address the issue of 
gender equality in a manner 
consistent with the provisions of 
the Constitution. 
 
LRC:  
- The CLRB and the TLGFB 
provide powers to traditional 
leaders in terms of custom and 
tradition. In this form, the Bills 
create a fourth sphere of 
government 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
32
 The Constitution made provision for only three levels: national, provincial and local. 
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PLAAS:  
- The constitutional requirement 
that tenure legislation provide for 
comparable redress in the event 
that land rights cannot be secured 
due to overlapping rights 
(see Section 25(6) of the Bill of 
Rights). This requirement is not 
met in the Bill. 
 
 Positions on Communal Ownership as Opposed to Private Ownership 
Paradoxically to what is expected from a debate around communal land reform, the issue of 
opposing tenure reforms seems not to have been the major aspect discussed during CLaRA’s 
development process. This contradiction is probably a result of the fact that the Act offers a 
certain possibility of choice – although as shown before many consider it as a biased margin of 
manoeuvre by pinpointing the predominance of traditional powers.33 Another reason is linked – 
according to several land reform protagonists – to a seeming agreement that private ownership is 
not a universal solution.  
As such, the most common approach to tenure reform in Africa today is one based on the notion 
of adapting systems of customary land rights to contemporary realities and needs, rather than 
attempting to replace them with Western forms of private ownership such as individual freehold 
titles (Okoth-Ogendo in Claassens and Cousins, 2008, p95). Most submissions shared this view 
and emphasised that traditional forms of land tenure should be taken into consideration when 
crafting tenure reform legislation and that there was a need to adapt existing practices and 
institutions rather than attempt to replace them because replacement of tenure regimes is more and 
more seen as a very expensive exercise with only partial results. In addition, it is recognised by 
many that, in South Africa, tenure is secured socially as well as legally so attempting to replace 
practices and institutions can result in overlapping de facto rights and management structures. A 
reform could undermine tenure security. Although they still recognise that the colonial and 
apartheid heritage has created a legal dualism that underpins the tenure systems in the country, it 
appears that many agree on the importance of adaptive interventions acknowledging this dualism 
and of legal and other mechanisms to connect the systems. Intermediate positions between the two 
extremes of privatisation and communal tenure are thus emphasised. If many argue that, whilst 
tenure reform was supported, comparative experience in countries such as Kenya indicate that the 
titling approach has delivered few of the anticipated benefits. According to them, the net effect 
has been to increase landlessness with poorer families selling up their holdings and moving to the 
cities. The ongoing fragmentation and subdivision of plots have led to the creation of holdings 
that are not economically viable and worsen circumstances of overcrowding with the only real 
benefits accruing to local elites. Private ownership by one individual/group, as established under 
                                                   
33
 While the community is given the power to chose (i.e. accept, reject or impose conditions in respect of 
applications for conversion to full ownership), this does not in itself provide meaningful protection from 
powerful local elites and traditional leaders who are likely to dominate and abuse the process.  
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the Bill, may extinguish the existing cropping and grazing rights of another person. According to 
many, the likely net effect is the repetition of dispossession of land rights, increased landlessness, 
rural poverty, and inequality. 
Another difficulty in implementing either one or the other option is linked to the fact that 
communal tenure systems include rights to land and natural resources that are held at different 
levels of social organisation. Many argue that these levels of social and/or political organisation 
constitute different ‘communities,’ nested within each other. As such, PLAAS wonders to which 
level of ‘community’ will titles be transferred when the Act is implemented. In addition, rights 
encompass rights to residential land, forest land and/or grazing land that vary and that exist within 
the larger context of a tribe, clan or entire village. The privatisation of communal land disregards 
the range/bundle of other communal tenure and land arrangements that fall outside ownership or 
occupation. These include rights of access to use land for crops, graze animals, or gather fuel or 
fruits. Many, in particular unions with mixed representations, believe that adequate safeguards 
should be provided in the Bill to prevent wholesale privatisation, entailing distinct measures 
directed at three possible phases of alienation of land rights. The first relates to the transfer of 
ownership from the State to communities under clause 16; the second to the community granting 
an individual community member’s application for conversion of a land tenure right to full 
ownership under clause 25; and thereafter the transfer by such community member of ownership 
to a person that is not a part of the community. 
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Table 8: Positions on Communal Ownership as Opposed to Private Ownership 
AGAINST PRIVATISATION INTERMEDIATE FOR PRIVATISATION 
National House of Traditional 
Leaders (National and Provincial 
Houses of Traditional Leaders, the 
Congress of Traditional Leaders of 
South Africa and the Royal 
Bafokeng Nation): 
- privatisation would not recognise 
traditional leadership 
 
COSATU:  
- While supporting the principle of 
communal land reform, the 
introduction of private group and 
individual ownership is considered 
problematic. 
 
PLAAS:  
- Communal tenure systems are 
nested systems, in which rights to 
land and natural resources are held 
at different levels of social 
organisation. Titling does not 
correspond to such community 
structures. 
LEAP:  
Agrees with the Bill’s attempts to: 
• secure the tenure of 
communities, households and 
individuals;  
• give legal recognition to 
existing communal tenure 
systems; and  
• provide for the administration 
of land rights in communal 
areas.  
 
SACC:  
- To confirm and strengthen the 
existing tenure rights of people 
living on communally-owned land. 
To restore communities’ control 
over their own lives and 
development by allowing them to 
participate in decisions about land 
allocation, tenure and use. 
 
 
 
 
The absence of local communities’ positions on the issue is interesting. An explanation could be 
that the Bill/Act leaves a choice. Another reason could be the little time and information available, 
particularly at local level, to establish a well-defined position regarding the reform of their lands. 
 
 The Minister’s Discretionary Powers 
There are several clauses in the Act that leave a lot of decisions to the discretion of the Minister, 
including the initiation of a land rights inquiry, decisions about whether and how to subdivide 
communal land, which portions to reserve as State-owned, and the extent and boundaries of the 
land to be transferred after the Minister makes a determination. 
Most of the contributions during the consultation phases, particularly those of activists and 
academics, emphasized that the Bill and later the Act gives too many powers to determine land 
rights to the Minister, and does not require adequate consultation with the affected communities. 
They argue that there are no clear criteria to guide the Minister’s decisions, and the affected 
 56 
communities have few, if any, opportunities to either participate in making these crucial decisions 
or challenge them once the Minister has made a determination. 
As such, there is no obligation for the Minister to secure the consent of the community affected 
with respect to any of these decisions, nor is the Minister even required to consult the relevant 
community before making a ruling. A community would have no right to initiate the tenure 
reform process, compel a land rights inquiry, or accept or reject the outcome of such an enquiry. 
Land rights enquirers are not compelled to consult communities prior to making their 
recommendations. Although general statutes governing administrative justice would presumably 
apply, there is no explicit mechanism by which a community may appeal a decision by the 
Minister. It would likely be costly and difficult for communities to challenge the Minister's 
rulings on such matters.  
In addition, although it is unlikely that the Minister would be in a position to have extensive 
knowledge of the land, tenure, and old and new order rights in each area, the Minister would have 
to rely on statements from officials in making final decisions. Critics, however, argue that it is 
unlikely that opposing opinions and conflicting interests would be pointed out to the Minister by 
officials (often concerned with delivery and their own positions). In such instances, they state that 
it is possible that the Constitutional Rights of excluded groups would be ignored without any 
further recourse.   
 
Table 9: Positions on the Minister’s Powers 
AGAINST 
INTERMEDIATE 
FOR 
 
 
 
 
SACC:  
- There is no obligation for the 
Minister to secure the consent of 
the community affected with 
respect to any of these decisions, 
nor is the Minister even required to 
consult the relevant community 
before making a ruling. A 
community would have no right to 
initiate the tenure reform process, 
compel a land rights inquiry, or 
accept or reject the outcome of such 
an enquiry. 
 
ANCRA:  
- The Bill has given extraordinary 
powers to the minister and 
unlimited powers to decide: upon 
land rights in communal areas and 
to whom they should go, on the 
extent and boundaries of the land to 
be transferred, to make 
Joint Monitoring Committee on 
Improvement of Quality of Life and 
Status of Women: 
- The Bill provides that the Minister 
MAY confer a new order right on a 
woman, but this is discretionary. 
National House of Traditional 
Leaders (National and Provincial 
Houses of Traditional Leaders, the 
Congress of Traditional Leaders of 
South Africa and the Royal 
Bafokeng Nation):  
- The powers given to the Minister 
should relate to process, 
transparency, and above all, the 
establishment of the existing rights 
of members of communities. The 
Minister should not have the power 
to change rights. 
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determinations based on land rights 
inquirers’ report that does not need 
to be published for public comment 
upon initiating a land rights inquiry. 
 
LPM:  
- It gives too many powers to the 
Minister to determine land rights, 
and does not require adequate 
consultation with the affected 
communities. 
 
LRC:  
- The difficulty with the Bill is that 
it makes the realisation of 
constitutional rights subject to the 
exercise of official discretion in a 
manner which does not give 
constitutionally adequate guidance 
to those officials as to how they are 
to exercise that discretion. 
 
PLAAS:  
- The wide discretionary powers 
given to the Minister to make 
determinations on a range of issues 
central to the security of people’s 
land rights are probably 
unconstitutional, insofar as the Bill 
of Rights requires the law to define 
clearly the extent of the land rights 
to be secured. 
 
Dwesa-Cwebe community: 
- The Bill provides the Minister 
with wide powers to determine land 
rights without any provisions on 
how these powers are to be 
exercised. 
Kgalagadi Community:  
- Many issues are left to the 
discretion of the Minister. The Bill 
does not make any reference to 
equal allocation of land, upgrading 
of rights, joint ownership, etc. 
Greater Manyeleti Land Rights 
Group: 
The Bill must not give discretionary 
powers to a single individual 
regardless of social standing. 
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III. CLARA’S POLITICS: STAKEHOLDERS’ POSITIONS, THE INTERPLAY OF 
ACTORS, AND THEIR IMPACT ON CONTENT EVOLUTION 
 
The previous chapter analyses the different positions of the stakeholders, issued during the 
development process and after the Act was released. This chapter analyses the influence of the 
different stakeholders to push through their points of view and safeguard their interests. The 
analysis of the stakeholders’ influence, i.e. positions of the different stakeholders which in fine 
were retained or not in the final version of the Act, has been conducted through (1) scrutinizing 
the evolution of its content; and (2) an in-depth analysis of the events and interplay of the actors 
in order to push their interests through. The influence of the different actors engaged in the 
development of the Act was analysed through linking both changes in the different drafts with 
preceding events and actions by the actors. 
1. Evolution in CLaRA’s Content and Analysis of the Factors Involved 
As detailed previously, the final draft of CLaRA came a long way, shaped and reshaped through 
different drafts premised on contributions from the various actors engaged in the process. As 
shown in Table 10, a first draft was prepared and served as a basis for further development and 
discussions. As it was based on previous work realised during the development of the LRB, the 
first CLRB drafts were already well developed (47 pgs., 10 chapters and 3 schedules) and 
presented in broad lines the final structure. The two first drafts were rather voluminous and were 
said to be less precise – a probably normal evolution for a policy document in the development 
and discussion phase. The final Act counts twenty-two pages, subdivided in ten chapters and one 
schedule 
But contrary to the structure of the document, the content shows more variations. This part 
analyses the evolution of the content of the different drafts and tries to relate the latter to different 
actions and events, in order to be able to retrace which aspects, ideas or lobby groups have had 
specific impacts on the Act itself. To initiate the analysis, the Land Rights Bill of June 1999 will 
be detailed; thereafter the evolution of the content and their implying factors through the 
following major drafts and final Act is analysed. 
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Table 10: The Evolution of the Structure of the Different CLRB Drafts and CLaRA 
 Land Rights Bill CLRB draft August 2002 CLRB draft March 2003 CLRB draft 
October 2003 
CLaRA draft 
November 2003 
CLaRA No. 11 July 
2004 
Volume 
(pages) 
47 
(46 excluding schedules) 
89 
(88 excluding schedules) 
22 
(16 excluding schedules) 
46  
(34 excluding 
schedules) 
21 
(15 excluding 
schedules) 
22 
(18 excluding 
schedules) 
Overall 
Structure 
10 chapters 
3 schedules 
12 chapters 
 
10 chapters 
1 schedule 
Memorandum on the Objects 
of the Bill 
10 chapters 
1 schedule 
Memorandum on the 
Objects of the Bill 
10 chapters 
1 schedule 
Memorandum on the 
Objects of the Bill 
10 chapters 
1 schedule 
Detailed 
Structure 
Preamble 
1. Definitions, objects, 
application and 
interpretation 
2. Protected rights 
3. Registration of protected 
rights 
4. Awards to provide 
security of tenure and 
comparable redress 
5. Transfer of State-held 
land 
6. Land rights management 
7. Eviction 
8. Enforcement of rights 
and dispute resolution 
9. Land rights 
commissioner 
10. General provisions 
- Amendment of laws 
- Repeal of laws 
- Transitional 
arrangements  
Preamble 
1. Definitions 
2. Objects and application 
3. Legal security of land 
tenure under communal land 
tenure systems 
4. Provision of redress 
where land tenure is 
insecure 
5. Transfer of communal 
land 
6. Alienation of communal 
land for development and 
commercial purposes 
7. Land administration and 
NR management in 
communal land 
8. Land rights board 
9. Dispute resolution 
10. Eviction of persons 
whose tenure rights have 
been terminated 
11. The conduct of land 
rights inquiries 
12. Miscellaneous 
provisions  
1. Definitions and application 
of the Act 
2. Juristic personality and 
legal security of tenure 
3. Transfer and registration of 
communal land 
4. Provision of comparable 
redress where tenure cannot 
be legally secured 
5. The conduct of land rights 
enquiry 
6. Content, making and 
registration of community 
rules 
7. Land administration 
committee 
8. Land rights board 
9. KwaZulu-Natal Ingonyama 
Trust land 
10. General provisions 
- Amendment or repeal of 
laws 
- Memorandum on the objects 
of the communal land rights 
bill 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Similar 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. Vesting of 
KwaZulu-Natal 
Ingonyama Trust 
land 
10. General 
provisions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Similar 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. KwaZulu-Natal 
Ingonyama Trust 
land 
 
10. General 
provisions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Similar 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- No memorandum 
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1.1 The Initial Land Rights Bill (3 June 1999) 
The idea of restructuring South Africa’s communal land is not recent, it had already emerged 
before the first democratic elections in 1994. As such, as part of the previous regime’s political 
and economic policy to enhance the situation in the homelands, the National Party White Paper on 
Land Policy (1991) emphasises the idea of divesting the State of black land. With activist 
appreciating this positively, the NP implemented in 1991 the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights 
Act (ULTRA) promoting the transfer of land rights to tribal communities. This act was, however, 
never effectively implemented as – during the transition period of 1993-1994 – the main 
stakeholders’ priorities differed: the NP sought to ensure protection of extant (white) rights to 
own private property, the ANC was insisting on land reform, but in favour of protecting right to 
private property, and civil society was pushing hard for land reform and the redistribution of 
white land. 
After the 1994 democratic election, which saw Nelson Mandela elected as President, the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) Policy document states: “A national land 
reform programme is the central and driving force of a programme of rural development. Such a 
programme aims to redress to land. It aims to ensure security of tenure for rural dwellers. And in 
implementing the national land reform programme, and through the provision of support services, 
the democratic government will build the economy by generating large-scale employment 
increasing rural incomes and eliminating overcrowding” (ANC, 1994, pg. 19-20).34 In this 
document, land tenure reform was to be addressed through a review of present land policy, 
administration and legislation to improve the tenure security of all South Africans and to 
accommodate diverse forms of land tenure, including types of communal tenure (Figure 1). 
                                                   
34
 Land reform in the RDP (1994): “Land is the most basic need for rural dwellers. Apartheid policies pushed millions 
of black South Africans into overcrowded and impoverished reserves, homelands and townships. In addition, 
capital intensive agricultural policies led to the large-scale eviction of farm dwellers from their land and homes. The 
abolition of the Land Acts cannot redress inequities in land distribution. Only a tiny minority of black people can 
afford land on the free market. The RDP must implement a fundamental land reform programme. This programme 
must be demand-driven and must aim to supply residential and productive land to the poorest section of the rural 
population and aspirant farmers. As part of a comprehensive rural development policy, it must raise rural incomes 
and productivity, and must encourage the use of land for agricultural, other productive or residential purposes. The 
land policy must ensure security of tenure for all South Africans, regardless of their system of land-holding. It must 
remove all forms of discrimination in women's access to land.” (ANC, 1994, p.19-20) 
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1994  First democratic elections 
 
1995, May Framework document on Land Policy and  
 
Consultations:  
+50 organisations responded 
 
1995, August   Draft Statement of Land Policy and Principles 
 
1995, August National Land Policy Conference (1,000 
delegates all sectors) 
 
1995, September  Draft Green Paper on Land Policy 
 
Consultations: 
+50 written submissions, 
Country-wide workshops 
 
1995, November  DLA started drafting the draft Land Rights Bill 
 
 
 
1996, February  Green Paper on Land Policy 
Tenure reform Core Group Established 
 
 
1996, November  Draft Policy Framework for Tenure Reform 
 
 
 
 
1997, April   White Paper on Land Policy 
 
Submissions from TRCG to 
Land Reform Policy Committee 
and DLA 
 
 
1999, June   Complete draft LRB 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of the Development of the Land Rights Bill 
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This announced the beginning of extensive process of public consultations on land policy issues. 
Over fifty organisations, including farmers' associations, NGOs, government departments and 
concerned individuals, responded to an initially prepared Framework Document on Land Policy 
released in May 1995 by DLA (White Paper, 1997). This resulted in a National Land Policy 
Conference, held on 31 August – 1 September 1995, where a draft Statement of Land Policy and 
Principles was discussed in detail by over 1,000 delegates who attended the conference, and 
where the initial foundations for the development of a Green Paper were laid.  
Following, up to February 1996, over fifty written submissions were received from the public, and 
workshops were held across the country to consult on the contents of the Green Paper. Regarding 
the reform of the communal lands, many voiced concern and others fervent support for the role of 
tribal authorities in tenure reform. Those in favour of tribal authority involvement insisted that: (i) 
the State should not hold land on behalf of black people; (ii) chiefs should be issued the title deeds 
for their tribe’s community; (iii) chiefs should be responsible for land redistribution; and (iv) 
problems would occur if land was bought by subjects and not by tribes as the subjects would be 
separated from the tribes. Those against the tribal authorities’ involvement in land administration 
expressed the following concerns: (i) communities falling under chiefs should get their own title 
deeds; (ii) government should do away with PTOs; (iii) chiefs should not accept bribes; (iv) the 
lack of security of tenure on communal land in urban areas hampered development; (v) Centre for 
Applied Legal studies made a written submission against the role of traditional leaders in tribal 
land administration; and (vi) community members specifically called for policy on the roles and 
rights of women to be explicitly integrated into the White Paper. 
The difficulty and sensitivity of tenure reform had become visible and had pushed the DLA to 
decide internally to set aside at least two more years for tenure research and strategising. It was 
also accepted that – despite the need to deliver – the process of developing communal land policy 
could last for three years. To initiate it, the DLA started drafting a first draft of a Land Rights Bill 
at the end of 1995. In February 1996, a Tenure Reform Core Group (TRCG) was formed through 
the appointments by the Minister of DLA and non-official members considered to be experts 
(DLA, activists, LRC, academics from PLAAS, former TRAC members, and former RWM 
members). This group was brought together to strategise on the development of tenure policy. It 
produced a draft Policy Framework for Tenure Reform in November 1996, much of which is 
copied verbatim in the draft White Paper (published in June 1997), and which recognised 
customary practices of land holding and tenure. 
In the meantime, two important pieces of legislation dealing with tenure were passed by 
Parliament in 1996. These were: (i) the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act No. 31 of 
1996 (IPILRA), and (ii) the Communal Property Associations Act No. 28 of 1996 (CPA). In 
addition, the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act No. 112 of 1991, was amended to bring it in 
line with tenure policy. IPILRA was a holding mechanism that prevented the violation of existing 
interests in land until new long-term legislation had been put in place. The CPA Act provided a 
means through which people wanting to hold land jointly and in groups could organise their 
tenure. It allowed for the upgrading and conversion into ownership of rural quitrents and deeds of 
grant. 
Although the KZN provincial government called for provincial autonomy, the Green paper was 
voted in and published as the white Paper on Land Policy in April 1997. At that time, the primary 
objective for the Government’s land reform was to redress the injustices of apartheid and alleviate 
the impoverished and suffering that it had caused. The overall political economic structure during 
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that period was reflected through Government’s 1994 Reconstruction and Development (RDP) 
programme, which sought to redress the past injustices, and was mainly based on development 
through redistribution. As such, the first phase of the land reform policies implemented by the 
Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs Derek Hanekom concerned the development of 
subsistence farming. Such an orientation highlighted the importance of the land reform and small-
scale agricultural production development impact on the social and economic development of 
rural areas. Government was privileging the security of food and means of subsistence in a 
country where resource distribution inequality is extreme and where the link between black 
populations and commercial farming was interrupted for several decades (Alden & Anseeuw, 
2009). Linked to this, the DLA was at that time mainly constituted by what is considered left-
wing personnel, representing the equivalent fraction of the ANC and previous-regime land 
activists (Alden & Anseeuw, 2009). 
Providing for three programmes recognised by the constitution (restitution, redistribution and 
tenure reform (see Box 2, pg. 3), the White Paper warned of the extreme caution that needed to 
guide tenure reform. Regarding this, it formally recognises customary practices of land holding 
and tenure, and differentiates between “governance” and “ownership” of land, whereas in 
apartheid government both owned and governed/administered land. This is important because this 
could translate into a system of ownership where members of a community could be co-owners of 
land (if they decide to have a communal system), but also into a communal arrangement that they 
are directly implicated in deciding how they – the co-owners – want the land to be governed and 
administered. As such, no one should be able to dictate how the land is administered; it must be 
participatory and involve the community. 
In October 1997, the TRCG made submissions to the Land Reform Policy committee, noting that 
individuals’ rights in the LRB would be newly created statutory rights, not transferred extant 
rights. As such, the original LRB was premised on securing the rights of people on communal 
land through statutory definition rather than titling, leaving the precise definition of the content of 
such rights and the boundaries of groups and representative authority structures to local processes 
overseen by Government (Claassens and Cousins, 2008, pg. 14). The TRCG thought this would 
be best as it makes rights that are theoretically sound, as they would be embedded in statutes. It 
also thought it would help with boundary disputes. Critics (within DLA and from civil society), 
however, thought the distinction between old and new rights would only exist on paper, and mean 
nothing in the community. They thought it was only a strategy for avoiding the overall traditional 
leader issue (Fortin, 2006, pg. 135). 
In 1998, the TRCG began meetings with a tenure drafting team; these meetings led to the LRB. 
Several failed test cases on transferring land ownership to groups or individuals35 resulted in the 
TRCG and DLA confirming the previous evolutions informing a new LRB. On 3 June 1999, a 
day after the second democratic elections, a first complete LRB draft was published for discussion 
purposes. This draft (Claassens and Cousins, 2008, pg. 12): 
                                                   
35
 The major difficulties with the transfer of ownership directly to groups or individuals were: boundary 
conflicts, community membership conflicts, access problems in regard to shared resources for vulnerable groups, 
lack of participation in decision making, and traditional leaders having undue power.  
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• sought to create a category of protected rights covering the majority of those occupying 
land in the former homelands; 
• the Minister of Land Affairs would continue to be the nominal owner of the land, but with 
legally reduced powers relative to the holders of protected rights; and 
• protected rights would vest in the individuals who used, occupied or had access to land, 
but would be relative to those shared with other members, as defined in agreed group 
rules. 
 
The LRB detailed the major themes for tenure reform as follows: 
• provide for protected rights to occupy, use or have access to certain tracts of land; 
• registration of protected rights; 
• a protected right means the right to occupy, use or have access to land; 
• people whose land rights are diminished or compromised as a result of forced overlapping 
of rights and interests acquire additional or alternative land; 
 
The major beneficiaries in terms of power given by the Bill were: 
• rights holder structures, meaning anybody representing protected rights holders in respect 
to land matters; where the context so indicates, this includes accredited rights holder 
structures (i.e. previously marginalised communities from the former homelands); 
• women are highlighted throughout the Bill; and 
• traditional structures can participate in an ex-officio capacity. 
 
Traditional leaders, largely left out of the process until then, felt threatened by the proposition. 
1.2 CLRB August 2002 Version Compared to the LRB (June 1999) 
The first change of orientation, characterised by the change in ideology from the 
institutionalisation of old order rights to the implementation of new order rights, is mainly linked 
to the change in the country’s overall political economy. As such, although initiated earlier 
already, the second democratic elections in 1999 and the instatement of Thabo Mbeki as President 
initiated a formal change in ANC leadership and policy orientation based on African Renaissance 
ideologies and more neo-liberal focuses. This resulted in the abandonment of the more 
development-oriented RDP for the neo-liberal Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) 
policy framework, which held out the promise of sustainable economic progress through the 
application of fiscal austerity measures and export-oriented growth (Alden & Anseeuw, 2009). 
The ground was laid for a rethinking of South Africa’s land reform policies, including tenure 
reform. As such, the first phase of land and agrarian reform, with its emphasis on the most 
marginalized sectors of the rural community, was clearly out of step with the guiding ethos behind 
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GEAR. Furthermore, it failed to address the broader developmental needs of encouraging 
investment into rural areas as a means of improving livelihoods and focusing on more market-
oriented production. The approach whereby only subsistence farming was being promoted was 
questioned and, as a result, the development of an emergent commercial and small-scale farming 
sector became the priority. Land reform no longer aimed at promoting self-sufficiency, but at 
creating a structured small-scale commercial farming sector with a view to improving farm 
production, revitalise the rural environment and create employment opportunities. This strategy 
coincided better with the more liberal orientations of the government. Analysts identify the focus 
on African renaissance embraced by the new President Thabo Mbeki as the overriding factor that 
influenced the philosophy of the ruling ANC (Cousins, 2004).  
Thabo Mbeki, the newly elected President, replaced Derek Hanekom with Thoko Didiza as 
Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs. The latter not only replaced the DG of the DLA and 
many DLA employees, she also put the land reform programmes on hold and reviewed the reform 
processes to evaluate strategy and policies. Many of the senior staff within the Department of 
Land Affairs were replaced with those who were viewed as sharing the same philosophy, and this 
made the AFRA claim that DLA now excluded civil society and NGOs, making it less 
transparent. The new Minister’s approach was also criticised as being less consultative with 
academics. Those replaced at this time were to later play a major part in opposing this piece of 
legislation. 
As such, although initially land reform programmes were “put on ice” and the DLA went through 
internal review processes to re-evaluate their strategies and policies, these new evolutions had a 
direct impact on the communal land reforms in which South Africa was engaged. Heavily 
influenced by the new ANC philosophy put forward (and driven predominantly by their President 
at the time), the new Minister decided that the Land Rights Bill was too complex and involved too 
much State support for rights holders and local institutions (Claassens and Cousins, 2008, pg.13). 
The Land Rights Bill was set aside and the development process for the Communal Land Rights 
Bill was to follow (see Figure 2). 
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1999, June   Complete draft LRB 
 
2000, March (2nd) Draft Communal Land Rights Bill 
 
2001, May        
Official start of consultations 
 
 
2001, October Intermediary 3rd draft CLRB, internal discussions only 
 
2001, November Official reaction PLAAS/NLC to 3rd draft 
CLRB 
 
National Land Tenure conference 
 
2002  Ministerial Reference Group established 
 
2002, March   4th draft CLRB, internal discussions only 
 
2002, May   5th draft CLRB, internal discussions only 
 
2002, June   6th draft CLRB, internal discussions only 
 
Midnet Land Reform Group and 
LEAP organise a workshop in 
Pietermaritzburg 
 
2002, July   7th draft CLRB, internal discussions only 
 
International Symposium on 
Communal Tenure Reform, 
organised by PLAAS and CALS 
 
2002, August   8th draft CLRB gazetted for public comment 
 
Official start of consultations 
(60 days) 
- Written contributions 
- 50 workshops 
2002, October 
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2003, March   9th draft CLRB, internal discussions only 
 
2003, July    10th draft CLRB published 
 
       Joint task force established 
 
Several secret meetings (Ingonyama Land 
trust, IFP, Zulu King), informal submission 
KZN house of TL 
 
2003, September  11th draft CLRB, introduced in the National Assembly. 
Introduction approved and notice published with intention to 
introduce CLRB in Parliament with a call for submissions 
 
Official start of public 
comments (21 days) 
 
 
2003, October  1st amended 11th draft CLRB 
 
Notice of intent is withdrawn and new notice of intent to introduce 
the 1st amended 11th draft CLRB 
 
2003, November 
- Public hearings 
- Submissions from various 
stakeholders 
 
    2nd amended 11th draft CLRB 
 
2004        ANC-DLA Study group, 
       Secret meetings IFP, 
       Portfolio Committee meeting 
 
2004, February  3rd amended 11th draft CLRB 
    Scheduled for second reading in Parliament 
    Voted unanimously by Parliament 
 
2004, July   CLaRA enacted 
 
Figure 2: The Evolution of the Development of the Communal Land Rights Bill 
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On 11 February 2000, Land Affairs announced new strategic direction mainly focusing on 
providing opportunities to emergent farmers and speeding up the restitution programme. There 
was also a first hint that the approach to communal tenure reform established in the LRB was 
officially abandoned in favour of a “transfer to tribes.” At the initial stage of the Bill’s 
formulation, the DLA was the central player with no evident undue influence from external 
quarters (save for the overriding philosophy of the ruling party). Several drafts were developed. 
Some of them were only for internal use and were not discussed publicly. 
As such, during March 2000, a draft version of the newly entitled bill (Communal Land Rights 
Bill, CLRB) – it is referred to as 2nd draft as seemingly the LRB was used as first draft – was 
published. The new Bill was oriented towards the transfer of title approach. The title of communal 
land is – according to the draft Bill – to be transferred from the State to a community which must 
register its rules before it can be recognized as a juristic personality legally capable of owning 
land. Individual members of the community are to be issued deeds of communal land rights, 
which can be upgraded to freehold titles if the community agrees (Claassens and Cousins, 2008, 
pg. 13). 
Although criticised for disregarding the difficulties noted by the transfer model in the test cases of 
1998-1999 (Claassens, 2000; Ntsebeza, 2003), the draft reflects the new Minister’s statements, as 
well as the debates over the role of traditional leaders in local governance that appeared towards 
the end of 2000 with the local elections nationwide. As such, by threatening to boycott and fuel 
violence at the polls, traditional leaders were demanding the dismantling of Municipalities in rural 
areas in favour of tribal authorities, and the delay of the election date. Government tried to 
appease them by proposing amendments to the Municipal Structures Act (increased representation 
of traditional leaders from 10% to 20% of total local councillors, but this was rejected by the 
traditional leaders since they wanted more representation). But, after having them delayed, the 
local elections eventually went through with the consent of the traditional leaders and without 
amendments to the Municipal Structures Act – already leading to speculations about a deal over 
land tenure legislation (Ntsebeza, 2003).  
In May 2001, consultations on this first official draft Communal Land Rights Bill officially 
commenced. Comments, remarks, additions and other were to be sent in before 26 November, the 
official date for the finalization of the consultation on the CLRB.  
About six months later, on 25 October, an intermediary 3rd draft CLRB was released for 
departmental discussion purposes only. However, the document leaked from the DLA, causing 
fury from civil society, including a significant number of former employees of the DLA, sidelined 
in 1999. PLAAS and NLC complemented the uproar by sending an official submission on 15 
November. They were opposed to the shift to the transfer of title approach, and sought challenge 
the draft bill. There were claims that the approach of transferring rights and ownership to 
communities would pit individuals and their rights against the community and could have 
negative consequences for already disadvantaged individuals (in Fortin, 2006, pg. 139). In 
addition, legal experts and civil society criticised the new draft CLRB for echoing the Upgrading 
of Land Tenure Rights Act of 1991 (issued by the National Party during the previous regime). In 
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addition, they expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of wide consultation on the Bill, and noted 
that the consultative process had been selective. 
With the consultations ending on 26 November, the DLA organised the National Land Tenure 
Conference in Durban, from 27 to 30 November 2001, which would include all major 
stakeholders. On this occasion, Sibanda presented the new draft CLRB, emphasising that it was 
time to “divest” the State of communal land in favour of private ownership. Again, this brought 
an entire strain of “anti-privatisation” criticism from civil society and traditional leaders. Civil 
society claimed that to enable privatisation under the circumstances proposed in the bill requires 
an ideal type of communal arrangement, which – mainly according to PLAAS – does not exist 
(Fortin, 2006). Traditional Leaders, for their part, began lobbying in favour of strengthening their 
land administration positions because they feared a loss of power and their eventual irrelevance. 
The Tenure Conference ended up being a brain storming session on a new approach to CLRB, 
with the DLA trying to accommodate different, often opposing, positions, and with the different 
stakeholders mobilising themselves in order to secure their positions and/or interests. 
Traditional Leaders began lobbying in favour of strengthening their land administration positions 
because they feared a loss of power and eventual irrelevance. On 4 December 2001, one week 
after the tenure conference, Minister Didiza addresses the National House of Traditional Leaders. 
She made it explicit that there would be a role for traditional leaders in communal land 
administration: “The call to traditional leaders on how to secure communal rights comes at an 
opportune time; when our President is calling for and championing the African renewal cause. 
African renewal, ladies and gentlemen, cannot reach its pivotal realisation without us going back 
to our natural leaders, our traditional leaders, who have been custodians of the rich African land” 
(Didiza Address 4.12.01, in Fortin, 2006, pg. 97). 
In early 2002, a Ministerial Reference Group was established by the DLA to help with the 
drafting of the bill. It was refused by the DPLG as the DLA declined to have the traditional 
leadership of the TLGFB as a LAC. It resulted in an acceleration of legal drafting: on 18 March, 
24 May, 14 June and 2 July 2002, the DLA released respectively the 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th draft 
CLRBs. Again, these documents were for Departmental discussion purposes only; no external 
comments were received or considered. In order to prepare a response to the forthcoming public 
release of the CLRB, AFRA together with the Midnet Land Reform Group and LEAP organized a 
workshop in Pietermaritzburg on 26 June. In addition, in order to learn from other experiences, an 
International Symposium on Communal Tenure Reform “Tenure Reform: Lessons for South 
Africa” was convened on 12 August 2002 by CALS, PLAAS and the DLA. However, the DLA 
pulled out a few days before the symposium. In addition, in mid 2002, PLAAS/NLC received 
funding from DFID to engage in community consultations and a media campaign against the 
CLRB. Influence from “civil society” started to increase at this time.  
During August 2002, the 8th draft of the CLRB was officially published in the Government 
gazette for public comment. No one was satisfied with the contents of the Bill, including the 
traditional leaders who were concerned about their diminishing role in governance. Activists and 
academics were very concerned about women’s rights and human rights under traditional land 
systems whilst the DPLG voiced concerns about service provision on private land (communally, 
individually or collectively held) because it was not supposed to provide services on private land.  
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Table 11: Comparison of the CLRB (8th Version, August 2002) with the LRB (June 
1999) 
Content & Major Changes Preceding Events 
Overall objective was narrowed: to provide for legal security 
of tenure by transferring communal land to communities, or 
by awarding comparable redress 
 
Differences regarding powers of traditional leaders and 
recognition of certain rights: 
- traditional leaders are considered in terms of the constitution 
- traditional leadership, which is recognized by a community 
as being its legitimate traditional authority, may participate in 
an administrative structure in an ex-officio capacity; provided 
that the ex-officio membership does not exceed 25% of the 
total composition of the structure. 
 
Differences regarding land tenure: 
- provision of land tenure right, not protected right 
- transaction and transfer of protected rights sections omitted 
- section dealing with the IPILRA is omitted (alienation of 
communal land for commercial development) 
- local record of protected rights (structure) omitted 
- omission of access to LRE determination documents 
 
Women’s rights: protection of women’s rights section omitted 
 
Chapter 2 - Application of the Act: 
- Ingonyama land is introduced in this draft 
-  community has to first register its community rules before 
being recognised as a juristic person 
- terminology differs here: protected right is referred to as 
‘land tenure right” 
 
Chapter 5 - Transfer of Communal Land:  
- Designation of officials to assist communities with 
applications or projects or requests 
 
*02/04/1999 Change in ANC leadership & 
policy orientation: African Renaissance/renewal 
& neo-liberal focus 
*11/04/1999 New strategic direction for DLA 
announced – there was a hint at the “transfer to 
tribes” model of tenure reform 
*11/04/1999 New direction suggests using 
existing land administration structures, where 
they exist 
*16/06/1999: Minister DLA replaced 
*8/1999 Land reform put on ice 
*11/02/2000: New strategic direction for land 
reform: speed up process & promote 
commercial opportunities for black farms 
*03/2000: AFRA claims DLA is now exclusive 
of civil society & NGOs, less transparent 
*1999-2000 Results of communal land transfer 
test cases analysed (Claassens, 2000), CLRB 
discussion documents before August 2002 draft 
were criticised considering test cases (ibid.)  
*11/2000 traditional leaders boycott local 
elections; attempts to appease them by 
proposing amendments to the Municipal 
Structures Act – rejected  
* Elections delayed 
*05/12/2000: Local Elections without 
amendments to Municipal Structures Act, 
traditional leaders accept election – speculation 
about a deal over land tenure legislation 
(Ntsebeza, 2003)  
*25/10/2001 Leak of CLRB before tenure 
conference 
*15/11/2001 PLAAS/NLC submission against 
transfer to community 
*27-30/11/2001 Land Tenure Conference 
*04/12/2001 Didiza addresses National House 
of Traditional Leaders – assuring role in land 
administration 
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Chapter 6 - Alienation of Communal land for development 
and commercial purposes 
-Totally new chapter in this draft. 
 
Chapter 7 - Land administration and natural resource 
management in communal land: 
- community rules and administrative structure must be 
adopted first before set up  
- where applicable, the institution of traditional leadership 
recognized by a community may participate in an 
administrative structure in an ex-officio capacity provided 
that the ex-officio membership does not exceed 25% of the 
total composition of the structure 
- land rights boards are dealt with in a separate Chapter 
 
Chapter 11 - The Conduct of Land Rights Enquiries: 
- omission of: determinations may be given to any interested 
party upon payment of fee 
- any person aggrieved by it may appeal to the LCC within 30 
days of seeing such a determination 
 
 
 
The change of government and, subsequently, of the countries’ political economic orientations, 
complemented by the influence exerted by the different stakeholders, mainly tribal authorities and 
civil society, resulted in major changes between the CLRB August 2002 version and the LRB of 
June 1999. Although the major theme for communal land reform did not change, with an 
objective that remained broad – “to provide for legal security of tenure by transferring communal 
land, to communities, or by awarding comparable redress” – new orientations were put forward. 
Besides several amendments made, the major changes in orientation regarding the previous LRB 
concerned (Table 11): 
• The shift from securing the rights of people on communal land through statutory definition to 
an approach promoting security of land rights derived through an exclusive title to land, 
whilst trying to combine this with the recognition of some elements of customary land tenure. 
As such, new order rights are defined as a tenure or other right to communal or other land 
which has been confirmed, converted, conferred or validated by the Minister in terms of 
Section 18. As such, terminology differs in this draft: protected right is referred to as ‘land 
tenure right.’ 
• The powers of traditional leaders, which in this draft are still defined as contemplated in 
Sections 211 and 212 of the Constitution. This draft outlines in far more detail the roles and 
powers of land administration and natural resource management structures on communal land. 
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As such, in opposition to the LRB, a community has to first register its community rules 
before being recognised as a juristic person. In this framework, an administrative structure is 
defined as any body of persons representing a community and authorized by that community 
to perform functions in respect of land administration and natural resources management in 
terms of that community’s community rules, which may include the institution of traditional 
leadership and other community-based institutions. In this process, chiefs are allocated much 
more responsibility. It is noted that, where applicable, the institution of traditional leadership 
that is recognized by a community as being its legitimate traditional authority may participate 
in an administrative structure in an ex-officio capacity provided that the ex-officio 
membership does not exceed 25% of the total composition of the structure. Land rights boards 
are dealt with in a separate Chapter, but are not detailed. Accordingly, under general 
principles, the section dealing with discrimination against women is omitted in this draft. 
Reference is made, though, to respecting the rights enshrined in the Constitution. In addition, 
there were considerable omissions compared to the previous draft of sections dealing with 
legal security of tenure, protection against arbitrary deprivation of tenure rights, and general 
principles. 
1.3 CLRB March 2003 Version Compared to the CLRB August 2002 Version  
With the publication of the 8th draft CLRB (General Notice No. 1423, Gazette No. 23740), it was 
also announced that comments were to be submitted within sixty days. In addition, the DLA 
organized – according to official statements – fifty workshops at provincial DLA offices, 
Contralesa, provincial houses of traditional leaders, local traditional leaders, at the Ingonyama 
trust, and within communities. During these consultations, the overall reaction was rather 
negative: it seems that the draft’s contents and processes did not satisfy any stakeholders. 
Regarding the contents, traditional leaders were concerned about their diminishing role in 
governance; activists and academics were worried about women’s and human rights under 
traditional land systems; and the DPLG voiced concerns about service provision on private land 
(communally, individually or collectively held) because it was not supposed to provide services 
on private land. Regarding the processes, the DLA was criticised by civil society for pretending to 
give a voice to the communities, but meetings were dominated by traditional leaders; in KZN, 
however, the DLA claims that attempts to have eleven community consultations about the CLRB 
were disrupted and disallowed by chiefs, claiming they did not have proper traditional permission.  
Consequently, in September 2002, in an attempt to appease opposing forces, the Tenure Reform 
Implementation Systems Department of the DLA released “A Guide to the Communal Land 
Rights Bill.” On one hand, attempting to answer some of the legal criticisms of the CLRB brought 
by the LRC, PLAAS and NLC, it tried to link various clauses about ownership versus 
administration and link them to the role traditional leaders to prove that the community will have 
choices about land administration. Although it reiterated the importance of traditional leaders in 
land administration, it condemned traditional authorities’ hunger for power. On the other hand, it 
tried at the same time to appease the traditional leaders’ concerns by saying: “The Draft Bill’s 
point of departure is the recognition of the gallant role played by the administrative structures and 
particularly the traditional leadership institutions in channelling the resistance to colonial 
dispossession of land and upholding the dignity and cohesion of African people, and in retaining 
access to part of their land […]” (in Fortin, 2006, pg. 103). It also stated that the Draft Bill’s point 
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of departure was the recognition of the gallant role played by the administrative structures and 
particularly the traditional leadership institutions in channelling the resistance to colonial 
dispossession of land and upholding the dignity and cohesion of African people, and in retaining 
access to part of their land (Fortin, 2006, pg. 103). (Attempts at reassurance in regard to the 
criticisms from activists were negated by the quoted section. Criticism continued and increased.)  
Not to be outdone, Contralesa released statements at this time voicing opposition to the Bill and 
warning that violence in areas such as KwaZulu-Natal was possible if certain concerns were not 
addressed.36 Contralesa, via Holomisa who claimed to position itself as peacekeeper, was urging 
the ANC to align the CLRB with traditional leaders’ demands so that they could continue 
dissuading their people from inciting violence.37 
In the meantime, in order to respond to what was seen as destabilising threats, the Director of 
DLA’s Tenure Directorate presented a paper for a Land Systems and Support Services 
Colloquium (2 March 2003) in which he claimed that “traditional leaders want exclusive control 
over communal land within the context of existing customary structures traditional leadership 
[sic]. It is difficult to accommodate and embrace the position that is articulated by the traditional 
leaders given the imperatives of the Constitution and the White Paper on Land Policy to transfer 
and democratize the structures of governance within the context of a unitary land administration” 
(in Fortin, 2006, pg. 112). However, President Mbeki addressed the National House of Traditional 
Leaders, mentioning the CLRB and its redrafting to incorporate proposals of all stakeholders, 
including those of the traditional leaders. Mbeki assured traditional leaders that the DPLG and 
DLA were working together on their respective bills and the results would be “coordinated and 
aligned” (which was denied by the DPLG (Fortin, 2006, pg. 98)). Although the initial DPLG 
proposition to work together and coordinate on TLGFA and CLRB for the roles and composition 
of traditional leadership was rejected by the DLA, Mbeki’s position nevertheless acknowledged 
this as proven by the reference to traditional leadership through the section 1 of the Traditional 
Leadership and Governance Framework Act of 2003 (and not through the Constitution anymore). 
The consultations and lobbying initiatives resulted in the 9th draft CLRB, which considered and 
incorporated – according to the DLA – all comments from stakeholders. It was released for 
Departmental discussion purposes only on 11 March 2003; a public release was not expected 
before June 2003.  
 
                                                   
36
 ANC Daily News Briefing, 6/11/2002. 
37
 ANC News Briefing, 4/12/2002 
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Table 12: Comparison of the CLRB March 2003 Version with the CLRB August 2002 
Version 
Content & Major Changes Preceding Events 
Overall objective was narrowed: “to provide for legal 
security of tenure by transferring communal land, 
including KwaZulu-Natal Ingonyama land, to 
communities, or by awarding comparable redress” 
 
Differences regarding powers of traditional leaders and 
recognition of certain rights: 
- traditional leaders are considered in terms of the 
constitution 
- Ingonyama Land Trust recognised 
- the fact that traditional leaders can be included in LACs 
as up to 25% ex-officio members of a LAC was taken out 
- LACs may be exercised and performed by recognised 
traditional councils  
 
Chapter 8: Land Rights Board: 
- composition of the board is expanded 
- functions of the board are much less detailed in this 
draft, omitting issues relating to cancellation of rights, 
awards of comparable redress, leasing of State-held land 
and disputes 
 
Chapter 9 - KwaZulu-Natal Ingonyama Trust Land: 
Completely new Chapter 
- Ingonyama Trust board to become Land rights board 
- to be headed in perpetuity by the Ingonyama 
- 25(a) notes that the Minister does not have the power to 
constitute the Ingonyama land rights board 
 
Chapter 10 - General Provisions: This draft adds the 
section on the application of the Act to other land reform 
beneficiaries 
 
Other:  
- the Chapters on Dispute Resolution and Eviction of 
*08/2002: the DPLG voices concerns about 
providing services on “private land” 
*02/03/2003: the DLA statement @ the LSSC 
colloquium that the priority was tenure democracy 
in rural areas (warning to traditional leaders) 
*09/2002: TRIS report outlining the separation of 
ownership and administration/governance  
*02/03/2003: TRIS paper condemning traditional 
authorities’ hunger for power; reiterates importance 
of White Paper (1997) 
* DPLG proposes working together on TLGFA & 
CLRB for roles & composition of traditional 
leadership, DLA not cooperative (Fortin, 2006)  
 
*** Draft not released publicly until June. 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
*08/2002: DLA CLRB consultations disrupted in 
KZN by traditional leaders 
*09/2002: TRIS report reiterates importance of 
traditional leaders in land administration 
*06/11/2002: Contralesa voices opposition & warns 
of possible violence related to CLRB, positions 
itself as peacekeeper 
*04/12/2002: Holomisa urges the ANC to seek 
Contralesa support to prevent violence 
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persons whose tenure rights have been terminated were 
left out  
- significant omissions regarding procedures and local 
(community) rules to be established: (i) the opening of a 
communal land register and designation of officials to 
assist communities with applications or projects or 
requests, (ii) consistency with the protection of 
fundamental human rights, (iii) consistency with 
democratic processes, (iv) fair access to the property of 
the community, (v) accountability and transparency, (vi) 
drafting and adopting of community rules 
- draft omits all aspects relating to natural resource 
management 
 
As such, the period between August 2002 and March 2003 saw the traditional leadership take 
ownership of the Bill’s development. Hence, the overall objective was narrowed and made 
reference directly to specific traditional leaders: “to provide for legal security of tenure by 
transferring communal land, including KwaZulu-Natal Ingonyama land, to communities, or by 
awarding comparable redress.” As such, while it still focused on new order rights defined as 
tenure or other rights in communal or other land which has been confirmed, converted, conferred 
or validated by the Minister in terms of Section 18, it emphasised specific beneficiaries, such as 
the Ingonyama Trust, drawing attention to the influence some key stakeholders have played in the 
Bill’s development process. 
Indeed, the CLRB March 2003 version’s major changes were strongly linked to traditional 
leaders’ concerns. They were better defined and given much more responsibility in this version. 
As such, a traditional council is not defined according to the Constitution anymore, but as 
described in Section 1 of the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act of 2003. 
The version noted regarding LACs that if a community had a recognised traditional council, the 
powers and duties of the land administration committee of such community could be exercised 
and performed by such council. Hence, the 25% quota for traditional leadership was dropped in 
this draft (previously traditional leadership members could represent up to 25% of ex-officio 
members of a LAC). However, regarding LACs, if a community had a recognised traditional 
council, the powers and duties of the LAC of such community could be exercised and performed 
by such council. These benefits were even more precise in the case of the Ingonyama Trust Board, 
which was recognised to become a land rights board on its own, to be headed and constituted in 
perpetuity by the Ingonyama Trust (and not by the Minister) itself. Although the composition of 
the land rights boards was expanded, the functions of the board were much less detailed in this 
draft, omitting issues relating to cancellation of rights, awards of comparable redress, leasing of 
State-held land, and disputes.  
Accordingly, there were considerable omissions from the previous draft of sections dealing with 
the rights of communities. Hence, although the section on security of tenure highlighted the issue 
of women and old order rights (“A woman is entitled to the same legally secure tenure rights in or 
to land and benefits from land as is a man […]”), many aspects dealing with legal security of 
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tenure, protection against arbitrary deprivation of tenure rights, and general principles were 
omitted. In addition, the following sections were also omitted: community rules that had to be 
consistent with the protection of fundamental human rights; opening of a communal land register 
and designation of officials to assist communities; fair access to the property of the community; 
democratic processes, accountability and transparency; drafting and adoption of community rules; 
and all aspects relating to community land administration and natural resource management in 
communal land. Finally, the chapters on dispute resolution and the eviction of people whose 
tenure rights had been terminated were left out of this draft completely. 
1.4 CLRB October 2003 Version Compared to the CLRB March 2003 Version 
About a month later, on 1 April 2003, Mbeki again addressed the National House of Traditional 
Leaders, mentioning the CLRB and its redrafting to incorporate proposals from all stakeholders, 
including those of the traditional leaders. While reassuring them as to the role of traditional 
leaders in land administration, Mbeki stressed the need for continued cooperation and non-
confrontation.  
But, when in July, the DLA – who tried to accommodate in public the willingness of the 
traditional leaders to control communal land – released an intermediary draft CLRB document for 
comment appealing the Ingonyama Land Trust Act and amending the LAC’s constitution (LACs 
for all communities under the CLRB, of which an absolute maximum of 25% could be traditional 
leaders or their nominees, with the rest elected by the community, with a 1/3 women membership 
requirement for LACs), it sparked outrage from KZN House of Traditional Leaders and Zulu 
King Goodwill. They called the CLRB a “recipe for a bloody confrontation.”38 While the DLA 
and DPLG were alarmed that unrest will follow these comments, the ANC sensed rising tension 
with the IFP and Contralesa. The potentiality of conflicts was re-confirmed on 19 August 2003, 
when the Minister and the DG of the DLA met with the Zulu King, Chief Buthelezi, and KZN 
traditional leaders. 
In response, the transfer of the Bill to the Cabinet was delayed and the ANC – who wanted to 
retain support of Zulu King39 – and Contralesa formed a joint task force, including the DLA and 
the DPLG, regarding the CLRB, officially in order to “operationalise issues relating to the 
TLGFB and the white Paper on Land Policy.” In addition, the Minister and the DG of the DLA 
met with the Zulu King, Chief Buthelezi, and traditional leaders in KZN and promised, at this 
meeting, that the Ingonyama Land Trust would not be repealed in later versions of CLRB on the 
condition that the trust’s membership was brought into line with the CLRB “democratic” vision 
for the LAC (i.e. would have elected members and women on Ingonyama Land). Sometime in 
September, Zuma also met – this time quietly – with Buthelezi and the Zulu king. The outcomes 
of the meeting are unknown. Although the KZN House of Traditional Leaders made a submission 
on the TLGFB which included a main focus on the CLRB on 16 September 2003 portraying both 
bills as attempts to “rob traditional leaders of the power of allocating and administering 
communal land” (Ntsebeza, 2005) and warning that, “where stability now reins, we are soon 
                                                   
38
 “New KZN land conflict looms” in Witness. 
39
 “IFP Bid to Woo King” in Mail and Guardian, 30 April 2003. 
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going to have social disintegration and great upheaval,”40 it seemed that after two years of furious 
contestation of the CLRB and TLGFB, Contralesa supported the two acts leading to a 
rapprochement with the ANC. The latter raised suspicions among civil society that suspected a 
deal between the ANC and traditional leaders (Fortin, 2006; Uggla, 2006). 
Subsequently, on 18 September 2003, an 11th draft CLRB was introduced in the National 
Assembly as a Section 75 Bill. The introduction was approved by the Minister on 23 September 
2003. Subsequently, in late September 2003, Vice-President Zuma met secretly with Chief 
Buthelezi and the Zulu King, while on 3 October, a notice of intent to introduce the CLRB into 
Parliament and invite the public to comment on the Bill within twenty-one days is released. The 
CLRB was gazetted and the deadline for comments was set for 24 October. The content of the 
gazetted draft was similar to the content as the 4 July version (10th draft), except that this version 
did not repeal the Ingonyama Land Trust Act and changed the LAC composition section (i) to 
make a chief, headman/woman or nominee a mandatory member of LAC, and (ii) stating that a 
maximum of 25% of LAC members can be traditional leaders, and that the other elected members 
cannot have any traditional leadership post. 
Civil society, land activists and NGOs, in a frenzy to respond within the deadline about changes, 
engaged in a series of workshops to analyse the new CLRB document and draft comments. 
Generally, they opposed the first two changes and supported the third; but overall, they accepted 
these changes as a necessary compromise. They all agreed on how to counter the Bill (with 
submissions and through community consultations) but not everyone agreed on the position. 
AFRA, for example, did not think it was their concern whether traditional leaders were 
constitutional or not, but stated that their primary concern was to address what will get the 
communities – in whatever form – secure tenure. This non-alignment of the different actors 
further weakened an already affected civil society. Since 2002, the Government had indeed been 
very active in influencing civil society and NGOs.41 If the Government imposed financial 
measures (cancellation of tax exemption, for example), it intervened also directly in NGO 
structures and decision-making. This was particularly the case with the NLC network, since some 
of their main figures helped set up the Landless People’s Movement. In July 2003, the Board of 
the NLC dismissed the NLC Director, Zakes Hlatswayo, in what has been described as motivated 
by the politics of containment. The board’s strategy, probably under governmental pressure, was 
to suppress and intimidate the NLC staff who were most vocal in their support for the Landless 
People's Movement (LPM) and its activities, such as the march during the WSSD. Later, in June 
2005, the NLC finally decided to close its national office and restructure its network of affiliates 
(Alden & Anseeuw, 2009). 
 
                                                   
40
 Written submission from KZN House TL, 16 Sept. 2003. 
41
 “Govt has taken control of civil society” (Glenda Daniels), Mail & Guardian, 27 March 2002. 
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Table 13: CLRB Early October 2003 Version Compared to the CLRB March 2003 Version 
Content & Major Changes Preceding Events 
Overall: 
*Bill introduced as a section 76 bill 
*reference to traditional leaders as LAC reads must 
instead of may (§22(2)) (emphasis added) 
*Ingonyama Land Trust not repealed 
 
Chapter 2: Juristic Personality and Legal Security of 
Tenure 
* Women’s rights: Sections 4(2) and 4(3) on old order 
rights held by married people were omitted. Also omitted 
was “A woman is entitled to the same legally secure 
tenure […].” 
* Omission regarding rights on (a) land other than the 
land to which old order right relates, (b) compensation in 
money or in any other form. 
 
Chapter 5 – Land Rights Enquiry (LRE):  
Sections omitted: 
*Section 17(2), requiring enquirer to include community 
input into Land Rights Enquiries (LREs) 
*17(3) requiring public availability of LREs before 
submission to Minister  
*Minister does not need to consider customary law 
(§19(1)) 
 
Chapter 7: Land Administration Committee 
* TL “must” as opposed to “may” (§22(2)),  
“If a community has a recognized traditional council, the 
functions and powers of the land administration 
committee of such a community must be performed and 
exercised by such traditional council.” (emphasis added 
by researchers) 
 
Chapter 8: Land Rights Board 
* Women’s rights diminished:  “seven members from the 
affected communities […] two must be women” (§27(1)) 
*1/04/2003:Mbeki addresses National House of 
Traditional Leaders reassures them as to the role of 
traditional leaders in land administration; says DLA 
& DPLG are coordinating on TLGFA & CLRB 
*30/04/2003 ANC senses Zulu King drifting 
towards IFP ('IFP Bid to Woo King, Mail and 
Guardian 30 April 2003)  
*04/07/2003: draft of LCRB released for comment 
– traditional leaders react vehemently; ANC senses 
rising tension with IFP & Contralesa as Zulu King 
calls draft a “recipe for bloody conflict” (Witness in 
Fortin, 2006). 
*15/07/2003: ANC – Contralesa joint task force 
formed to “operationalise issues related to the 
TLGFB and the White paper on Land Policy” 
*19/08/2003: Minister and DG DLA meet with 
Zulu King, Chief Buthelezi and KZN traditional 
leaders 
*16/09/2003: KZN House of Traditional Leaders 
make submission on TLGFB, with heavy reference 
to the simultaneous CLRB, accusing both bills of 
intending “to rob traditional leaders of the power of 
allocating and administering communal land” (in 
Uggla, 2006) 
*09/2003: CLRB suddenly gets support of 
Contralesa and IFP (Fortin, 2006; Uggla, 2006) 
*18/09/2003: 11th draft of CLRB introduced to the 
National Assembly (as §75 bill) 
*23/09/2003: CLRB gets approval of Minister 
*Late/09/2003: Zuma meets with Chief Buthelezi & 
Zulu King 
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* New additions in this draft (§42(2)): a magistrate has 
power to punish for an offence or awarding a new order 
right to a non-community member without proper 
consent (§42(2)) 
 
Although the overall structure and content of the October version of the CLRB did not vary 
strongly from the previous version, significant changes appeared regarding the different actors’ 
rights, introduced to appease conflictual situations and accommodate requests from the different 
stakeholders, but which mainly favour traditional and administration systems, generally 
neglecting civil society and local requests.  
Indeed, firstly, regarding the LACs, this new draft read “must” as opposed to “may” in previous 
versions: “If a community has a recognized traditional council, the functions and powers of the 
land administration committee of such a community must [emphasis added] be performed and 
exercised by such traditional council.” It continued by noting that LACs stand for traditional 
councils in respect of an area where such councils have been established and recognised and, in 
respect of any other area, mean a land administration committee established in terms of Section 
22. Linked to the latter, although it represents a concrete application of the latter and was strongly 
criticised, the Ingonyama Land Trust was not repealed.  
Secondly, the formal administration, and more particularly the Minister herself, were also 
attributed more rights and powers. As such, land enquiries did not have to be presented to the 
community for comments anymore before going to the Minister, who in addition now was 
allowed to make determination related to land and rights regarding the land concerned by dispute. 
In addition, a magistrate now had the power to punish for an offence or awarding a new order 
right to a non-community member without proper consent. 
Accordingly, many rights initially devoted to communities and linked to the democratisation of 
the process of communal land reform were omitted: (i) rights linked to land other than the land on 
which an old order right or compensation in money was applicable; (ii) the majority of the 
sections regarding women’s rights and old older rights; and (iii) the majority of sections linked to 
land rights enquiries to ensure that decisions made by a community are in general the informed 
and democratic decisions of the majority of such community. Finally, women’s rights were 
diminished as their representation in the land boards was reduced from one third to two out of 
seven land board members. 
1.5 CLRB November 2003 Version Compared to the CLRB Early October 2003 
Version 
On 8 October 2003, the 11th draft CLRB was amended. This was done quietly; stakeholders from 
civil society, academia and even the portfolio committee chairperson were unaware. The amended 
draft differed materially from the draft published on 3 October, as it dropped the 25% quota for 
traditional leadership representation and provides in clause 22(2) that: “If a community has a 
recognized traditional council, the functions and powers of the land administration committee of 
such community must be perfumed and exercised by such traditional council.” As a new insertion, 
a traditional council was defined as meaning a traditional council as defined in Section 1 of the 
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Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act of 2003. On this very same day, the 
Cabinet approved the Bill with the last minute changes.  
Although only few changes had been made since the previous version, the way they were 
implemented caused problems. Indeed, the changes were requested by the DLA, while the Bill 
had already been processed through the National Assembly. The Cabinet approved the changes to 
the CLRB. But a leak from the DLA about the changes tipped off activists and the portfolio 
committee chairperson and resulted in activists, academics and NGOs mobilising a furious 
response through the media and appealing to the DPLG. Outraged because of changes and 
because of the closed-door way in which the changes were made, they subsequently claimed that 
the CLRB, as released and in the procedural context, compromised democracy in rural South 
Africa. Working to oppose the CLRB, they went straight to the media and the portfolio committee 
to launch complaints. They appealed to the DPLG for support because of the impact of the 
changes regarding the TLGFB’s development had on the CLRB. Changes in the TLGFB were 
meant to soften blow of changes to the CLRB but activists claimed that the changes to the TLGFB 
(having a majority of traditional council members elected) essentially made the LAC and TL the 
same institution, and that communities would not understand the important differences between 
their intended governance roles. In addition, it seemed that the only place available for 
compromise in the TLGFB was the gender clause in composition requirements, and not the 
content of the TLGFB itself and the composition of traditional leaderships (Uggla, 2006). 
The TLGFB portfolio committee chair agreed that they did not have land administration in mind 
when drafting the TLGFB, which now had to compensate for the actions of the DLA in the 
CLRB. Not only did it show that activists saw the DPLG and TLGFB Portfolio Committee as 
more amenable than the DLA, it also showed that the ANC approaches to issue of traditional 
leadership were not uniform and that there were fractures in ANC policies regarding how to 
approach the issue. As such, on 21 October, a TLGFB Portfolio Committee meeting was 
organised, which included the DPLG and the ANC. The ANC members of the TLGFB portfolio 
committee stated that the changes to the CLRB were a surprise to them and accused the DLA’s 
disorganisation and political inability. It raised questions about the ANC’s position in the last 
minute changes (because the ANC Portfolio Committee was unaware of the changes, but the 
Cabinet approved the changes) as many began to see the DLA as operating from its own politics 
and not within party politics.  
On 17 October, the notice of 3 October was withdrawn and a new notice of intent to introduce the 
CLRB draft of 8 October, as a Section 76 Bill, was published in Government Gazette No. 25562. 
Although civil society and academics went so far as to say that the CLRB compromised the 
existence of democracy in traditional rural areas, and with tensions increasing between 
stakeholders, the CLRB was introduced in the National Assembly as a Section 75 Bill on 31 
October 2003.  
From 10 to 14 November 2003, public hearings on the CLRB were organised. On one hand, 
activists wanted to have the bill entirely redrafted. Their strategy was to fuel debate within the 
ANC, between the DLA members who made the last minute changes, the cabinet that passed the 
changes, and those who were unaware and unsupportive of changes (e.g. the DPLG). 
Communities were also engaged in the process. Regarding the latter, the DLA accused the 
PLAAS and NLC of “using and manipulating” communities to validate their own concerns about 
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the bill, while not really consulting with them in a way that captured community needs. On the 
other hand, Contralesa believed that the DLA was looking out for the interests of chiefs. They 
considered they were not concerned. The ANC was, indeed, worried about its re-election in the 
upcoming national elections in April 2004, and was appeasing traditional leaders. The possibility 
of fast-tracking the bill was often cited in hearings. Some ANC MPs were acutely aware that party 
lists were being drafted for the election, and were reluctant to become dissidents of the CLRB at 
the expense of inclusion in the party list (Uggla, 2006). But the hearings also brought ‘new’ 
players in: COSATU wanted the bill to be withdrawn and reconsidered; the Coalition/Tripartite 
Alliance did not want the bill withdrawn, but did not want it to be fast-tracked and perhaps be 
revised; the CGE made damning a presentation on gender and democratisation. 
There was, however, a general feeling, particularly among activists, the PLAAS and the NLC, that 
the hearings were of little consequence and that the committees already had their minds made up. 
They stated that the public hearings and public submissions had “zero impact” (Fortin, 2006, pg. 
222). The latter was also the case on 17 November when the ANC, the DLA and the DPLG study 
groups met. The DLA asked the DPLG to amend the composition of traditional leadership in the 
TLGFB but no agreement was reached. On the 24th of the same month, an ANC-DLA study group 
meeting conceded that the only way to alter the content of the CLRB was to change the gender 
component of LACs; no changes were made in the end. 
The consultations led to the release on 21 November 2003 of the second amended 11th Draft 
CLRB with the DLA’s proposed amendments introduced as a Section 75 Bill. The Zulu King and 
Contralesa, for their part, endorsed the CLRB. 
 
Table 14: CLRB November 2003 Version Compared to the CLRB Early October 2003 
Version 
Content & Major Changes Preceding Events 
* omission of §17(2) & §17(3) concerning 
democratic decision-making processes for 
communities 
* omission of the section concerning the release 
of LRE findings 
 
 
Chapter 10: General: 
* omission of: “A magistrate’s court has the 
power to impose any penalty in terms of this 
section.” (§43(2)) 
* omission of magistrate’s power to act on 
unlawful allocation of community land without 
proper consent (§43(2)). 
*08/10/2003: Cabinet approves changes to CLRB 
*16/10/2003: leak from the DLA about changes to the 
CLRB – activists, academics and NGOs mobilise a furious 
response through the media and appeal to the DPLG 
*17/10/2003: Civil society and activists claim the CLRB, as 
released, and in the procedural context, compromised 
democracy in rural South Africa 
*17/10/2003: Zulu King & Contralesa endorse CLRB 
*21/10/2003: TLGFB Portfolio Committee meeting: the 
ANC members angered by the DLA’s actions with the 
CLRB; process of change questioned; the DLA accused of 
not knowing what they were doing; major concern over 
allocation of powers to traditional leaders in CLRB, 
terminology acutely avoided in TLGFB which used roles 
and functions instead to avoid the creation of a 4th tier of 
government 
 82 
*21/10/2003: civil society pressures DPLG to change the 
content of the TLGFB and composition of traditional 
leadership; the only place available for compromise in the 
TLGFB was the gender clause in composition requirements 
 
Few amendments appear between the October 2003 and November 2003 versions of the CLRB. 
They do, however, have important implications for CLaRA as they directly concern the rights and 
powers of the different stakeholders and the democratic processes in the communities. As such, in 
addition to some cutting back on the powers of magistrates, several omissions were made dealing 
with (Table 14): 
- the democratic process in community decision making regarding community rules (§17(2) and 
§17(3)); 
- the contents of a land rights enquiry report: the release of the report to the community was no 
longer enforced; and 
- the powers of the Minister in making a determination when there was a dispute (§18(5)) 
 
1.6 CLRB July 2004 Version Compared to the CLRB November 2003 Version 
The end of 2003 and beginning of 2004 were characterised by several negotiations and meetings 
that led to the third amended 11th Draft: the composite draft of the CLRB prepared by the DLA. 
As such, an ANC DLA study group meeting was held and discussed the need to strengthen 
women’s positions in the LAC. This was, however, not included. In early January, Zuma had a 
“high level meeting” with the IFP the results of which are unknown; and, finally, on 27 January 
2004, the Portfolio Committee voted and recommended a number of material amendments.  
Sibanda wrote, however, an article in the Sunday Times newspaper on 1 February 2004 that 
angered critics for its flippant tone (Fortin, 2006, pg. 112) and made them conclude that the 
CLRB had became too personal for him, and that this proved that the bill was not up for 
discussion anymore, securing it to pass before reaching parliament. But, the amendments were 
finally still integrated into the CLRB, with the most relevant in section 24 removing reference to 
LACs’ “ownership” function and rephrasing this as their “powers and duties” regarding land. 
Zuma reacted with a high level meeting on land affairs with the IFP,42 while the CLRB was 
passed unanimously by the National Assembly in February 2004. On 26 February, it was 
scheduled for vote in Parliament and was subsequently passed unanimously by the South African 
National Assembly. On 14 July 2004, Thabo Mbeki, who had been reinstated as President for the 
second time, signed the CLRB and enacted CLaRA. 
 
                                                   
42
 Pretoria News 28/01/04 in Fortin (2006, pg. 99). 
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Table 15: CLRB July 2004 Version Compared to the CLRB November 2003 Version 
Overall: 
* New insertion reading “to provide for the 
democratic administration of communal land by 
communities” (emphasis added) 
* Addition of democratic process required for 
community decision-making 
 
LACs and traditional authorities: 
* Omission: LAC to be a traditional council 
where there is a traditional council 
 
Women’s rights: 
*Addition: Old order rights held by all spouses 
(§4(2)) deemed to be held by all spouses in a 
marriage in which such a person is a spouse, 
jointly in undivided shares irrespective of the 
matrimonial property regime applicable to such 
marriage and must, on confirmation or 
conversion in terms of names of all such §18(3), 
be registered in the names of such spouses 
*Addition: Women’s tenure right is as secure as 
a man’s, regardless of any rule, law or custom to 
the contrary (§4(3)). 
 
Additions:  
* different forms that an award for comparable 
redress may take i.e. other land, money or a 
combination of both  (§12(2) and §12(3)) 
* outlines the contents of the land rights enquiry 
report as outlined in the October 2003 draft but 
somehow omitted in the November 2003 draft 
(§18(5)) 
 
*11-14/11/2003: CLRB public hearings; significant pressure 
to withdraw bill or to alter content from the ANC tripartite 
alliance; CGE makes damning presentation on gender and 
democratisation 
*11-14/11/2003: the DLA accuses PLAAS/NLC of using 
communities to lobby by proxy and manipulating 
community presenters 
*17/11/2003: ANC DLA & DPLG study groups meet; the 
DLA asks the DPLG to amend the composition of traditional 
leadership in the TLGFB but no agreement reached 
*24/11/2003: ANC DLA study group meeting decided that 
the only way to alter the content of the CLRB is to change 
the gender component of LACs; no changes made in the end 
*01/2004: Zuma has high level meeting on land affairs with 
IFP (Pretoria News 28/01/04, in Fortin, 2006, pg. 99) 
*27/01/2004: Portfolio committee recommends a number of 
material amendments 
*01/02/2004: Sibanda writes article in the Sunday Times that 
angered critics with its flippant tone (Fortin, 2006, pg. 112); 
critics of the CLRB say that he was too personal in 
development of the CLRB and could not handle criticism; 
critics claim this is proof that bill was not up for discussion 
anymore and that it had secured passage before reaching 
parliament 
*9/2/2004: amendments made to the CLRB, most relevant 
§24 taking away reference to the “ownership” function of 
LACs and rephrasing this as “powers and duties” regarding 
land 
2/2004: the CLRB passed unanimously by National 
Assembly 
07/2004: DLA Tenure Newsletter re-enacted, mainly used to 
discuss the CLRB 
*14/07/2004: Mbeki assents to the CLRB 
*20/07/2004: the CLRB becomes CLaRA 
 
Some of the previous omissions were re-inserted partly or re-formulated. They mainly concerned 
the democratic processes, land right enquiry procedures, and women and marginalised rights. 
Hence a new major insertion was integrated: “[CLRB] to provide for the democratic 
administration of communal land by communities”  (underlined in the CLRB). Additions were 
 84 
made to ensure that decisions made by a community were informed and democratically made by 
the majority of members of the community (18 years or older). Consequently, the fact that a LAC 
had to be a traditional council, in respect of an area where such a council was established and 
recognised, was also omitted.  
In addition, women’s rights were partly reinstated. The CLRB July 2004 version noted that an old 
order right held by a married person was – despite any law, practice, usage or registration to the 
contrary – deemed to be held by all spouses in a marriage in which such a person is a spouse, 
jointly in undivided shares irrespective of the matrimonial property regime applicable to such 
marriage and must, on confirmation or conversion in terms of names of all such §18(3), be 
registered in the names of such spouses. It also emphasised that a woman is entitled to the same 
legally secure tenure, rights in or to land, and benefits from land as a man, and no law, community 
or other rule, practice or usage may discriminate against any person on the basis of the gender of 
such a person. 
Finally, the sections dealing with the different forms an award for comparable redress could take 
– i.e. other land, money or a combination of both – were reinserted, as well as the process for the 
contents of land rights enquiry reports, as outlined in the October 2003 draft but omitted in the 
November 2003 draft. 
2. Effective Policy Influence: Consultation, Participation, or Just Policy 
Legitimisation? 
The inclusiveness of public policies can not be based on the simple participation by (formal and 
informal) actors. As written before, it supposes the elaboration of compromises. Hence, within the 
context of broader participation regarding policy development, it seems pertinent to analyse not 
only participation but also the effective influence certain actors had on the process and content of 
the act. This section looks at the varying degrees of influence exerted by the different stakeholders 
during the CLaRA development process. 
Broadly, as described earlier and as shown in Figure 3, three major groups characterised three 
positions (although varying points of view could be emphasised for specific aspects and could 
shift during the development process). Major opposition came from what we term the “land sector 
NGOs/activists” and women’s groups. Major support for the legislation came from the traditional 
lobby, the ANC and the IFP (eventually). A more neutral group, although when they came 
forward often slightly negative regarding CLaRA, includes trade unions (Cosatu), commissions 
(SACC, SAHRC), and the communities. The influence of these diverse actors was, however, very 
different, with the third group being almost invisible. 
In the early stages of the drafting of the legislation (around 2000), the ANC had the most 
influence on the ideas in the legislation as it pursued policies around the African renaissance 
championed by then President Thabo Mbeki. With the ANC wielding an absolute majority in the 
legislature, easing the legislation to pass through Parliament, it is instructive to note though that 
the Bill was voted unanimously. Parliamentarians are deemed to represent the best interests of the 
people and, as such, the ANC parliamentarians can claim to have voted in favour of this 
legislation in the best interests of the majority. Although at times seemingly divided during the 
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drafting of this legislation, the ruling party, the ANC, had significant influence on the legislation. 
Although the influence was subtle and part of the political game most times, the last minute 
changes when the Bill passed before the National Assembly and the often ‘secret’ meetings with 
traditional leaders – all this just before the Presidential elections – were more direct. It is not clear 
to what extent the DLA – at the centre of the drafting process as they were the responsible arm of 
Government regarding this matter – was independent of political influence since many of the 
ANC meetings were secret, but since the ruling party deploys cadres to various arms and 
departments of Government, it has a direct influence on policy processes and content. In this 
instance, Thoko Didiza had been deployed to the DLA and had a major influence on CLaRA. 
By far the most influence in terms of content in the final Act was exerted by the traditional lobby 
comprising of CONTRALESA, the National House of Traditional Leaders and the KZN house of 
Traditional leaders, amongst others. Starting with no explicit mention of the role of traditional 
leaders in land administration, through a mere 25% representation on LACs, the lobby finally 
managed to give themselves (solely), the role of land administration where a recognised 
traditional council exists within a community. This represented a major victory for traditional 
leadership in South Africa – and also garnered support for the ruling party in certain areas of the 
country.  
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Figure 3: Schema of Influence in CLaRA’s Development Process 
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This also represented the major bone of contention with land sector activists who felt that the 
LAC created a fourth sphere of Government that was not provided for in the Constitution. As 
the drafters of the abandoned Land Rights Bill saw their ideas being sidelined in the new 
CLRB, they organised themselves into land activists and found new homes in PLAAS, the 
National Land Coalition (NLC) and a few other land sector NGOs that came into being 
primarily to oppose the new Bill. This lobby group was well resourced and continues to mount 
opposition to the Act. With support from abroad they managed, mainly through PLAAS, to 
initiate a parallel consultation process enabling multiple contributions and the 
engagement/participation of several – often grassroots-based – organisations and 
communities. Another lobby group that made some headway in influencing the content of the 
final Act was the women’s lobby comprising groups such as the Commission for Gender 
Equality (CGE) and the Rural Women’s Movement (RWM). From no prescribed 
representation on the land administration committee, the lobby managed to force through 
changes to the legislation that ensured at least one third of each LAC would be composed of 
women. To what extent this one third will be able to participate meaningfully in day to day 
LAC operations remains to be seen. 
Although some practices during the formulation process for this piece of legislation can be 
questioned (the last minute changes), this chapter shows, however, that one cannot say there 
was no consultation. The formulation process of this legislation begs the questions: What is 
participatory democracy? What is inclusiveness? There were numerous submissions 
requesting the legislation be stopped and fresh consultations be conducted with a more 
broader and more equal panel of stakeholders (including rural communities), as many were 
worried about the excessive powers being given to traditional leaders through Land 
Administration Committees. Even the ruling party’s partner in the Tripartite Alliance, 
COSATU, sounded a word of caution on giving titles to rural communities sighting failed 
attempts of this approach in other African countries. In spite of all this, the legislation was 
enacted anyway. While participation did take place, this shows, however, that certain 
stakeholders either did not appear or did not manage to push their positions forward. Indeed, 
communities in particular only appeared sparsely at the end of the process. Often not weighing 
enough within the political battles around CLaRA, the lack of legitimacy and representativity 
(as they were often seemingly represented and criticized for being represented by NGOs) of 
the existing actions led to a shortage of power to really counter the traditional authorities and 
fractions of the ANC. If indeed, as part of these political games, there was Government 
pressure to close down certain grassroots movements (the examples of the closures of the 
NLC and the LPM are relevant here), it leads to questions regarding popular participation in 
policy development. 
The ways in which the different groups sought to influence the contents of the Act were an 
attempt at legitimizing (or de-legitimizing in the case of the land activists) the outcome of the 
development process. This is the way parliamentary democracy works, and those not satisfied 
with the outcomes can seek redress in the judiciary – as they have done in the constitutional 
court. 
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IV. ITHE POSITIONS ON COMMUNAL LAND TENURE AND INSTITUTIONS 
AT THE LOCAL LEVEL 
 
 
The previous chapter concluded that the main controversies around CLaRA at the national 
level included several issues, two of which are of particular interest in this chapter: (1) local 
governance, including the scope and extent of the tribal authorities’ prerogatives with regards 
to land allocation and land administration; and (2) the bundle of communal land rights, 
including security of tenure (is a title issued by the State an effective material support for 
tenure security?) and the newly opened channels towards the privatization of communal land. 
The aim of this component of the project is to study CLaRA’s local elaboration process to see 
whether and under which conditions it had been inclusive of the communities, and how the 
debates were framed and formulated at this level. It quickly appeared that CLaRA’s 
elaboration was not characterized by a local inclusive level. Even though the traditional chiefs, 
through their political organizations, featured as a prominent actor in the negotiations and the 
elaboration of the successive versions of CLaRA (see previous chapter), there was hardly any 
consultation of the main local stakeholders – the community members themselves. The 
debates at the national level also appeared to rely on rather monolithic and idealized (either 
positive or negative) views of communities. They did not seem to rely on comprehensive and 
objective data about actual daily individual land practices within the communities defining 
and shaping the effective, and probably very diverse, communal land and governance systems. 
 
The objectives of this chapter are, thus, reformulated as follows:  
1. characterize community members’ perceptions with respect to their bundles of rights under 
the communal land tenure system (with the aim of providing insight into the extent of de facto 
individualization and commoditization of communal land), and the perceptions of security that 
are attached to it; and  
2. identify their positions towards the two features of CLaRA that have been identified as 
salient and controverted, namely the issuance of individual land titles by the State, and the role 
of the chief and  tribal authorities in land matters. 
1. The “Local Theory” on Communal Land Rights 
The two communities exhibit common features in terms of local theories on communal land 
rights: they use similar categories for land classification, and have similar discourses on 
general rules and practices, including those relative to processes of individualization and 
commoditization. Whereas de facto individualization of land rights appears to be quite under 
way, the process of commoditization, while noticeable, is still partial. In any case, the 
reference to the chief remains central in discourse and practice. 
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1.1 The Communal Land Tenure Regime: Individual and Permanent Usufruct 
Rights Except for Grazing Areas 
 
The land in the two communities studied is divided into residential stands, arable stands 
(farmfields), business stands, and communal areas (also called open or grazing areas). 
Communal areas are used for wood picking and grazing and anyone from the community has 
a right of access and withdrawal on this area. By contrast, in both communities, the other 
categories of land are individually appropriated. A clear indication of this is that most of the 
stands are fenced (or are planned to be fenced) or clearly demarcated. In Makapanstad, the 
written rules given by the tribal office even make fencing a requirement. They stipulate that, 
“When your stand is not fenced within 3 weeks, kgoro [a group of elders in each section 
representing traditional power] will take the stand from you and they will allocate another 
stand when you are ready to fence it.” In other words, fencing is what establishes and 
materializes individual rights. 
People hold individual bundles of rights on residential stands, arable stands and business 
stands. Those rights include usus and fructus, and some aspects of abusus: according to the 
local theory, as stated by the tribal office of the two communities as well as by key 
informants, landholders have the right to transfer land by heritage, but they cannot sell the 
land (more on this below). The rights are granted indefinitely, and they are registered at the 
tribal office. The registry takes the form of a list of community members, and duplicates of the 
receipts for the registration fees charged by the tribal authorities. Any change in the use of the 
land (e.g. from farmfield to residential stand, or from residential stand to business stand) must 
be previously notified to the tribal office and is conditioned on the tribal authority’s approval. 
1.2 Access to Land: Between Entitlement and Interpersonal Arrangements 
Community members often refer to the community as a safety net for several reasons, the first 
of which deals with land access. As the “local theory” states, there is an entitlement to land 
when a (male) community member becomes an adult and gets married: on communal land 
“everybody [from the community] can get a piece of land,” and “people pay no rent or taxes.” 
At the same time, people expressed signs of a growing shortage of land, suggesting that in 
practice this entitlement to land is not really holding anymore.43 In both communities, there is 
no more unallocated land suitable for individual use; residential stands are being placed in 
former farmfields; residential stands are being subdivided, with the results that the size of 
individual stands is tending to diminish; and young people are increasingly having trouble 
finding residential stands, particularly those who cannot make family arrangements with their 
parents or grandparents. 
In both communities, the “local theory” states that, for a person that needs a piece of land 
whether for housing, farming or business, there are two ways of proceeding: (1) either you 
first choose a piece of land by yourself and register it with the traditional authority, or (2) you 
go straight to them and they allocate a piece of land for you. If you choose your land yourself, 
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 However, the sense of safety net also derives from the social meanings attached to the fact of belonging to 
a community. People often compared communal land to townships: in the community, “people help each 
other.” More on this below. 
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you have to “negotiate” with the owner of the land before you register it with the traditional 
authority. Although there is little unallocated land left in either community, there is an 
unspoken rule in both communities that if a stand has been vacated and abandoned for some 
time and that there is no relative to prove that the stand has an owner, this land can be 
reallocated to someone. In practice, it was observed that most people choose their stands 
themselves and then went with the traditional authority for validation. 
In both communities, there is a fee to pay for the registration of the (new) stand and a paper is 
issued by the traditional authority as a proof of payment. This paper is a mere receipt. But it is 
also the proof that you belong to the community, and it must be produced any time a 
community member wants something from the tribal office, such as proof of residence, an ID 
application, a burial order, a business application, etc. 
That transfers other than heritage are openly part of the local theory suggests that they are 
indeed quite common. Some of these transfers are still intergenerational and take place in a 
non-market arena. However, what is called “negotiation” is sometimes indeed a transaction 
involving money. 
In both communities, although most people refer to the origin of their rights as “an allocation 
by the chief” (see next section), it appears that the role of the traditional authority with regards 
to current access to land is now mostly an administrative one. Since most of the land is already 
individually appropriated, traditional leaders do not get involved directly in land allocation 
anymore. Sometimes they play a role of mediation/brokering between those who are looking 
for land and those who are offering it; most of the time they simply register the transfers of the 
pieces of land in the community, and charge fees for transfer registration. 
2. Individual Perceptions and Practices Around Permanent Transfers  
Table 16 displays the origin of the rights on communal land as stated by the interviewees. 
Unfortunately, the first category (“allocation by chief”), although very illustrative of the 
central reference to the chief that is still being made by community members, does not allow 
one to differentiate between the cases when the land was affectively allocated by the chief out 
of the stock of vacant land, and the cases where the land rights were obtained through one of 
the other three possibilities, and the transfer was validated through the chief. Thus, for the 
purpose of the analysis, we will only consider whether there are cases of permanent transfers 
outside inheritance, and will not focus on their absolute or relative frequencies, which are 
probably underestimated. Table 16 still allows us to conclude that in both communities there 
are other arrangements to access communal land, including intra-familial arrangements and 
extra-familiar arrangements that in some (but not all) cases are explicitly referred to as 
purchases. 
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Table 16: Origin of Rights on Communal Land 
 Makapanstad Selepe Total 
Residential Stands    
allocation by chief 26 10 36 
inheritance 9 16 25 
intra-familial arrangement 3 12 15 
extra-familiar arrangement 3 4 7 
no answer 4 3 7 
Total interviewees with residential stands 45 45 90 
Farmfields    
allocation by chief 2 0 2 
inheritance 1 11 12 
intra-familial arrangement 0 7 7 
extra-familiar arrangement 1 1 2 
no answer 3 7 10 
Total interviewees with farmfields 7 26 33 
 
When asked what they were allowed to do on their land, the majority of people (fifty-nine out 
of ninety, i.e. 66%) replied that there was no constraint on the bundle of rights they enjoyed, 
as the following quotation illustrates: “I own it [the land]. I can do whatever I want.”44 
When asked more specifically about sales transfers, people gave more qualified answers. The 
main views concerning sales transfers are summarized in Table 17. The first result is that for 
seventy-one out of ninety people interviewed, sales of residential stands are allowed, even 
though twenty-nine of them mention some restrictions: what can be sold is only the house, not 
the land, and the transfer has to be validated through the chief. This somehow relates to the 
rationale put forward by the twelve people for whom selling residential stands is impossible 
because “the land belongs to the chief.” Some of these people even said that if you leave the 
community you have to demolish the house because you cannot sell it.  
Table 17 also suggests a somewhat different picture in the rural and the more urban 
communities. In Selepe, even though two thirds of the interviewees thought that it was 
possible to sell residential stands, there is still one third that believed that this was absolutely 
impossible or did not answer the question. In Makapanstad, these two last categories account 
for less than 10%. However, even in Makapanstad, twenty-four people make a clear 
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 Interview 5B, Selepe, 03/04/08. 
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distinction between selling the house and selling the land (even though on practical grounds 
this does not make much of a difference), and mention the chief as a necessary broker.  
 
Table 17: Perceptions Regarding the Right to Sell Residential Stands 
Are you allowed to sell? Makapanstad Selepe Total 
Yes 41 30 71 
Yes, the house and the stand 8 6 14 
Yes, but only the house, and through the chief  24 5 29 
Yes, with no precisions 9 19 28 
No, because it's the chief's land 2 10 12 
Don't know / Did not answer 2 5 7 
Total 45 45 90 
3. Written Evidence of Land Rights and Perceived Security of Tenure 
3.1 Current Written Evidence of Land Rights 
Table 18 confirms the “local theory” in the sense that in most cases individual rights are 
supported by written evidence issued by the traditional authorities. Referring to the apartheid 
period before 1994, eight people also told us they had to pay levies to the department of 
Agriculture for their rights on farmfields and their rights on their residential stands, and that 
the corresponding levy slips (which we would tend to see mostly as a testimony of oppression) 
were written proof of their land rights on the plot. 
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Table 18: Written Evidence of Land Rights 
 Makapanstad Selepe Total 
Residential Stands    
chief receipt 38 37 74 
levy slip 0 1 1 
no paper 1 7 8 
no answer 6 1 7 
    
Total interviewees with residential stands 45 45 90 
Farmfields    
chief receipt 2 9 11 
levy slip 0 7 7 
no paper 1 4 5 
no answer 4 6 10 
    
Total interviewees with farmfields 7 26 33 
 
3.2 Perceived Security of Current Tenure and the Role of the Written Receipt 
The majority of people consider that their rights on communal land are secure (Table 19). 
Indeed seventy-three out of ninety (81%) interviewed expressed that they do not think that 
anyone can take their land away from them. Out of these seventy-three people, sixty-two 
consider that the traditional authority, i.e. the chief, enforces the rights because the rights are 
allocated and recognized under the tribal system. Communal land ultimately “belongs to the 
chief” and he is the safe keeper of the “rights he has given.” 
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Table 19: Opinions on Security of Tenure and the Enforcement of Rights 
 Makapanstad Selepe Total 
Do you consider that your land rights are secure? 
yes 39 34 73 
no 2 11 13 
Don’t know / Did not answer 4 0 4 
 
How are your rights enforced? 
chief (with receipt) 34 40 74 
other 3 2 5 
Don’t know / Did not answer 8 3 11 
 
The sense of tenure security is supported by the holding of a written document, even though 
this is merely a receipt issued by the chief. Most people consider the receipt they received 
when the land was allocated to them as sufficient proof that the land is theirs, as one man said 
“I will prove this is my land by using the receipt.”45  Besides the written receipt, the 
perception of tenure security also derives from the common knowledge held by the 
community as a group. As several people told us, “everybody knows this is my plot,” “the 
community knows.” 
As Table 20 shows, the relationship between holding a written document from the chief and 
feeling secure on one’s land is not totally exclusive. There are six people who consider 
themselves secure although they do not have a written document, and ten people who consider 
themselves insecure even though they do hold a paper from the chief. However, as a general 
trend, holding such a document still appears to make a difference in the feeling of security: the 
ratio of people that feel secure over those that feel insecure is almost seven to one with a 
written document, whereas it is only two to one without a written document. 
 
Table 20: Perception of Tenure Security and Written Documents 
 Feels secure on his/her land 
 Total Makapanstad Selepe 
 yes no yes no yes No 
Has a paper from the chief       
Yes 65 10 36 2 29 8 
No 6 3 1 0 5 3 
Total 71 13 37 2 34 11 
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 Interview 35A, Makapanstad, 05/06/08. 
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Table 19 shows that thirteen people consider their rights to be insecure, eleven of which are in 
Selepe and only two of which are in Makapanstad. Table 20 also shows that of the ten people 
that consider their rights insecure even though they have a written document, eight are from 
Selepe. The alleged sources of insecurity also separate the two communities in distinct groups. 
In Makapanstad, albeit ultra-minority, the perception of insecurity is directly linked to the 
communal land system as compared to the private property system, materialized by title 
deeds. One woman considered the chief as being a source of insecurity, because of his alleged 
monopoly on holding the community title deed (even though there are no such deeds under the 
current system), and another questioned the power of the receipt to really provide them with 
security of tenure.  
 
 “The chief is the only one having a title deed, it’s easy for him to take the land away from 
the people. It can happen.”46  
“Kgoshi might not be here in the future and he is the one who can prove that this land is 
mine. Other tribes might come and push us out. Receipts don’t stay; they are not in the 
computers.”47 
 
Their words question the security of tenure as a relative feature in a legal pluralistic 
environment. As the women say, the receipt has only value inside the tribal system, it cannot 
be equated to a title deed, and has no value outside the tribal system. 
In Selepe, two main sources of insecurity were put forward: the prospecting by mining 
companies on farmfields without the consent of the owners (six people), and the possibility 
that a family member who had agreed to give away a piece of land would claim it back (four 
people). The source of perceived insecurity thus seem to be more linked to specific 
enforcement issues than to a comparative assessment on the basis of property regime 
principles. Actually, the Selepe data from Table 19 indicate that the recognition given to the 
chief and the receipt that he issues as the source of enforcement of one’s rights is also shared 
by some of the people who consider themselves insecure. 
The people who see the mine as a threat either had a farmfield taken away by the mine or 
knew of someone whose farmfield was taken away. People mentioned that Anglo Platinum is 
pushing people off their land without negotiation and that prospecting companies come and 
prospect on farmfields without the owners’ agreement. People mentioned that the chief had 
negotiated with the mine without consulting them, and that they did not have any word in the 
matter. The following words of a young man in Selepe sum up the issue: 
 
“The Mine does not ask the owner when they need a farm field. They agree with the Kgoshi. 
The owner of the farm field does not have much to say. The Kgoshi has the final agreement. 
It’s difficult to lodge complaints. […] The Mine planned to take the farm fields of many 
people. Anglo Platinum takes advantage because it’s State land, so things just happen. 
There are tensions when the mine just puts a machine on a farm field. It’s a take it or leave it 
situation. We have nothing to say.”48 
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 Interview 12A, Makapanstad, 30/05/08. 
47
 Interview 27A, Makapanstad, 03/06/08. 
48
 Interview 16B, Selepe, 04/04/08. 
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Between the lines, what initially appeared as an external source of insecurity was associated 
with some statement about the chief defaulting on his responsibility to protect the security of 
tenure of his community members, either indirectly (through incapacity) or directly (through 
organizing himself the activities of the mine, and possibly charging money for that, see Box 
4). 
 
Box 5: The Ga-Selepe Tribal Authorities and the Atok Platinum Mine 
In the Selepe area, there is an Anglo Platinum platinum mine, which has been mining 
since the 1970s, and several shafts were open recently. 
According to the explanations of the chairman of the Board of Trustees, the mine 
organized meetings to inform the community about the opening of a shaft on Selepe land. 
The community was consulted and decided to let the mine build a shaft through a tribal 
resolution. A lease is to be signed between the mine and the community, according to 
him. The mine made a donation of two million rand and will pay lease money, a rent, 
every year. For this matter, a board of trustees was created to manage the money. The 
trust has still not received any lease money yet, and only 25% of the donation money was 
unblocked. The reason he gave for this is that the lease has not actually been signed yet 
by the Department of Land Affairs and the Department of Minerals and Energy. 
 
On a different level, four people in Selepe mentioned family members as being a source of 
insecurity. They evoked the possibility of a family member claiming their land, the family 
member being the previous owner of the land. One man also mentioned that he was afraid 
someone from the community might invade his farmfield. 
In summary, the majority of people feel secure on their land under the current tenure system. 
This sense of security can be explained by the confidence people have in the tribal system to 
enforce their rights, but also by the fact that in these two communities there has not been 
pervasive threats to the current land tenure system (although the mine issue in Selepe tends to 
qualify this). These results therefore come from a particular context and cannot be applied 
blindly to the overall community system. 
The people who mentioned insecurity of tenure in Makapanstad make an explicit comparison 
between the communal and private property right regimes, focusing notably on the value of 
the receipt given by the traditional authority, highlighting that it does not have the power of a 
title deed. In Selepe, people refer to insecurity of tenure in very practical terms, referring to 
effective situations of threat or encroachment. They do not weigh the relative pros and cons of 
alternative property rights systems. More specifically, in Selepe, it seems that the chief is 
either not able or not willing to enforce the rights of the people against the mine’s prospecting 
activities. This questions the chief’s power to enforce the rights of the people, and reveals 
issues relating to a lack of accountability and transparency.  
3.3 Comparative Assessment of Community Receipts and Title Deeds 
As Table 21 shows, opinions on the ranking of title deeds relative to receipts are quite 
heterogeneous, with no one position clearly outstripping the others: forty people consider the 
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title deed as superior, while thirty-one believe the opposite, and nineteen did not answer 
(usually on the grounds that they lacked information to compare the two). 
Table 21: Perceptions of Title Deeds Versus Community Receipts 
 Makapanstad Selepe Total 
Does a title deed bring something more than a receipt? 
yes 23 17 40 
no 13 18 31 
no answer 9 10 19 
Total 45 45 90 
Rationales put forward (multiple answers allowed) 
Title deed > receipt    
Title deeds bring more rights (generally speaking) 20 10 34 
Title deeds bring more abusus rights (specifically: to sell, 
to mortgage) 12 2 14 
Title deeds mean more security 3 8 11 
Title deeds mean less power for the chief 5 0 5 
Title deed = receipt    
There is no need for title deeds 11 17 28 
Title deeds are incompatible with communal system 2 1 3 
 
The main rationale put forward by those considering that the title deed has more value than the 
receipt is the broader scope of individual rights that it entails (85% mention this): “with a title 
deed the land really belongs to me and I can do whatever I want.” More specifically, fourteen 
people mentioned the right to sell, and one person also mentioned the right to mortgage in 
order to access a loan. Five people (all of them from Makapanstad) also explicitly stated that 
an advantage of the title deed would be to lower the chief’s power. Finally, the security 
criteria (the more formal the document, the higher the security) was put forward by only 
eleven people, eight of which in Selepe. This last result strengthens the conclusions reached in 
the previous section, namely that most people do not deem the current system to be insecure. 
On the other hand, for thirty-one people, a title deed would bring no additional benefit 
compared to the receipt. For three of them, a title deed is even something unconceivable, 
because it is incompatible with the current customary system (“the land belongs to the chief”). 
For this minority group, there is a close link between title and governance. Finally, it is 
noteworthy that a non-negligible number of people (nineteen out of ninety) consider that they 
are currently unable to answer this question. 
At the community level, Makapanstad seems to stand out on three aspects. First, there was a 
clearer preference for the title deed over the tribal receipt (expressed by two thirds of the 
people answering the question, as opposed to only half in Selepe). Second, twelve people from 
Makapanstad referred to the broadening of abusus rights that the title deed would bring, as 
opposed to only two people from Selepe. We have seen in previous sections that a land market 
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was presumably already operating in the two communities. The discrepancy appearing in 
Table 21 might indicate that the land market in Makapanstad is already more active (which 
would be logical considering its proximity to Pretoria), and that landholders perceive that they 
could sell their land at a better price under a private property regime. Finally, even though 
only five people are concerned, only in Makapanstad is the issue of title deed versus receipt 
framed in terms of an explicit goal to decrease the power of the traditional authority. Next 
section will come back to the issue of local power and local governance in more depth. 
4. Matters of Local Governance: Traditional Bodies and Local 
Government 
Contrasting with how the debate is framed at the national level, most people do not refer to the 
chief as a principle of local governance. They talk about a flesh and bone person and his 
specific practices and performance (although several people from Makapanstad do talk about 
principles). Quite logically, the history of the community, the personality of the chief, and the 
issues specific to the community influence people’s positions and opinions on governance 
matters.  
4.1 Service Delivery and the Articulation Between Traditional Power and the 
Municipality 
Although communal land is often presented as a safety net, it is also criticized as a place with 
no development, no services, and no opportunities.  
As a matter of fact, the main grievance of the people interviewed in both communities was not 
about land issues but, rather, about the lack of infrastructures. seventy-three people 
complained about service (electricity, tap water, sewage, etc.) delivery. The two communities 
are very much underdeveloped infrastructure-wise. In Selepe, only two sections out of five 
have electricity and there is no running water, sewage or sanitation services, street lights, 
proper roads, public transportation, or proper infrastructures. In Makapanstad services are 
slightly more developed, but still the vast majority of the households interviewed had no 
running water or electricity.  
It is interesting to analyze what people think is blocking infrastructure development because it 
gives some hints on their perceptions about the local governance structure. In both cases the 
legal pluralism with regards to service provisions seemed to translate into a lack of 
accountability as regards the community members/service users.  
In Makapanstad, many accuse the chief of blocking service delivery because of a power 
struggle between traditional and municipal authorities. Twenty-two people mentioned that he 
does not want to develop the land because it means he will lose his power, whereas only one 
person mentioned this in Selepe. According to these people, the chief has to agree if 
something is done on his land and he exercises this power by keeping the land from 
developing. If the municipality enters the chief’s land, it means that the chief is no longer in 
charge. In Makapanstad, corruption (of the ward councillors, contractors) was also mentioned 
by five people as a reason for the lack of service delivery.  
The case of Makapanstad is illustrative of how legal pluralism can sometimes hinder local 
development, when it translates as confrontation rather than complementarity. Table 22 
displays the views of the Makapanstad community members about how the traditional leaders 
and the municipal government should interact. In more than half of the answers (twenty out of 
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thirty-three), it is considered that the role of the chief for matters of local services and 
infrastructures should be subordinated to the local municipal government, or that the chief 
should have no role at all. Although a minority, five people still consider that the power that 
the chief derives from being the owner of communal land legitimizes the control he should 
have over the municipality decisions. 
 
Table 22: Perceptions on the Articulation Between the Chief and the Municipality  
 
Makapanstad 
chief should be under municipality 15 
chief should have no role at all 5 
chief and municipality should work together 8 
chief's land, the municipality has to go through him 5 
did not answer 12 
Total 45 
 
In Selepe for the majority of people (34), service delivery (and the lack thereof) was 
considered a matter for the municipality: it was the municipality and the ward councillors who 
were just making promises of service delivery, and they were to blame if nothing was 
happening. However, four people also mentioned that there were strong political differences 
between the municipality and the chief, which hindered development. 
 
Table 23: Perceptions on What Is Blocking Service Delivery 
 Makapanstad Selepe Total 
the chief, he does not want to lose power 22 1 23 
the chief because he’s from a different political party than the 
municipality 3 1 4 
the municipality / ward councillors, they just promise 10 34 44 
corruption / non-transparency 5 0 5 
did not answer 5 9 14 
Total 45 45 90 
 
The provision of local services is not only a matter of who makes the decisions. It is also a 
matter of finance. On communal land, there are few sources of income for the municipality. 
People pay fees which go to the tribal authority, but they do not pay any taxes (such as 
housing taxes) to the municipality. The municipal budget has to come from State grants and 
the national government, and can be quite constrained. In Selepe, however, the mine is a 
source of income for the municipalities and the communities, so the lack of service delivery 
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also has to be considered through the lens of a global lack of accountability from both 
traditional and municipal authorities. 
In summary, the issue of the respective roles for the customary authorities and local municipal 
government with regards to the provision of local services and infrastructure appeared as quite 
conflicted in one of the two communities. In both communities, transparency and 
accountability appear as key issues, but they were not related to one local governance system 
in particular. Both customary and municipality bodies were criticised on these grounds. 
4.2 Role and Appreciation of Traditional Structures and Power 
Table 24 provides the main categories mobilized by interviewees when asked an open 
question on the role of the chief. 
 
Table 24: Opinions on the Chief’s Role 
What is the chief's role? Makapanstad Selepe Total 
control / cohesion 14 41 55 
conflict resolution 7 18 25 
culture / tradition 6 8 14 
land allocation 11 5 16 
no role / useless 6 1 7 
did not answer 11 1 12 
 
In both communities, the chief’s main role appears to be related to social and political control, 
which is deemed to provide community cohesion. This answer is particularly frequent in 
Selepe (forty-one, compared to fourteen in Makapanstad). This is in line with what was 
expected, Selepe being a more rural and traditional community setting than Makapanstad. The 
second category is conflict resolution, again more frequently referred to in Selepe than in 
Makapanstad. A somewhat related, but less frequent, category is the role of chief as a keeper 
of culture and tradition. Interestingly, although the role of the chief with regards to land 
matters does appear in the array of answers, it is not by far the most frequent, and it is 
unexpectedly more cited in Makapanstad than in Selepe. On the opposite side of the spectrum, 
a few people (7) said that there is no role for the chief anymore, six of them from 
Makapanstad. 
 
Independently of what is – or what should be – the role of the chief, there were grievances 
about a lack of transparency in both communities. The issues around the way traditional 
power was exercised are displayed in Table 25. A first point is that there were more critics in 
Makapanstad than in Selepe, with the issue of service delivery again standing out. In seven 
cases, people hinted that the chief might be taking undue personal benefits out of natural 
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resources from the communities (sand in Makapanstad, minerals in Selepe49). The issue of 
non-transparency surrounding processes of land allocation was also mentioned in sixteen 
cases (ten in Makapanstad, six in Selepe), although we unfortunately could not dig deeper into 
the underlying facts. 
 
Table 25: Issues Around Chiefs and Traditional Power 
 
Makapanstad Selepe Total 
chief blocking the service delivery 23 1 24 
non-transparency regarding decision making 10 8 18 
non-transparency regarding allocation of land 10 6 16 
non-transparency regarding negotiation with the mine n/a 5 5 
non-transparency regarding the sand issue 2 n/a 2 
did not answer 10 29 39 
 
In summary, a demand for transparency and accountability mechanisms was expressed by 
community members. Quite noticeably, this demand was not framed explicitly in terms of 
inclusiveness and participation in the decision-making processes. Also, even though the 
questionnaire was mostly oriented towards traditional forms of local governance, criticism 
was also expressed regarding the local municipality system. A last feature is that people 
usually make the distinction between the principles behind each governance system and how 
they perform, and they actually focus much more on the latter aspect, which is of direct 
practical relevance to them. In other words, criticisms against efficiency and/or accountability 
of either system of local governance do not necessarily mean a negative opinion of (or any 
opinion whatsoever on) the political acceptability of either governance principle as such.  
5. Linking the Results with CLaRA’s Prospects: Opinion Clusters 
Regarding Land Governance and Title Deeds 
 
In this section, we proceeded to cross the previous results regarding the community members’ 
perceptions of land governance and title deeds. The purpose was to identify clusters of 
opinions that could inform – albeit indirectly – us as to how community members could 
receive the notice of CLaRA when it finally comes to grassroots consultation or 
implementation.50 The results are shown in Table 26. 
                                                   
49 From the discussions, it also appeared that only a few people really knew how the chief in Selepe had 
negotiated with the mine. 
 
50
 Although this was not entirely satisfactory methodologically speaking, we were not in a position to ask people 
their opinions on CLaRA itself. The questionnaire asked whether the interviewee had heard of CLaRA: only 
six people, five of which in Makapanstad, answered yes (a clear confirmation of the results obtained in the 
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study at the national level, see previous chapters), and none of them could give an accurate definition of its 
content (it was generally confused with the redistributive land reform programme). 
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Table 26: Opinion Clusters Regarding Land Governance and Title Deeds 
 Title Deed Yes Title Deed No Total 
 Makapanstad Selepe Total Makapanstad Selepe Total  
Chief 
Yes 10 17 27 11 17 28 55 
Chief 
No 10 1 11 0 0 0 11 
Total 20 18 38 11 17 28 66 
 
The total results recall the results presented in earlier sections: on the one hand, title deeds are 
considered to have an advantage over receipts by a majority, but not an overwhelming 
majority, of interviewees; on the other hand, while the performance of the chief in terms of 
efficiency and transparency is somewhat contested, it does not translate into a majority 
expressing the will to get rid of this governance system as such. 
 
Crossing the categories led to the following clusters:  
• The “traditionalists,” who do not see the point in getting a title deed and consider that 
the chief has a role to play with regards to land governance because the figure of the 
chief provides individual tenure security and binds the community’s social group 
together. This is the most numerous group (but only by one unit), with twenty-eight 
people (42%). Note that the “traditionalists” do not necessarily consider that their 
bundle of individual land rights are constrained under the current communal land 
system (and that it should be that way): half of them consider that they have no 
restrictions and seven believed that they could sell communal land. 
• The “modernists,” who consider that title deeds bring either broader (including 
abusus) or more secure rights, and who consider that the traditional structures do not 
bring anything additional compared to government institutions. Only eleven people 
(16%) belong to this cluster, ten of which come from Makapanstad. 
• The “pragmatists,” who, like the “modernists,” value the benefits that title deeds could 
bring them but at the same time, unlike the “modernists,” consider that the traditional 
system need not disappear (even though some may say that there are some flaws in the 
way traditional power is exercised). This is probably the most interesting group 
because it illustrates how people are able to deal separately with governance issues 
and property rights issues, and that they can accommodate the current legal pluralism, 
trying to make the most benefit out of each system. What also makes this cluster quite 
relevant is that it represents twenty-seven people (42%), almost as many as the 
traditionalists, seventeen of which come from Selepe. 
• The “nihilists,” who want neither the tribal system nor title deeds. We actually did not 
expect this category to be filled. 
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6. Concluding Comments Concerning the Local Level 
With regards to governance, the people’s main concern is the development of the community, 
especially in terms of infrastructures. It is mostly trough this problem of development that the 
community members question governance structures – either traditional authority or local 
municipal government – or their articulation (since local conflicts between State and tribal 
authorities can hinder the delivery of public services). A general result with regards to local 
governance is that people distinguish between systems of governance (State versus traditional) 
on the one hand, and their performance on the other. The “demand from below” is framed in 
terms of more transparency, accountability and effectiveness, whatever the institutional 
framework. Criticisms against effectiveness and/or accountability of either system of local 
governance (for the purposes of land administration and service delivery) do not necessary 
mean a negative opinion regarding the political acceptability of either governance principle as 
such. In particular, we found that the majority of people do not want traditional structures to 
disappear. Some want them to be reformed or changed, but the traditional system also 
represents culture, identity, and safety nets (in terms of access to residential land – even 
though there are signs of shortage – and in terms of social cohesion, particularly in the rural 
community). 
 
With regards to property rights, in the “local theory,” communal land is still referred to as a 
safety net in the sense of entitlement to land when one becomes an adult and gets married, and 
the role of the chief is still referred to as an allocative one. However, in practice, there is little 
vacant communal land left to allocate, access to land is increasingly taking place through 
interpersonal arrangements (within the family or through the land market), and the role of the 
chief seems to have shifted towards that of a broker and a validation and registration office for 
land transfers (charging a fee for this service). 
In both communities, individualization of land tenure is almost complete, which does not 
mean that people consider communal land to be equivalent to private property. People 
accommodate the seemingly contradictory statements that “the land belongs to the chief” and 
“I own the land.” This is because they do not refer to the same bundles of rights. What is 
recognized as belonging to the chief is the right of administration, while the usufruct rights are 
clearly perceived as individual and permanent. 
The security of this individual tenure is not an issue under the current system for the two 
communities, although some problems were reported (particularly in Selepe with respect to 
the mining activities). The receipts issued by the tribal authorities are considered to be an 
effective material support for this tenure security. At the same time, private property title 
deeds can be valued as bringing additional benefits, because they broaden the scope of rights 
(particularly in terms of abusus) and because it is a more formal, State-issued document. An 
interesting result is that there is not necessarily an incompatibility between a stated preference 
for a title deed and the acknowledgement of the relevance of customary leadership, as the 
“pragmatists” group (which represents 42% of the sample, as much as the “traditionalists,” 
and 3.5 times more than the “modernists”) clearly shows. Also note that being a member of 
the “traditionalists” does not imply an opposition to the title deed as a matter of principle. The 
majority in this group simply does not see the point of title deeds compared to the current 
system. 
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The results also provide some hints at the heterogeneity among communities.51 As expected, 
the more urban community displays a more State-oriented vision of local governance and a 
more privatized vision of land rights. However, this is only a relative feature, which also 
seems to be fuelled by context-specific resentment with respect to the chief’s attitude and 
practices.  
The latter implies certain policy implications.  
Deriving policy implications from this study must be done very cautiously, for two reasons. 
The first is that results from only two communities cannot be safely generalized to the totality 
of communities in South Africa. The second relates to the fact that CLaRA was not known by 
most of the people interviewed and its provisions were only alluded to indirectly. This being 
said, we believe that the study reveals processes, perceptions, discourses and rationales that 
can be highlighted and provide some guidance for future reflections. 
The first point regarding technical and policy discussions is that there is a need to carefully 
disentangle the issue of land property rights and the issue of local governance (as people 
themselves do). Some governance problems (lack of accountability, lack of transparency, and 
even threats to individual tenure security) will neither be resolved nor made worse by CLaRA; 
they are just another issue. On the other hand, some tenure security problems (such as the 
threats posed by the mine in Selepe) might not be resolved by any titling programme if there is 
no effective judiciary system to enforce new order rights against powerful economic interests. 
The second point is that the current processes and practices in the two communities seem to 
bear a fair level of compatibility with the main feature of CLaRA, that is a titling programme 
under a broader communal property regime. Most people could accommodate in their 
discourse both the advantages of State-issued land documentation and the advantages of 
belonging to a community. However, the exact attributions of the traditional bodies need to be 
carefully worked through. Indeed, a majority of people are not opposed to the chief system 
with regards to land administration, as long as it is maintained as a minimum role: while there 
might be no problem if they continue performing as a registration body, there would definitely 
be problems if the titles were issued in the name of the chief instead of community members, 
or if new or broader allocation or management rights were given to the chief. 
The growing pressure on land that was observed in both communities could trigger a demand 
for land titling, not so much for people to further secure their rights (since there was no sign of 
pervasive insecurity in the two communities), but mostly for people to broaden the scope of 
their rights and improve their conditions of access to the land market to take advantage of the 
increasing demand for land. If the market access rationale prevails, the logical follow-up 
would be for some individuals to make use of the new legal opportunity to translate their 
community deeds into title deeds. There is potential demand from below, but the chiefs might 
oppose these initiatives (as the tensions in Makapanstad already illustrate), and tensions or 
conflicts might arise as a consequence. 
The results clearly indicate the need to deepen the work on strengthening local governance 
processes. The study also revealed a major stake that lies in the respective roles and powers 
                                                   
51
 Although the sample was designed in order to account for possible individual heterogeneity (e.g. 
according to age, gender, wealth etc.) the results did not allow us to identify clear patterns at the individual 
level. 
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for the traditional authorities and municipal governments in terms of infrastructure, services, 
local development projects, etc. This governance issue is linked to the property right regime 
since the chiefs derive their power from the control they exercise over community territory. 
This issue goes beyond the scope of this particular study, but our data indicate that there might 
be some spillovers in how the leaders and community members perceive and make use of 
CLaRA. Finally, while national debates emphasize inclusion and democratic processes of 
decision making in local governance, local discourses mostly emphasize transparency and 
effectiveness. Obviously, the two focuses are not contradictory. However, the local results 
might somehow illustrate that the conditions for effective participation of all stakeholders, 
including women, might not currently be met, and that the demand from below is less 
grounded in principles and more in outcomes. 
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V. FROM (NON-) CONSULTATIONS TO POLICY DEVELOPMENT 
REGARDING SOUTH AFRICA’S COMMUNAL LAND: CONCLUDING 
REMARKS ON CLARA AND THE RENEWAL OF PUBLIC POLICY 
 
The renovation of public policy in general, and particularly (communal) land policy, appears 
in many cases to be a priority on national agendas to relieve the numerous challenges rural 
Africans face: land conflicts, land insecurity, important demographic pressures and weight, 
and the high prevalence of poverty in rural areas. Simultaneously, although at varying paces 
according to particular situations, the countries of sub-Saharan Africa engaged (at times due to 
external pressure) in institutional reforms. These complementary reforms concerned, on the 
one hand, decentralisation and regional integration, on the other hand, the democratisation of 
public life and the promotion of new forms of governance that favour, among other principles, 
transparency in decision making and management, negotiation among actors, and the 
responsibilities of decision-makers with regards to other actors. This new politico-institutional 
context raises questions, notably related to the renovation of public policies, not only 
regarding their content, but equally about the processes driving their elaboration that are based 
on the inclusion of a multitude of actors and institutions at different levels (national, 
provincial and local). 
 
As such, in 2004, the Government of South Africa voted the Communal Land Rights Act. 
“The purpose of the Act is to give secure land tenure rights to communities and persons who 
occupy land that the apartheid government had reserved for occupation by African people 
known as the communal areas. The land tenure rights available to the people living in 
communal areas are largely based on customary law or insecure permits granted under laws 
that were applied to African people alone” (DLA, 2004, pg. 4). According to the framework of 
more transparent and inclusive policy development and implementation processes, the CLaRA 
of 2004 was hailed by its drafters as one of the most participatory pieces of legislation ever 
drafted within the Department of Land Affairs (DLA, 2004). Regarding its development 
process, the DLA notes (DLA, 2004, pg. 4):  
 
“The public consultation on the Bill commenced in May 2001 following the production of 
third draft of the Bill. The consultation process culminated in the hosting of the National 
Land Tenure Conference (NTLC) held in Durban at the International convention Centre in 
November 2001. Two thousand persons representing various stakeholders attended the 
conference. 
“Between 14 August 2002 when the Bill was gazetted and 22 September 2003, there was 
also a thorough public consultation process on the Bill. Stakeholders consulted include 
eleven National Departments and six Provincial Governments: Eastern Cape, North West, 
Mpumalanga, Limpopo, Free State and KwaZulu-Natal. Organisations consulted were, 
amongst others, the Bafokeng Royal Council, Congress of Traditional leaders of South 
Africa, local and district councillors from the Polokwane and Capricorn districts, 
councillors and officials from Polokwane municipality, the press, His Majesty King G. 
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Zwelithini, together with Inkosi Mangosuthu Buthelezi and Amakhosi in Ulundi. Over and 
above the reference group set up by the Minister, communities were consulted widely in the 
affected provinces.” 
 
However, several months after having voted the Act, CLaRA was accused of non-
constitutionality for several reasons (see Chapter 2). The still-ongoing court case has delayed 
the implementation of the Act, with DLA officials indicating that the regulations of the Act 
might only be tabled in Parliament after the next general elections in 2009.52 If the delay in 
implementing the Act is an example of an inherent democratic process, it also leads to 
questioning the implemented, seemingly more inclusive, development process. Several 
questions come to the fore. It leads to the necessity to scrutinize the technical and 
organizational aspects of such more inclusive processes. Indeed, if there seems to be a broader 
consensus on the need for more transparent and inclusive decision making, there is no overall 
harmony on how such processes can be developed. What went wrong or what is being 
criticized? It also leads one to question the nature of these more inclusive processes. Are they 
really inclusive, i.e. reflecting the positions of a large – if not the entire – panel of 
protagonists, or does it just represent a Government strategy to legitimize policy reform? 
The present report, “The Politics of Communal Land Reform in South Africa,” is part of a 
broader reflection on the renovation of public policy, particularly communal land policy. As 
such, on one hand, the democratisation of public life, the participatory approach, the 
inclusiveness and the promotion of new forms of governance, and on the other hand, the 
impact the latter has on the content of the specific land policies, are critically investigated in 
CLaRA’s development process. The main purpose of this study is to determine whether the 
development of CLaRA (Act No. 11 of 2004) represents a renewal of public policy 
development which is participatory, inclusive and transparent, including – in the framework of 
South Africa’s decentralisation process – the different levels of decision making (local, 
provincial and national). It investigates and analyses to what extent CLaRA’s development 
process and contents can be considered innovative. Being aware of the importance of 
integrating grassroots views and stances in a study focusing on inclusiveness and 
participation, the study makes a distinction between public policy making at national and local 
levels. As such, it was implemented at two levels, focusing on the following research objects: 
• the unrolling of the processes at national level that permitted CLaRA’s development 
and validation; and 
• the integration of local positions within the policy development process, i.e. analyse 
the positions at local level and their participation (or non-participation) in the 
processes at national level. 
 
                                                   
52
 Discussion with Vuyi Nxasana, Chief Director of Tenure Reform. 
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1. A Complex Development Process Engaging Several (Often Not 
Communal Land) Factors 
 
The project shows that, contrary to what Kariuki (2004) wrote, the process was not a simple 
“communal versus private” debate. As detailed in this report, CLaRA’s final draft and Act 
came a long way, and was shaped and reshaped through different drafts premised on the 
contributions of the various actors engaged in the process. The analysis showed that mainly 
three broad categories of factors had an influence on CLaRA’s development process and 
subsequently on its content. These non-independent factors are: South-Africa’s political 
economy, its governance practices, and its political games and actors’ interactions. 
Firstly, the shift of orientation regarding the land tenure reform approaches was – as shown in 
the study – strongly linked to the evolution of the country’s political economy. Visible 
through the change of Government in 1999, it was informed by two very different paradigms. 
The first, implemented during the Mandela era, was characterised by a more developmental 
approach, and the second by a more growth-oriented paradigm, since Mbeki took over the 
presidency (but which had already started with replacement of the RDP by GEAR). 
Accordingly, they influenced the approaches to land tenure reform. The initial Land Rights 
Bill was premised on securing the rights of people on communal land through statutory 
definition rather than titling, leaving the precise definition of the content of such rights, the 
boundaries of groups, and the representative authority structures to local processes overseen 
by the Government (Claassens and Cousins, 2008, pg. 14). The final CLaRA is founded on the 
premise that security of land rights derives from the holding of an exclusive title to land, 
whilst trying to combine this with the recognition of some elements of customary land tenure 
(Claassens and Cousins, 2008, pg. 13). The Act seeks to transfer land from the State to 
communities with subsequent deeds for individual members of the community, which may 
become freehold titles if the community agrees. 
Secondly, the study also shows that the way policy is developed is strongly linked to the 
governance practices implemented by the country and, consequently, its leaders. Although, 
civil influence over (land) policy waned during these years (even more due to the ideological 
position of NGOs against a racially-segregated society in general and the employment of 
many of the NGO protagonists in government positions) and a certain “workshop fatigue” also 
appeared (Cousins, 2004, pg. 16), it appeared that the governance practices did not allow 
actors outside of government and the ruling party to effectively influence policy development. 
As such, the organisations involved run the risk of being used to legitimise the claim of a 
"consultative" process to justify the government’s and the ANC’s policies. According to 
Cousins (2004), “it seems clear that ‘participation’, although stressed in the rhetoric of the 
time, was in practice taken to mean ‘consultation’. Real decision making power was retained 
by the ruling party […].” While it was emphasised that all stakeholders were consulted during 
the CLaRA process, this was nevertheless practiced given the compromises with established 
lobbies and the continuing presence of strategic interests of the ruling party. Cousins – mainly 
about the overall land reform policy process in South Africa, but it is applicable to the specific 
case of CLaRA – wrote: “In practice, there was an ‘inner circle’ of trusted groupings and 
individuals, who participated most actively in debates on policy […], and an ‘outer’ circle’ of 
stakeholders whose views were solicited but whose actual contributions to policy thinking 
remained limited” (2004, pg. 17). The willingness to listen to new ideas therefore seemed to 
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be weak. This has been all the more apparent since 1999 when Thabo Mbeki took over the 
presidency and the new Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs, Thoko Didiza, was 
appointed. A major reason relies on the fact that, during Thabo Mbeki’s terms, power was 
centralised strongly and all kinds of opposition limited (the closing of the NLC is very 
relevant here). Gumede (2005, pg. 58) described this trend by stating that “the difference in 
Mandela’s and Mbeki’s leadership styles has as much to do with their individual personalities 
and a generation gap as their specific experiences of the ANC.” Indeed, Mbeki, often 
described as the stiff, authoritarian intellectual who came across as uncaring and distant, 
supported the idea that embarking on reform through consultations with diverse stakeholders 
could lead to inertia. As a result, the government (or governing party) engaged in no (or very 
few) consultations with opposing political and civic forces to formulate or implement policies. 
Gumede (2005, pg. 65) explains, “Mbeki’s government […] reforms have tended to be 
initiated from above, as with GEAR. Thus they are launched by surprise, independently of 
public opinion and without participation of organized political forces.” After the second 
elections in 1999, concerns appeared about the lack of clarity regarding the manner and extent 
to which the consultations influenced the “final product” seemingly “to be drafted by a few 
experts – in fundamental contradiction to the supposed participatory approach” (NLC, 2002, 
pg. 1). Despite their apparent initial strength, the presence and role of the civil society 
organisations appears to be limited by the current process. This also (partly) explains why 
grassroots organisations and local-level communities do not appear to have been major 
influencing actors. 
Thirdly, from the descriptions and analyses in this study, it also appears that the policies 
(detailed through the different drafts and in the final Act) were strongly influenced by the 
political games and the actors’ interactions throughout the elaboration process. First, the 
ANC’s political interactions with traditional authorities should be emphasised. Although the 
outcomes of some “quiet” meetings were generally unknown, they were often followed by 
important changes in the subsequent drafts (in favour of traditional leaders, the KZN House of 
Traditional Leaders and Chief Buthelesi) (Fortin, 2006; Uggla, 2006). This was, for example, 
the case with the CLRB October 2003 version, and was particularly evident just before the 
2004 elections, during which the CLRB was amended after it had already been introduced in 
the National Assembly. These influences sometimes came when the DLA or the DPLG had 
other measures in mind (but were “overruled”, e.g. appeasing the tribal authorities’ hunger for 
communal land control), emphasising that other elements and objectives than those linked to 
communal land reform were at stake. A second element is the seemingly little – or less 
significant – influence of civil society, academics, and other actors not linked to the 
government or traditional authorities. Indeed, the latter only appeared sparsely at the end of 
the process, as was the case for local communities and unions. Although civil society was 
present from the initial phase, particularly through several NGOs, research centres and some 
academic institutions, their lack of representation was questioned. Regarding the latter, the 
DLA accused the PLAAS and NLC of “using and manipulating” communities to validate their 
own concerns about the bill, while not really consulting with them in a way that captured 
community needs. According to Fortin, criticisms of the bill from civil society “constrained 
the political space in which [the CLRB drafters] were operating […]” and made defending the 
contents of the draft bills difficult (2008, pg. 82). As such, the drafters saw a strong offence as 
the best defence, wherein they questioned “the extent to which those critics were 
representative of ‘people on the ground’ and in turn casting doubt on their legitimacy. People 
also spoke of such critics being ‘compromised’ and ‘manipulation’ by them of people on the 
ground” (ibid.), in this case the “critics” were community groups advocating against the 
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contents of the bill and the “people on the ground” were researchers and civil society. Often 
not weighing enough within the political battles around CLaRA, the lack of legitimacy and 
representativity of the existing actions led to a shortage of instruments and power to really 
counter the traditional authorities and the factions of the ANC. If indeed, as part of these 
political games, government pressure did exist to stifle certain grassroots movements (the 
closures of the NLC and the LPM are relevant here), it leads one to question popular 
participation in policy development. 
 
2. Local Positions Towards Communal Land Reform in South Africa 
and Their Non-Consideration in the Policy Process 
It quickly appeared that CLaRA’s elaboration was not characterized by local inclusiveness. 
Even though the traditional chiefs, through their political organizations, featured as a 
prominent actor in the negotiations and the elaboration of the successive versions of CLaRA, 
there was hardly any consultation of the main local stakeholders, i.e. the community members 
themselves. The debates at the national level also appeared to rely on rather monolithic and 
idealized (either positive or negative) views of communities. They did not seem to rely on 
comprehensive and objective data about the daily individual land practices that were taking 
place within the communities, thereby defining and shaping the real, and probably very 
diverse – as shown by the project – communal land and governance systems and issues. 
With regards to governance, the project showed that the main concern of the people is not land 
tenure per say, but the development of the community, especially in terms of infrastructures. It 
is mostly through this problem of development that the community members question 
governance structures, either the traditional authority or local municipal government, or their 
articulation (since local conflicts between the State and tribal authorities can hinder the 
delivery of public services). With regards to local governance, our research revealed that 
people distinguish between systems of governance (State versus traditional) and their 
performance. The “demand from below” is framed in terms of more transparency, 
accountability and effectiveness, whatever the institutional framework. Criticisms of the 
effectiveness and/or accountability of either system of local governance (for purposes of land 
administration and service delivery) do not necessary equal a negative opinion of the political 
acceptability of either governance principle as such. In particular, it was found that the 
majority of people do not want traditional structures to disappear. Some want them to be 
reformed or changed, but the traditional system also represents culture, identity, and safety 
nets (in terms of access to residential land – even though there are signs of shortage – and in 
terms of social cohesion, particularly in the rural community). 
 
With regards to property rights, in both communities analysed in the framework of this 
project, individualisation of land tenure is almost complete, which does not mean that people 
consider communal land to be equivalent to private property. The security of this individual 
tenure is not an issue under the current system for the two communities, although some 
problems were reported (particularly in Selepe with respect to the mining activities). 
Although, private property title deeds can be valued as bringing additional benefits since they 
broaden the scope of rights (particularly in terms of abusus) and because they are a more 
formal, State-issued document, the large majority stated they were satisfied with the tribal 
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system in place. As such, in the “local theory,” communal land under the present system is 
even still referred to as a safety net in the sense of entitlement to land when, for example, one 
becomes an adult and gets married, and the role of the chief is still referred to as an allocative 
one. Ii is important, however, that what is recognized as belonging to the chief is the right of 
administration, while usufruct rights are clearly seen as individual and permanent. In practice, 
because there is less and less vacant communal land left to allocate, access to land is 
increasingly taking place through interpersonal arrangements (within the family or even 
through the land market), and the role of the chief seems to have shifted towards that of a 
broker and a validation and registration office for land transfers (charging a fee for this 
service). 
An interesting finding is that a stated preference for title deeds is not necessarily incompatible 
with an acknowledgement of the relevance of customary leadership and governance, as the 
“pragmatists”53 group (which represents 42% of the sample, on par with “traditionalists”54, 
and 3.5 times more than “modernists”55) clearly shows. 
A first point regarding these results is that there is a need to carefully disentangle the issue of 
land property rights from the issue of local governance (as people themselves do). On one 
hand, although some of these issues seem even more important in local perceptions (lack of 
accountability, lack of transparency, service delivery), they will not be affected by CLaRA = 
they are just another issue. On the other hand, some tenure security problems (such as the 
threats posed by the mine in Selepe) might not be resolved by any titling programme if there is 
no effective judiciary system to enforce the new order rights in the face of powerful economic 
interests. The latter does not even seem to be a major issue at the local level – which makes it 
relevant to question of CLaRA’s pertinence. 
A second point is that the current processes and practices in the two communities seem to be 
fairly compatible with CLaRA’s main feature (although it has been shown that tenure rights 
were not a primordial issue). People could accommodate in their discourse both the 
advantages of State-issued land documentation and the advantages of belonging to a 
community. However, the exact attributions of the traditional bodies need to be carefully 
worked through. Indeed, a majority of people are not opposed to the chief system with regards 
to land administration, as long as the chief does not abuse his roles. The fact that the large 
majority of people interviewed are still attached to the tribal system (again proving the need to 
disentangle rights) highlights people’s confidence in the system. This is particularly true, since 
service delivery has been lacking in both communities, with people accusing either the 
recently implemented municipal system and agents directly, or the inconsistencies between the 
traditional and municipal authorities. This contradicts many of the criticisms on which civil 
society based its actions. 
The results clearly indicate a need to deepen the work on strengthening local governance 
processes. The study also revealed that a major stake is the respective roles and powers of the 
traditional authorities and the municipal government in terms of infrastructure, services, local 
                                                   
53
 “Pragmatists” are defined as those who, like “modernists,” value the benefits that title deeds could bring them, 
but at the same time, unlike “modernists,” believe that the traditional system does not need to disappear. 
54
 Defined as those who do not see the point in getting a title deed and believe that the chief has a role to play with 
regards to land governance. 
55
 Defined as those who consider that title deeds bring either more broad (including abusus) or more secure rights, 
and who believe that the traditional structures do not bring anything additional compared to government 
institutions. 
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development projects, etc. This governance issue is linked to the property rights regime since 
the chiefs derive their power from the control they exercise over community territory. This 
issue goes beyond the scope of this particular study, but our data indicate that there might be 
some spillovers in the way that leaders and community members perceive and make use of 
CLaRA.  
 
3. The Lack of Institutionalised Compromises Founding CLaRA and the 
Need for More Effective Local Organisation and Inclusiveness 
As shown, while national debates emphasize inclusion and democratic processes in decision-
making for local governance, local discourses mostly emphasize transparency and 
effectiveness. Obviously, the two focuses are not contradictory. However, the local results 
might somehow illustrate that the conditions for effective participation by all stakeholders, 
including women, might not be currently met, and that the demand from below is less 
grounded on principles and more on outcomes. 
Indeed, although some aspects of the formulation process for this piece of legislation can be 
questioned or criticised (the last minute changes, non-inclusion of local-level stakeholders), 
our research shows that one cannot say there was no consultation or participation. The 
multiple changes made during the complex process of discussion, debates, consultation and 
lobbying show the engagement of a broad spectrum of actors. The fact that some of these 
actors had to use the constitutional court as a last recourse shows, however, that the resulting 
policy is not based on a compromise, discrediting the Act (at least temporarily). Although the 
majority of the accusations relate to the Act’s content, they are strongly related to the process 
or some part of the process. The formulation process for this piece of legislation thus begs the 
following questions: What is participatory democracy? What is inclusiveness? 
As such, there were numerous submissions and criticisms (even from COSATU, a member of 
the governing tripartite alliance) requesting that the legislation be stopped and fresh 
consultations to be conducted with a broader and more equal panel of stakeholders (including 
rural communities). In spite of all this, the legislation was enacted anyway. It can be judged 
that this is the way parliamentarian democracy works as the parliamentarians (70% ANC) can 
claim to have voted in favour of this legislation in the best interests of the majority. If 
participation did take place, it shows however that certain stakeholders either did not appear or 
did not manage to push their positions forward. Indeed, communities in particular only 
appeared sparsely at the end of the process. Often not weighing enough within the political 
battles around CLaRA, the lack of legitimacy and representativity (as they were often 
seemingly represented and criticized as being represented by NGOs) of the existing actions led 
to a shortage of power to really counter traditional authorities and  ANC factions during the 
development process, and CLaRA’s enactment during its passage through the National 
Assembly. If, as part of these political games, there was indeed Government pressure to close 
down certain grassroots movements (the closures of the NLC and LPM are relevant here), this 
raises questions regarding popular participation in policy development. 
The inclusiveness of public policies can not be based on the simple participation of (formal 
and informal) actors, and is surely not a concept to be defined upfront (in a normative way). 
As written before, inclusiveness implies reaching compromises. Hence, within the context of 
broader participation regarding policy development, it seems pertinent to analyse not only 
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participation but also the effective influence certain actors had on the process and content of 
the Act. This brings us back to the theoretical basis of this study: sustainable policies are 
based on institutionalised compromises, implying agreements between actors in conflict. To 
enable such agreements, a governance structure is needed. This structure will have to be 
developed, and requires the necessary balance of power.56 
This brings us back to the three factors described above, which are not independent but are – 
on the contrary – strongly interconnected. Indeed, the contents of enacted policies depend 
heavily on the policy processes in place. The political games and actors’ interactions have, as 
such, shaped the policy itself. This is strongly dependent on the governance structure in place, 
which is strongly linked to the political economy of the country. These, however, can be 
influenced similarly by political games and the actors’ interactions, presenting not a vicious 
circle (as there is no sequence) but a continuous interaction between these three aspects.  
This leads to the lack of representation of local communities and movements. Not only were 
they not in a position to propose – even less to defend – their positions and influence policy 
content during CLaRA’s elaboration process, they were also not powerful or representative 
enough to adapt the policy development process – and governance structure – itself. 
Responding to an often heard statement during this research, “Government does not want to 
listen to us,” there seems to be a misconception of policies and policy processes overall, 
particularly in a renewed governance structure characterised by multi-level policy 
stratification and pluri-actor engagement (Anseeuw & Wambo, 2008). The latter implies that 
in such a governance framework, government – although elected – represent an actor similar 
to the other stakeholders and is not obliged to listen (to echo the terms of the above statement). 
In the case of CLaRA, this shows the importance of local representation and organisation – 
aspects that are presently strongly lacking. If, indeed, as often suggested, communication and 
information dissemination are inherent aspects of such a framework, they should not be the 
means for but rather the result of better participation. 
 
 
* * * * * * 
 
The study made valuable contributions to the existing body of knowledge on public (land) 
policy formulation in South Africa and indeed policy formulation in the broader sense. First, 
knowledge was developed on the development processes for land policies as negotiated public 
policies. The study reflected on the importance of institutional compromise, using the light 
shed on these issues by the CLaRA process, which required the involvement of several levels 
of decision-making and different types of actors. Second, the study highlighted factors that 
influence the compromises at the foundation of new land policy in South Africa. It gives 
details on the overall political objectives that gave CLaRA momentum, and the concrete 
conditions which supported or hindered the established compromises, taking into account the 
interests of the various actors, particularly at local level. Knowledge was generated by paying 
particular attention to the way in which civil society and traditional leaders were involved in 
                                                   
56
 It would be simplistic to believe that the State or Government, considered to be an actor among others, would 
enable these processes voluntarily. 
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the process, and the impact of their involvement on the processes’ outcomes. The major 
aspects to be invested further are twofold. The first aspect deals with the modalities of making 
policy development processes formally more inclusive, and subsequently making the results 
more durable. This could be established by all-inclusive policy platforms, for example. The 
second aspect – which is not at all independent of the first aspect – concerns the organisation 
of local movements and local-level organisation so that more equitable power-sharing 
structures can be established, influencing not only content but also processes. 
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